Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

352. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 17, 1970, 1200Z.

390. Country Team Message. Subject: Cyprus: Greek Involvement in Double Enosis Scheme. Ref: State 37841.²

1. We have carefully sifted reports available here relating to involvement of GOG or elements thereof in plan, perhaps connected with attempt on Makariosʼ life, to promote double enosis solution. There is increasing evidence that some Greek National Guard officers, and some Greeks on mainland notably Aslanides, were plotting to achieve what they considered quiet solution to Cyprus problem and to cause trouble for present junta leadership in Athens. [less than 1 line not declassified] appear most authoritative reports we have seen on this score.³ If they are accurate, it appears that this fractional element had decided to turn what may have been its thoughts—resulting from entirely understandable frustration with Makariosʼ intransigence—into action. But we have not seen sort of repetitive indications we hope we would be receiving if highest levels of GOG had decided on double enosis course, or if there had been kind of highly secret discourse with Turkey which would appear indispensable prerequisite to adoption and successful implementation of such a plan.

2. What now seems fairly certain, however, and what perhaps is causing much of speculation about existence of a GOG master plan, is that some Greek mainland officers have been carrying on activities at variance with officially expressed GOG policy. As attested by several good reports received by DATT Nicosia (C–051), March, 1970, TR 6823001670, March 2, 1970),⁴ as well as [less than 1 line not declassified] there are some GOG officers who have at minimum (A) talked up enosis and (B) been involved with National Front in manner that appears to constitute somewhat more than surveillance of its activities which could be considered a justifiable KYP assignment. Perhaps most compelling evidence of mainland officer activity contrary officially stated policy is to be seen in GOG FonMin Pipinelisʼ comments to UK Ambassador Stewart (Athens 864).⁵

3. Evidence increasingly points to Georkadjis as man behind March 8 attempted assassination of Archbishop, even after bearing in mind Makariosʼ transparent effort to cast Georkadjis as the villain in mind of Cypriot public. What is more difficult to establish is connection Georkadjis may or may not have had with mainland elements.

4. One report from a previously reliable GOC source received by DATT March 13 and transmitted to addressees as C–052 Mar 70⁶ joins these two primary strands of prevalent suspicion by tying prominent junta officials into Georkadjis attempt and portraying the whole as part of coup plan against Papadopoulos. This is a tempting theory in that it would explain both paras (2) and (3) above. Indeed, Papadopoulos opponents may feel they can get at regime only by outside diversion (Cyprus). However, there seem many questionable elements to this thesis, e.g. why would disorder in Cyprus make junta more vulnerable instead of putting it more on its guard?

5. In short, we discern increasing evidence of Greek officer involvement in developments of last ten days. We believe these officers were pursuing some political objective looking toward creation of chaos in Cyprus as an avenue toward enosis with Greece and opposition to present Greek junta leadership. If their thinking went beyond this point—to the international consequences of an attempt to alter the political status of Cyprus—we have very little knowledge of it. We have no indication that double enosis was ever discussed with the Turks. Even if it had been, we seriously doubt Turks would be inclined to hook up with desperate, quixotic types involved here or would trust them to safeguard interests of Turk Cypriot community or of Turkey in probable bloody aftermath had attempt on Archbishop succeeded.

6. This is an unfolding scenario. Within a few days we expect to be able to evaluate more precisely the roles of the various players—dead and alive.

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated priority to Ankara and Athens.
2. Telegram 37841 to Nicosia, March 14, requested Embassy comments on the involvement of Greek officers and agents of the KYP in “double enosis” schemes. (Ibid.) In telegram 1245 from Athens, March 18, the Embassy responded to the Departmentʼs query by suggesting that while the senior Greek leadership was committed to a negotiated resolution of the Cyprus situation, officers stationed on Cyprus were probably involved in plots against Makarios. (Ibid.) Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB 315/01245–70, March 18, reported that Makarios was skeptical about Greek officersʼ involvement in the attempts against him. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. Dated February 25, it reported on Papadopoulosʼ meeting with the British Ambassador to Greece. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
6. Not found.