Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

355. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 28, 1970, 0915Z.

481. Subject: Cyprus: Analysis of Current Situation.

1. Summary. March 8 attempt on Archbishop and March 15 murder of one of islandʼs key power figures have brought realignment of several elements in situation on Cyprus, affecting US interests. This tel analyzes changes that have taken place and seeks assess where we stand in regard future. Our conclusion is that normal conditions are being restored but that our position and prospects for intercommunal settlement may have been somewhat impaired.

2. Assassination Attempt/Georkadjis Murder: From his conversation with me March 26 (Nicosia 475)² and many other indicators it quite clear Makarios has chosen line he will use for diplomatic and quasi-public (press) consumption: Georkadjis organized unsuccessful attempt on Presidentʼs life and was in turn eliminated by one or more of his co-plotters to prevent exposure. Greece was not involved although some involvement by disloyal individual mainland officers not to be entirely ruled out. However, role of “foreign forces” unclear (leaving residue of ambiguity as to whether or not this could conceivably include Greece).

3. In fact, of course, situation with regard to assassination attempt and Georkadjis murder is anything but clear. Georkadjis does indeed appear responsible for attempt on Presidentʼs life, but where the lines go from him, if they go anywhere, remains to be proved.

4. GOG line, exemplified by its Embassy here, is that the plot stops with Georkadjis; no Greek officer did anything wrong; there certainly is no conspiracy tracing back to mainland. In reality we know that GOG suspects some of its officers misbehaved and is quietly investigating. If it finds traces of their associations with Georkadjis or improper enosist activity—or more—it will certainly remove culprits unostentatiously. Indeed we know (DATT C–072)³ that UN has already spotted a couple of mainland officer billets which seem to have been vacated recently without explanation.

5. Makarios doing his own quiet investigating, with different motives. He apparently has quite a lot of raw material to sift through including evidence provided by his involuntary palace houseguest, Kyriacos Patatakos, right hand man of Georkadjis during his last days, and various Georkadjis memorabilia including 50 tape recordings. One of Presidentʼs main objectives is certainly to root out all the domestic participants in plot against him. Another is to uncover every possible trace that may exist of mainland or other foreign involvement. He must try to satisfy himself either that there was none or at least that it was involvement of individuals unconnected with Athens. If any questions remain unanswered, his suspicious nature will cause him calculate that GOG or elements thereof may have been behind Georkadjis and that there may be repetition of March 8. But even if he should uncover something, we doubt he would expose it or take any action that would bring open clash with Greece. A falling-out could fatally impair military position of his government. More likely, he would hold information in hope of someday using it against opponents.

6. Makariosʼ Internal Position: All considered, Makarios standing with his people about back where it was before March 8, or has even perhaps slipped somewhat. Assassination attempt produced outpouring of sentiment for him. However, this perhaps more than offset by simple public distaste for fact that at Archbishopʼs orders Georkadjis was pulled off plane that would have taken him to self-exile and safety and 36 hours later he was dead. Georkadjis was after all an authentic EOKA hero in the struggle for Cypriot independence, and for eight years thereafter Makariosʼ strong man in cabinet. Yet there was not a word of sympathy or commemoration from the Presidential palace when he was killed. UNCIVPOL has heard echoes of disapproval around island. For the moment, this probably makes little difference to Makarios, who has seen his most dangerous enemy disposed of, and Glafcos Clerides, his only conceivable rival for presidency, compelled to disown his own past association with Georkadjis and virtually to suspend the activities of his own party.

7. Intercommunal Talks: Trauma of recent events has caused many to re-examine fundamentals and conclude as do Pipinelis and Clerides, among others, that a major corrosive factor leading up to recent events was lack of progress in talks and frustrations produced thereby. Ergo, these argue, as I did March 26 with Makarios, a decisive new push is called for in weeks ahead. His answer indicated that some new sense of momentum may be imparted and perhaps some small progress will result. But we cannot honestly believe it will be very much. Events of March have fortified conviction of Turks (Nicosia 393)⁴ that it would be folly again place themselves under a Greek administration, and there is not much chance that under present circumstances Makarios would consider granting them degree of autonomy they seek. On GOC side, we have noted weakening of Clerides, who has led voices of moderation seeking to offer Turks reasonable compromise. With the Archbishop, outside suggestions for greater flexibility have shed like water from duckʼs back in past and we see no particular reason why this monthʼs happening will have changed his views substantially. Only dim possibility is if he concludes GOG was in some way behind attempt on his life and judges he had better get moving lest in frustration the junta tries again. And even in this far out case his penchant would be for maneuvre rather than movement. Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that interested third parties must continue to explore every possible approach to an intercommunal accord.

8. Off island, Pipinelis speaks with conviction of this being time for progress but we doubt his sentiments echoed in Ankara, which we assume likely be more cautious in handling Cyprus problem, not less.

9. Soviets and Communists: Russians and their friends have been both lucky and skillful. By adroit behind-scenes work, full extent of which only beginning to come to light (e.g. Moscow 1344)⁵ and timely propaganda they have asserted role as champions of independent Cyprus (and to certain extent of Turkey) against suspected US–UK–GOG machinations.

10. From here, the scenario has probably not yet fully played itself out. Rational Cypriot oligarchy has firmly concluded that it patently nonsense to think US had anything to do with recent events. Makarios would have US believe he thinks so too. At same time, we expect he will opportunistically continue to keep open his options for public insinuation of unspecified foreign complicity, including US and UK. Communists are cleverly keeping alive public speculation about a past USG association with Georkadjis. This and their general propaganda line condition at least some of Cyprus public to credit charges that US and in broader sense NATO had some role.

11. Possibility of More Violence: Instinct tells most Cypriots with whom we in contact that a period of calm lies ahead. They approve Governmentʼs apparently vigorous actions to disarm private armies. They aware that surviving captains of Georkadjisʼ organization have acknowledged their dead leaderʼs part in attempt on Archbishop and have preached against revenge. At same time, no one has confidence that cycle of violence is at an end or that there will not be another attempt against President at some later stage.

12. Conclusion: In short, except in negative sense, there is little cause for satisfaction to US in what has happened or changes that have taken place over past weeks. Archbishop was not killed, and Greece and Turkey did not fall out. Talks will go on. But Clerides has been weakened; Turks and Turkey are more suspicious than ever; Soviets have made gains; USG is in minds of many identified in some nebulous way with Archbishopʼs apparent would-be killer; NATO in general and Greece in particular are mildly suspect. This is not a situation in which we can expect easy progress toward a Cyprus solution. Our effort should be to minimize disruptive factors and work carefully in many quarters to move things slowly back in direction that advances our policy objectives, particularly progress in talks.

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Moscow, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.
2. Dated March 26. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. Dated March 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CYP)
5. Dated March 18; the Embassy reported the text of a Soviet statement on Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)