Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

374. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, July 17, 1971.

CYPRUS SITUATION

The negative elements always inherent in the Cyprus situation are more pronounced now than at any time since 1968. There are three new factors to be considered.

• First, the evidence is very strong that the Government of Turkey has decided that the status quo on Cyprus operates to its disadvantage and that of the Turk Cypriot community on the island. As time passes, more Turk Cypriots emigrate and more are re-integrated into Cypriot economic life, thus weakening the Turk Cypriot enclaves. In addition, the enclaves are not economically viable; it costs the GOT $25 million in hard currency annually to keep them afloat. If it is correct that the Turks/Turk Cypriots are not prepared to accept the Cypriot status quo much longer, we can anticipate increasing pressure for a “solution” through the successful (from the Turk point of view) conclusion of the local talks, or, failing this, through the imposition by Greece and Turkey of a previously agreed arrangement, or through unilateral action by Turkey forcibly to partition the island.²
• Second, since the overthrow of the Demirel Government, the military in Turkey has assumed a more direct and influential role in the policy-making process. The Turkish General Staff is more oriented toward direct action (read military intervention) on the Cyprus problem than are civilian political leaders. I think we can safely assume that voices calling for a forcible solution of the Cyprus problem are heard more frequently and nearer the center of power in Turkey than in the past.

Finally, Turkeyʼs new Prime Minister, Erim, is himself a factor. He has a long and intimate association with the Cyprus problem and was the chief Turkish negotiator in 1963–64, a period when solving the Cyprus problem by geographically partitioning the island and giving a piece to Turkey and one to Greece was much in vogue (this was the essence of the Acheson Plan of 1964). Archbishop Makarios foiled partition attempts in the mid-60ʼs and, in my judgment, he would make every effort to do so again—including bringing Greece and Turkey into conflict to avoid what to him is anathema. The Archbishopʼs implacable opposition to partition and the GOTʼs apparent belief that partition may be the only acceptable solution are cause for concern.

Counterbalancing these negative elements is the fact that the local talks during the past three years have made substantial progress, although the currently crucial problem of local autonomy remains unsolved. The two local negotiators, Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Denktash for the Turk Cypriots, are in basic accord on the organization of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. They have also reconciled differences on organization of the police force (a major step) and the definition and constitutional enshrinement of various communal rights for Turk Cypriots. There is still substantial disagreement on the very important issue of how local autonomy—which all sides agree the Turk Cypriots should have—is to be structured. However, the fact that agreement on local autonomy has not yet been reached should not obscure the great progress already made in the local talks on other important and difficult areas.

I do not believe that the situation is acute at the present time, although it could become so in very short order. The local negotiators, Clerides and Denktash, have another scheduled meeting on July 26, and Turkish Foreign Minister Olcay will be meeting with his Greek counterpart, Palamas, in New York in late September during the General Assembly session. After we have the results of the July 26 meeting on the island, it might be well for me to call in the Greek, Turk, and Cypriot Ambassadors to review with them the progress that has already been made in the local talks (a fact often forgotten in the flurry of propaganda and negotiating postures) and to urge them to continue to intensify and support the local talks, particularly since they have come so far. Proceeding in the above fashion would make clear our continuing support for the local talks and by implication our rejection of adventurous “dynamic” solutions. By the same token it would not close out any future options. I will take another look at this after the July 26 meeting on Cyprus and before Olcay and Palamas meet in New York and recommend how I think we should proceed.

1. Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum was prepared by Boyatt. A note on the first page reads: “Hold for Sisco. Do not send.” Sisco wrote: “I agree with recds—JJS. An attached note text reads: “JJS—For your use in orally briefing the Secretary—Roger Long.” The memorandum was concurred in by Pugh, Churchill, and Davies. A summary of the information in this memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger in a July 30 memorandum from Eliot. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
2. The Embassy in Cyprus reported on growing talk about Turkish partition plans in telegram 1214 from Nicosia, July 14. In telegram 4869 from Ankara, July 15, the Embassy in Turkey commented that it had no indications of Turkish preparations for a move against Cyprus. (Both ibid.)