Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

421. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1969, 5:35–6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Call of Turkish Minister of Defense Ahmet Topaloglu on Secretary Laird

PARTICIPANTS

• Turkey Side
  • Minister of Defense—Ahmet Topaloglu
  • Assistant Secretary General for International Security Affairs—Sukru Elekdag (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
  • Assistant Director General, NATO Department—Muammer Akcer (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
• United States Side
  • Secretary of Defense—Melvin Laird
  • Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter
  • Director, Near East and South Asia Region (ISA)—Brigadier General
  • John W. Baer
  • Country Director for Turkey, NESA Region (ISA)—Captain Edward C. Krebs

The conversation opened with an exchange of pleasantries during which the MOD and the Secretary noted their common background as politicians. Secretary Laird remarked that as early as 1954 he had visited Adana and had had the opportunity to travel through the political district from which Minister Topaloglu was elected that year. The Minister said that he hoped the Secretary would have another opportunity to visit Turkey.

Minister Topaloglu then changed the subject to military assistance. Noting that the US, over a period of 20 years, had given Turkey military aid in the amount of 2.5 billion dollars, he wished on behalf of his countrymen to thank the US for this assistance. He also wished, however, to explain the current situation in view of Turkeyʼs importance on the southeastern flank of NATO. Secretary Laird replied that he had great respect for the Turkish armed forces. He had watched them train and knew they were good. He had also inspected some of their port and military facilities and knew how important they were.

The Minister said he appreciated the Secretaryʼs awareness, and believed that what was needed at present was an examination of the extent the Turkish armed forces had been improved by US aid and what more needed to be done to improve them in the face of the current threat—a threat that was not Turkeyʼs alone but of all of the allies. He went on to say that the aid which had been given through 1966 had averaged $144 million a year and had been given to the armed forces in general. Since 1966, however, US military assistance had been based on a five year program and fixed force goals for the Turkish armed forces. To achieve this program, a decision taken in the US Senate set the aid level at $134 million a year. This was determined to be the minimum level to achieve the NATO Bravo force goals established at that time.

The Minister then said that since these decisions had been taken some important changes have taken place: 1) the situation in the Middle East has become worse; 2) the USSR naval forces in the Mediterranean have become a threat; and 3) the hope of NATO that we could reach a détente with Russia has been dashed with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, when NATO met last fall, it was decided that member countries should do more to meet the new situation. In the NATO meeting of last January it was agreed that NATO members who could not meet their goals and who were receiving assistance should get more aid. In spite of this, US military assistance to Turkey dropped to about $95–97 million, while costs of equipment rose very sharply.

Minister Topaloglu next pointed out that, while Turkey understood the US situation with respect to Vietnam, the US balance of payments problem, and US efforts to protect her allies over the past 20 years, the US had taken on herself the leadership to protect the West and western ideals. She must, therefore, understand the position and difficulties of her allies. He went on to say that when he attended his first NATO meeting in 1966 he was surprised to hear that most Ministers of Defense spoke more like Finance Ministers than Defense Ministers. Their talk was always of curtailing expenditures. Now, while Turkey does not expect the US to impose more taxes to defend NATO and Europe, there remains the common problem of protecting the peace. Turkey intends to cooperate with the US towards this aim.

The Minister next focused on the situation on the southeastern flank of NATO. He pointed out that Turkey has fought more wars with Russia and knows Russia better than other NATO countries. He likened Turkey to a “rock” which prevents Russian encroachment into the Middle East and Africa. Whether Turkey receives aid or not, it intends to preserve itself as a “rock,” as it has done for centuries. Since the US has taken steps to prevent the expansion of communism into SE Asia, it is aware that the next area for communist expansion is the Middle East and Africa. Turkey is sure the US is going to prevent this, but if Turkey does not receive external assistance now it will be too late later on for Turkey to assist in this task. The MOD then said he had some constructive suggestions to make in this respect:

1. During the visit of the late Mr. McNaughton, the US and Turkey had agreed that a proper level of military assistance should be about $134 million a year.² We do not want more but only that which we had agreed upon. This level should be resumed.

2. Bring down the price of military equipment. This would not involve the Senate but lies within the power of the Administration.

Minister Topaloglu next presented a memorandum which he explained set forth the condition of the Turkish armed forces following curtailment of military assistance and some suggestions for improving this condition. He highlighted these suggestions by stressing the need for Fletcher class destroyers and Guppy II–A submarines, accelerated supply of F–100 A/C to replace obsolescent F–84s, and faster delivery of heavy vehicles and equipment for the ground forces. Referring to the policy of flexible response, the MOD spoke of the Bulgarian and Russian capability to attack without warning as underscoring the need to improve and make ready the Turkish armed forces.

In concluding his remarks, the Defense Minister said that while he is convinced the US will never leave Turkey alone and defenseless, he felt it was his duty to inform Secretary Laird of the weaknesses of the Turkish armed forces. He then noted that the US had the means to implement the program agreed upon over two years ago, and if implemented it would eliminate many hardships.

Secretary Laird thanked the Minister for his frank remarks on the Turkish armed forces. He said that the new administration was reviewing the worldwide military situation and that this review encompassed not only our own forces but our military assistance programs as well. He added that our commitment in Vietnam certainly gave us problems. Nevertheless, President Nixon, by his trip to Europe, has shown that he is interested in improving and strengthening the NATO alliance. Secretary Laird went on to say that we realize how important it is to maintain our force levels in Europe, and President Nixon has made it plain that these will depend on security requirements rather than financial hardships.

Making reference to the memorandum the MOD had submitted, Secretary Laird said he was interested in the remarks the Minister had made concerning the Navy and Air Force and that we would look into them. He continued by saying we have not finalized our military assistance programs and we recognize your needs as important not only to Turkey but to NATO as a whole. Secretary Laird completed his remarks by saying that Congressmen often asked whether US aid did not permit the recipient to do less. In the case of Turkey he knew this was not the case.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, Turkey 333–, 1969. Confidential. Drafted on April 11 by Krebs and approved by Nutter. The meeting took place in Secretary Lairdʼs office.
2. Force goals for the Turkish armed forces were agreed upon between the United States and Turkey. According to an undated memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations: “The goals were originally proposed by Assistant Secretary McNaughton to the Greek and Turkish MODs in February 1966. This policy was not announced to NATO but was treated as a bilateral matter between the US… and Turkey.” (Ibid., FRC 330 75–0125, Turkey 000.1–333, 1971) Documentation on the McNaughton goals is ibid., FRC 330 75–0009, Turkey—McNaughton)