Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

351. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS 314/02703–70

Washington, March 9, 1970.

COUNTRY

Cyprus

DOI

8 March 1970

SUBJECT

• Reaction Following Attempted Assassination of Makarios

ACQ

[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[41/2 lines not declassified]

1. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: At 0710, 8 March an attempt was made to kill President Makarios by shooting him as he departed in a helicopter for Makhaeras Monastery. See Nicosia Embassy telegrams 288, 300 and 322).²

2. Shortly after noon, 8 March 1970, President Makarios returned to the Archbishopric from his visit to Makhaeras Monastery and closeted himself with some of his closest associates. The group of about a dozen people included Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, his personal physician; Andreas Azinas, Cooperatives Commissioner; Nicosia Mayor Odysseas Ioannides; Miltides Christodoulou, Government public information officer; Vaso Loiza, a female employed in the Office of the Director of the Cyprus Information Service; Ourana Kokkinou, a spinster long associated with EOKA and confidant of Makarios; and some of Makariosʼ relatives. Although Makarios was calm and in reasonably good humor considering his narrow escape earlier in the day, the others in the group were excited, angry and shouting to be heard. Makarios asked if the persons he had ordered arrested before he left for Makhaeras were in custody. Loiza said she had passed his message to the police, but did not know what had been done. Makarios was highly irritated, and told the group that he had ordered the arrest of former Interior Minister Polykarpos Georkatzis and several others immediately after the attempt on his life. The group began shouting. During the bedlam of accusations against Georkatzis, Makarios abruptly left them saying he wanted to see a few of them privately.

3. Later, [less than 1 line not declassified] Makarios said he had felt very ashamed that his friends had so totally lost control of themselves. Concerning Georkatzis, Makarios said he had strong reason to believe that his former minister was behind the attempt to kill him. However, he did not think that Glafkos Clerides was involved or was even aware of the plot. Explaining further, Makarios said Georkatzis had conspired with men who were not known to be associated with him such as Costas Ioannides, an editor of “Gnomi” and supporter of Dr. Takis Evdokas. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: Makarios did not intend to imply that Evdokas was conspiring with Georkatzis.) Upon reflection, Makarios decided that investigation and arrests should be made “in all directions” so that the general public would not conclude he was acting against Georkatzis for political motives. This would give the impression of an impartial investigation. In due course, when the police completed their investigation and advised him that they had sufficient evidence to convict Georkatzis and his fellow conspirators, the public would be informed. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: of the 11 men in custody at noon, 9 March, several are National Front leaders: Costas Haralambous and Michaliakis Rossides, Costas P. Ioannides, presumably the person referred to above, is also in custody.)

4. By the evening, 8 March, Makarios was no longer certain whether Georkatzis should be arrested, and discussed his doubts at some length with his advisors. Lyssarides and Azinas contended that Georkatzis should be arrested. Makarios also had difficulty in deciding whether to make a public announcement that Georkatzisʼ apartment had been searched by the police. [11/2 lines not declassified] In the end, he concluded that an announcement should be made to avoid³ hysteria, and vied with each other in trying to get Makariosʼ attention. Makarios himself was calm. He did not discuss what concrete steps he planned to take in response to the attempt to kill him.

6. [1 line not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.
2. Telegram 288 from Nicosia, March 7, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Telegram 300 from Nicosia, March 8, and telegram 302 from Nicosia, March 9, are ibid., POL 15–1 CYP.
3. A note on the cable at this point reads, “Missing Portion,” referring to three lines of text that are missing. A note at the end of the cable reads, “Headquarters comment: Missing portion will be disseminated only if it materially affects the sense of this report.” The missing portion was not found.