Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

422. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, May 7, 1969, 1546Z.

3068. For President and Secretary from Komer.

1. On leaving Turkey after an active five-month tour, I wish to report on what I regard as the quite unsatisfactory state of our relations with a key ally, and offer my final recommendations for repairing them.

2. Few would deny that Turkey is very important to us. Moreover, a review of the record shows that my predecessors and I have repeatedly warned of the gradual erosion of our position here and the growth of anti-American sentiment. See for example my 1116 of 19 Feb 1969.² But somehow, amid the press of other business, the US has been slow to react with policies and programs commensurate to the need.

3. The problem here is not just one of US-Turk relations, but of Turkeyʼs whole westward orientation, which in turn plays a key role in the stability of its democratic regime. For unless Turkey gradually joins Europe, it will probably not be able to solve its deep-rooted economic and social problems within a democratic frame. Since the 1960 revolution successive Turkish Governments and Turkeyʼs politically articulate minority have been reappraising Turkeyʼs role in the world and its alliances, in which the US plays by far the largest part. The main conclusions they appear to have reached are that (a) Turkeyʼs interests require substantial improvement of relations with the Soviet and Arab blocs; (b) sharp cuts in US military and economic aid represent loss of US interest in Turkey; (c) the present size and scope of US activity may harm rather than contribute to Turkeyʼs security, and (d) the US cannot be relied on to support an acceptable resolution of the Cyprus issue or even to come to Turkeyʼs aid in event of war.

4. Despite all these reservations, most Turks still believe that Turkey has no realistic alternative but to rely on the NATO umbrella to protect it against unpredictable Soviet pressures. But the fact that most Turks, and above all the GOT itself, are still pro-US and pro-NATO should not blind us to the forces at work beneath the surface. Though still quantitatively small, they are qualitatively more significant among the press, students, and the educated elite.

5. Turkeyʼs growing reservations about the West have combined with the democratic freedoms established under the 1961 constitution to stimulate a revival of Turk xenophobia. This has provided the far left with a highly favorable environment for attacking not only the American presence but also all Turkish institutions, including the present regime, whose policies support a continuing close alignment with the West. Even the EEC is now under attack. Growing reservations among the Turkish public, and even many soldiers and officials, about the efficacy and value of this alignment have placed both us and the Turks who support us increasingly on the defensive. Particularly worrisome is the likely leftward swing in the chief opposition party after Inonu.

6. To counter this trend and preserve our fundamental interests, I see two major lines of action as required. The first is actively to counter the extremist anti-Western campaign through a comprehensive program to expose its distorted propaganda, set the record straight on our own activities, propagandize the continuing advantages to Turkey of its cultural, economic, and mutual security associations with the US and the West, and finally to remind the Turkish public constantly but subtly of the risks of drifting into neutralism. In short, we must deny to the Turkish left its enormous advantage in holding the initiative in the propaganda battle. Many will say that this is the GOTʼs job, not ours. But unless we show the way their own efforts will remain halfhearted and, if past experience is any guide, largely ineffective.

7. I believe that we have made significant progress in this area during the five months I have been in Turkey. A purposeful Mission effort to refute lies, correct distortions, and describe the truth about the American presence has made the far leftʼs propagandists aware that they can no longer peddle their wares with impunity. The Turkish press now presents at least a somewhat more balanced picture than it did five months ago, and the irresponsibility of the extreme left publicists has been made more apparent. For example, the public now accepts about 20,000 as the number of Americans in Turkey, whereas a few months ago auditors were citing figures of 36,000 and 48,000. Contributing to an improved US image have been our readiness to reconsider 6th Fleet visits before the October elections and to reduce the highly visible US military presence especially in urban areas. But a great deal more can and must be done. I urgently recommend that our information and political action efforts be sharply stepped up.

8. Second, we must readjust our policies and programs to the changes in Turkish attitudes. By concentrating on preserving those elements of our relationship which are essential to our [garble] and modifying all other elements to meet the insistent Turkish demand for a sense of greater independence, we can save money to boot. Highest priority should go to restoring Turkeyʼs faith in the US as its chief ally. To achieve this in the current environment of growing scepticism about American purposes requires, in my judgment, three major policy adjustments:

A. Prompt conclusion of a revised bilateral agreement³ sufficiently favorable to Turkey to credibly symbolize a new relationship. This matter has become urgent, and if we fail to complete the job before the Turk Parliament adjourns in three weeks, we will have lost a major political opportunity.

B. Restoration of military aid to something more like the Mc-Naughton level of $134 million.⁴ However understandable, past sharp cuts have seriously weakened Turkeyʼs military posture and had a sharply adverse psychological impact.

C. Reduction of our own military presence to the minimum required by our strategic interests. Over the past few years we have closed down three [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities and plan to eliminate two more. We expect to vacate one of our two air bases. Reductions have been made, and others planned, in our military support facilities, but these are occurring too slowly and without adequate prior consultation with the GOT. I am convinced that most of our military functions here could—with American guidance, training and technical support—be gradually assumed by Turks. At a minimum let us aim toward eliminating US-exclusive installations and paring down the ubiquitous support structure which is primarily responsible for our “visibility” problem. Next to restoring military aid levels, nothing would help more than to urge that Turkey gradually assume the military [less than 1 line not declassified] missions which we now carry out ourselves. Even for those limited operations which for security or technical reasons must remain under US control, we should accept (as we have in other countries) “cover” arrangements provided by the host government. Not only are the advantages to our balance of payments and image in Turkey obvious, but we will end up sooner or later having to do this anyway. Why not gain from doing it faster now?

9. Finally, the Cyprus issue remains a major contribution to the deterioration of US-Turkish relations and could again seriously damage our position here. More than likely, at some time in the next year or two the US will again have to decide whether or not to throw its power and prestige into the scales of a solution. In approaching such a decision we must recognize that failure to intervene, or intervention that appears to Turkey to be in favor of the Greeks, could seriously risk losing Turkey as an ally. It may be parochial to say so, but I fear that we have based our Cyprus policy more on the concept of Greek majority rule than on our strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

10. I have addressed this final dispatch to you, Mr. President and Mr. Secretary, because I have learned from over ten years of high policy experience that one of the great flaws of our system is the failure to flush up emerging major problems to the top level until they have reached the flash point. Turkey is as yet far from that point, but the trend is sufficiently adverse that more aggressive skillful preventive medicine is needed now. If we play our cards right, we can retain an effective ally. If not, I predict a continued erosion of Turkeyʼs westward orientation. I would not be surprised to see a neutralist Turkey within five-seven years.

Komer

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70. Secret; Limdis.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Apparent reference to the U.S.-Turkish Bilateral Cooperation Agreement, signed March 5, 1959. (10 UST 320)
4. See footnote 2, Document 421.