368. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers1

Background Information on the Cyprus Issue

Since early 1968, the Turk and Greek communities have been engaged in a long and difficult series of discussions designed to reach a new constitutional arrangement for the island. These talks were initiated [Page 896] after the serious crisis which erupted late in 1967. Our primary interest in Cyprus is to achieve a Cypriot solution which will remove Cyprus as a bone of contention between our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

The basic constitutional question which stubbornly resists resolution is the conflict between Turk-Cypriot demands for bi-communal autonomy and Greek-Cypriot demands for a unitary government within which the Turkish minority would be guaranteed fairly extensive civil rights. Neither party, nor their respective “parent countries,” have budged from these basic stances. As a result, there have been no constitutional breakthroughs in the intercommunal talks, during the three years they have been underway. The negotiators from time to time have been forced to concentrate on less basic issues (e.g. partial refugee resettlement, freedom of movement between the two communal areas, and dismantling of quasi-military barricades).

There are now danger signs that mounting frustration on both sides may bring about complete impasse in the talks, and thus threaten renewed intercommunal strife. There are also intelligence indications, reported to you separately,2 that the new Turkish Government under Prime Minister Erim has come to the conclusion that partition and double enosis (annexation of the two parts to Turkey and Greece) represent the best solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turks are seeking a direct dialogue with Greece to discuss the future of Cyprus and will be meeting with the Greeks in this connection at the NATO Ministerial.

We believe, and are emphasizing with the Greeks and Turks, that the Cypriot intercommunal negotiations continue to represent the best procedure for resolving the Cyprus problem. We believe a Greco/Turkish dialogue could serve a useful supportive role if restricted to giving new impetus and breathing new life into the Cypriot negotiations.

In the meantime we are consulting with our concerned Ambassadors in the interest of sharpening our contingency studies, and in Brussels have shared our apprehension with the Secretary General at NATO. Brosio also believes that the only practical approach to the problem is to plug away at the intercommunal talks, and will so stress at Lisbon in conversations with Olcay and Palamas.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Long on May 26 and concurred in by Davis, Cash, Churchill, Floyd (EUR/RPM) and Van Hollen (NEA). A notation on the memorandum indicates that Sisco signed it. Eliot sent a copy to the White House on May 27. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, Presidentʼs Trip Files, DobryninKissinger, 1971, Vol. V)
  2. See footnote 2, Document 367.