Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

354. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Jones) and the Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, March 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Possible Cyprus Coup: U.S. Options in UNSC

The following options would present themselves under the various circumstances of a coup dʼetat in Cyprus.

1. Assumption: Coup dʼetat engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but without Greek Government approval.

Under these circumstances, the Cyprus Government would very likely request Security Council action. It is conceivable, as suggested in Ankaraʼs 1633,² that the Greek and Turkish Governments would join in such a request. In this situation U.S. support for the request for Security Council consideration would seem to be adequate to counter any similar Soviet request.

2. Assumption: Coup dʼetat engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but with Greek Government approval.

In this contingency, Turkish military intervention would be almost inevitable. In the face of such developments, it would be desirable for the U.S. and the U.K. to move quickly for Security Council consideration, prior to any USSR request for a Security Council meeting. Presumably the Cyprus UN representative would in any event request UNSC action. Whether we and the British would join in a formal request for a meeting or simply support a Cypriot request would best be determined in light of the precise circumstances at the time.

3. Assumption: Cooperative action on the part of the Greek and Turkish Governments designed to bring about double enosis. Once again the Cypriot Government could be expected to request Security Council action. Moreover the Soviet Union would probably join in or strongly support such a request. In such circumstances we would wish to move quickly in support of a Cypriot request, or on our own initiative but in cooperation with the U.K., to request Security Council action in order to beat the Soviets to the punch.

The precise terms of any UNSC Resolution would, of course, have to be designed to meet the exact situation. However, in any of the above circumstances we would seek action critical of the coup dʼetat calling for the end to any hostilities or violence, urging peaceful settlement procedures, and perhaps providing for some specific immediate UN measures to assist in restoring peace. Unless the specifics of the developing situation make it impossible, both in terms of the realities of the situation on the ground and broader political considerations, we would seek both in direct talks with the parties and in the UN to have the status quo ante restored.

1. Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 26. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Torp (NEA/CYP) and sent through Davies.
2. In telegram 1633 from Ankara, March 19, the Embassy reported that Turkey had informed it of a Soviet démarche which laid blame for the attempt on Makarios on the Greek Government or its officers; that Turkey was receiving reports of planning for a coup against Makarios; and that the Greek Government had approached Turkey regarding joint action in the event of a coup attempt. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)