Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

286. Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Athens, July 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

• [less than 1 line not declassified] Action to Support U.S. Policy Aims in Greece

1. In my report of March 31,² I analysed the Greek situation and submitted my recommendations. Essentially, I proposed—

a. Restoral of the suspended portion of MAP for Greece and the future maintenance of MAP at adequate levels, and

b. Continued pressure on the Greek Regime to encourage the earliest possible implementation of the 1968 Constitution.

2. Basic assumptions—The present Government is firmly in control of the Greek internal situation, the opposition within Greece has no effective short-range means at their disposal to effect the overthrow of the present Government, Soviet long-range policy towards Greece aims at separating Greece from NATO, isolating Greece from its natural allies in Europe, denying use of Greek soil to the U.S., thus neutralizing Greece as a U.S. ally, then hopefully leading Greece into the neutralist camp and ultimately the Communist sphere of influence à la the Arab world.

3. Supplementary assumptions—

a. Papadopoulos, as the leading figure in the collegiate Greek Regime, has the greatest breadth of those in his group. I believe he sincerely intends to implement the constitution and restructure Greek political life, though he has not been explicit as to the timing of the last step—elections.

b. Some of the other Revolutionary officers are less enthusiastic than Papadopoulos about implementing the 1968 Constitution. (For a discussion of the dynamics of the present Regime, see my telegram Limdis Athens–970 of March 2, 1970.)³

c. In addition to our quiet diplomacy and personal persuasion, to advance the date of full implementation of the 1968 Constitution, and to influence the Greek Government to take other public steps to improve its reputation at home and abroad, [11/2 lines not declassified]:

(1) To influence Greek authorities to relax security restrictions, to reduce resort to and hopefully to end martial law, and to adhere to its commitments to implement the 1968 Constitution.

(2) To influence the Greek authorities to avoid other repressive measures which do political damage to Greece without filling a decisive security need.

(3) To promote the concept of a reconciliation of the various non-Communist factions within Greece.

4. The time has now come to move even more positively in direct support of our aims here in Greece as well as in opposition to the well identified Soviet and other Communist tactics. Specifically, I therefore recommend that the Department obtain interagency approval for a [less than 1 line not declassified] program which would embrace these five points—

a. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to facilitate implementation of the 1968 Constitution by convincing doubtful elements within the Regime of the practicality of this move, encouraging those elements who are already disposed in that direction and building up momentum in public media in Greece and abroad for a sincere implementation of the Constitution.

b. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to counter Communist efforts to exploit the Greek issue to split NATO and to isolate Greece by breaking her economic, political, and military ties with Western Europe and North America.

c. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to assist in rebuilding democratic institutions in Greece through the provision of [less than 1 line not declassified] advice and assistance and the persuasion of key Revolutionary officers that elections under the 1968 Constitution will be in their long-range interest. (It is in U.S. interest to see healthy institutions created and a return to the chaotic period of 1966 avoided.)

d. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to encourage closer ties of Greece with the non-Communist Western world, ties which have been strained in the period since April 1967.

e. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to expose Communist and Soviet tactics and duplicity and to thwart Soviet purposes in Greece.

5. The above program would not be expensive. Indeed it is not today a question of large sums of money. Rather we need approval of a modest program (of perhaps $35,000 in FY 1971) designed to keep matters in Greece moving in such a direction that we may avoid much more serious and disturbing problems at a later date.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Document 273.
3. Document 269.
4. In a July 14 message to Tasca, Sisco and Davies indicated “interest” in the proposal and requested a more detailed analysis of the “types of activity and what you have in mind.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972) In his August 5 reply, Tasca outlined a series of steps that could be taken to employ the Greek and foreign press to build support for implementation of the 1968 Constitution and to expose Communist propaganda operations. He also suggested providing advice to junta leaders on the creation of viable political and economic-social movements to support their continuance as a force in a restructured democratic state. (Ibid.) In an August 19 memorandum to Christopher Van Hollen (NEA), James Gardner (INR) reported that a message to Tasca had been approved authorizing implementation “of those parts of the Ambassadorʼs proposal that are aimed at leading the regime toward regular constitutional practices and those that are directed against Communist forces. It disapproves those that are designed to popularize the regime with the Greek people or to arouse perhaps unjustified hopes among the Greek people about the future course of the regime. The response also concludes that none of the approved actions is so unusual or serious as to require interagency consideration in the 40 Committee.” (Ibid.)