373. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)1
SUBJECT
- Cyprus: Makarios Maneuvers
Background
The Greeks, in what appears to have been a ham-handed try at pressuring Makarios, have sought the GOCʼs acceptance of an Athens-formulated constitutional compromise. The GOC Council of Ministers, after reviewing the proposal which was presented by Athens as a demand on the GOC, rejected it.2
[Page 906]Analysis
In rejecting the GOGʼs you-must-accept-this proposition, Makarios has again demonstrated that he will not bend to outside pressure. In advance of what was almost a certain GOC refusal, Makarios leaked parts of the Greek proposal, portraying the latter as betrayal of the Hellenic ideal and an attempt to sacrifice Cyprus to Turkish demands. According to intelligence reports,3 Makarios, in discussing the Greek proposal with his colleagues, stressed that if the junta is determined to compromise the Cyprus cause, it must first find a way to remove him.
This may be precisely what the junta has in mind. According to Dountas, the Greek DCM in Nicosia, the Greek proposal never stood the slightest chance of acceptance by Makarios and was handled under instructions from Athens in such a manner that rejection was a foregone conclusion. A possible conclusion is that Athens deliberately handled the proposal in a manner to provoke a GOC rejection, thus relieving Athens of a long-standing commitment to pursue a joint policy on the Cyprus problem. An intelligence report indicates that the Greek proposal was presented to Makarios with the admonition that if he rejected it, Athens would be freed from its earlier commitment.4
On the other hand, it may well be that, facing pressure from Ankara for Greek intervention with Makarios, the junta used this on-the-surface clumsy approach to demonstrate its lack of influence in Nicosia and to provide Makarios with an opportunity through the Cypriot press to surface a threat of outside intervention.
Regardless of Athensʼ intention, Makarios is proceeding, as Embassy Nicosia points out,5 to cover his rear while striking out on all fronts. With the leftist and rightist press in full cry identifying the threat as emanating from Turkey, NATO, and the United States, Makarios has informed UN representatives on the island that the GOC will not submit to outside pressure, that in event of the latter he will raise the matter with the Secretary General and the Security Council. The Communist press, as might be expected, has named the United States as behind current threats to Cyprus and Makarios, and reminded the Cypriots that the Soviet Union, as in the past, stands between Cyprus and NATO sponsored machinations.
Separately, but obviously not unrelated to the Greek proposal and alleged pressure, Clerides is said to be preparing a constructive re [Page 907] sponse to Denktashʼs letter of April 27, with the understood intention of keeping the door open for continuation of the intercommunal talks.
The Clerides response could intentionally bring about some flexibility in the intercommunal negotiations as a means of assisting Makarios to frustrate pressure from Athens and Ankara. In a conversation with Ambassador Popper immediately before the latterʼs current trip, Clerides said he intended to propose to the Council of Ministers a new approach.6 He added that he personally favors the handling of Turk Cypriot communal affairs by Turk Cypriot members of the Cypriot House of Representatives sitting separately; with their legislation to be promulgated by the Vice President and administered by a Turk Cypriot Minister of Communal Affairs. He would foresee a Ministry of Local Affairs headed by a Turk Cypriot to be nominated by the Turkish community. This Ministry would have authority over all District Officers, one of whom would be Turkish, and over all local government affairs. There would be a unified police force, of which 20 percent would be Turk Cypriot, except in exclusively Turk Cypriot areas where the police force would be entirely Turkish Cypriot.
Although Ambassador Popper doubts that Makarios or the Council of Ministers could be persuaded to give Turk Cypriots such a large voice in the Cyprus Government, Cleridesʼ thinking, if sincere, does indicate more flexibility than we have previously seen or heard.
U.S. Role at This Time
Given Makariosʼ rejection of the Athens constitutional compromise proposal, the ball is in his court. If Cleridesʼ response to Denktashʼs April 27 letter results in some flexibility in the negotiations, Makarios will anticipate some degree of relaxation of the pressure which he is currently under. If the Clerides proposals have merit, we should be prepared to wade in with Ankara for an equivalent step.
In the meantime, we should actively pursue our policy of stressing with Athens and Ankara that we see their own cooperation and dialogue as a useful input for the intercommunal negotiators. At the same time, we should be prepared should we be approached by either Athens or Ankara in the interests of other than a negotiated solution to point out our fears that an attempt to resolve the problem through means other than negotiations would be dangerous indeed and could seriously threaten our mutual interests.
- Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1 Cyp. Secret. Sent through Davies.↩
- The proposals were made in the form of a June 18 letter from Papadopoulos to Makarios that was published in the July 12 issue of Der Spiegel. On June 24 Makarios replied with a letter rejecting the proposals. Extracts were also published in Der Spiegel, September 6.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Intelligence Information Cable TDCS 315/03466–71, June 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)↩
- Reported in telegram 1044 from Nicosia, June 21. (Ibid.)↩
- Reported in telegram 1006 from Nicosia, June 16. (Ibid.)↩