Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

367. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers ¹

Washington, May 20, 1971.

Cyprus

We have received reliable information that the Turkish Government has abandoned its three-year policy of relying on the intercommunal talks in Cyprus to bring about a solution of the problem there and are instead looking toward a negotiated solution based on partition of the island between Greece and Turkey (double enosis). You will be briefed separately on the intelligence information which leads us to this conclusion.² As you know Ankara and Athens are now moving toward a Greco/Turkish dialogue aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem. We have stressed to both Governments that their discussions should be supportive to the on-going Cypriot intercommunal talks.

Double enosis has long been Turkeyʼs preferred solution to the Cyprus problem, for it would not only insure the status of the Turkish-Cypriot minority on the island, but would also permit the basing of Turkish troops in Cyprus and thus resolve their security concerns. The Greek Government has from time to time favored this solution as well, but in general has failed to push the double enosis solution. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, are very strongly opposed to partition and double enosis. They have successfully resisted prior attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem on these grounds.

We believe that President Makarios, with the full support of the Greek Cypriots, will react vigorously if he suspects that the Ankara/Athens dialogue is designed not to play a supportive role to the intercommunal talks, but rather to formulate a double enosis solution which would then be imposed upon the Cypriots. The Turkish Government has been unable to accept the fact that the Greek Cypriots are the controlling factor in this situation in that the Greek Government cannot force the Greek Cypriots to accept a solution which is so basically opposed to their policy aims. In the event that such an imposition is attempted, the Greek Cypriots could foment a crisis on the island, knowing that the great powers would be forced to intervene unilaterally and through the UN and would probably return the situation to the status quo ante.

In the next few days, we will be taking action here and in the capitals to strongly re-state our basic policy line that the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem is one agreed on by the Cypriots themselves, that intercommunal talks seriously engaged in by both parties represent the most feasible means to achieve such a solution, that the Greco/Turkish dialogue can be helpful only if it plays a supportive role to the intercommunal talks, and that imposed solutions are not feasible. We will be asking you to take this line with the Greeks and Turks at the NATO Ministerial Meeting next month.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Long and Davis and concurred in by Churchill, Cash, and Davies. Sisco did not initial the memorandum and a note on another copy indicates it was not sent to the Secretary. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1–1 Contingency Planning)
2. Not further identified.