276. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)1
SUBJ
- EUR Position with respect to the possible Resumption of Shipments of Heavy Military Equipment to Greece
I am setting forth below the likely effects upon Western Europe of the possible resumption of heavy military shipments to Greece. Given the importance of this question to our position in Europe as well as the cohesion of NATO, the formulation of alternative courses of action relating to the implementation of this policy should take account of these consequences.
Public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in U.S. military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity and the NATO image, regardless of how the matter is handled tactically.
1. Continued Trouble about Greece in NATO
The Junta has been severely damaging to NATOʼs image in Western Europe, particularly among young people. Nevertheless, by strenuous backstage maneuvers by some of the Governments concerned, discussions of the Greek situation have been kept to a minimum in NATO fora. NATO members have recognized that open discussion either of the Greek issue or the policy of individual NATO members towards Greece would be explosive and divisive and could lead to a walk-out by Greece; the resulting constitutional question for NATO because of the absence from the Council of a Member State could be serious. Indications are that, for the foreseeable future, sentiments among NATO countries on the Greek issue will run so high that it would be dangerous and possibly permanently damaging to NATO if discussion of Greek internal matters were allowed to arise in any NATO meeting.
2. Immediate Consequences for the Spring NATO Meetings
If the Greek question were to be brought into prominence by a U.S. decision to resume heavy military shipments to Greece before the NATO Ministerial Meeting of May 26–27 and the June 11 DPC Ministerial level meeting, it is very probable that one of the Western European countries, probably one of the Scandinavians with the support of [Page 705] some of the others, would attempt to raise the Greek question, arguing that the question of military assistance to Greece is basically political in nature and that it is not possible to ignore public opinion in their countries on the issue. Even if the Greek question itself did not come before NATO, the side effects of indirect attacks in proposed communiqué language, in ministerial statements and in corridor discussions would dominate these two meetings and effectively prevent progress on other matters. We could in effect anticipate Donnybrooks and expose the U.S. Delegations to highly emotional debates.
3. Adverse Effects on a possible Spanish Link to NATO
Preliminary discussions have already made it clear that our attempts to further a Spanish link to NATO will be handicapped, if at the same time the Greek question becomes active because of the resumption of shipment of heavy arms. Some NATO Members believe that to have both the Greek issue and the Spanish link prominent unduly emphasizes the issue of NATOʼs relationship to “dictatorships.” For the near future, it appears wise to soft pedal the Greek issue if we wish to promote acceptance of a NATO relationship to Spain.
4. Modalities of handling a Decision to resume Arms Shipments to Greece
- a)
- NATO Consultation: If we consult our NATO colleagues, we must take it for granted that much—or most—of the advice given will be negative. A NATO endorsement of our resuming arms shipments to Greece will be out of the question. Therefore, to consult in the North Atlantic Council would cause difficulties. If resumption is decided, however, the Allies, as a matter of courtesy, should be informed in advance.
- b)
- U.S. Announcement to NATO that it intended to resume Arms Shipments: If we were to inform but not consult our NATO colleagues of our intention to resume arms shipments, we would, of course, relieve them of any responsibility for our decision. Attracting to ourselves the lightning in this way would not, however, really spare NATO, since in a number of Western European countries criticism of the U.S. tends to spill over into general criticism of NATO because of the dominant role of the U.S. in NATO, accusations that the U.S. does not take into account the wishes of its NATO partners in the formulation of its policies, and finally, accusations that NATO is a U.S. tool in the latterʼs support of dictatorships and “repressive” policies. However, this course would be less difficult than to consult.
- c)
- Timing to minimize adverse Consequences for U.S. Policy in NATO: As indicated above, it is imperative that no announcements be made about the possible resumption of heavy military equipment deliveries before the NATO meetings scheduled now for May 26–27 and June 11. Laying the groundwork with our NATO colleagues before those dates could bring on the very discussion we wish to avoid.
The Italian regional and local elections are scheduled to take place on June 7. It would be desirable that news of any possible resumption of shipments by us not be announced before that date because inevitably the Communist and other anti-NATO candidates in the election would have a field-day citing the Greek issue.
To inform our NATO colleagues of the resumption of arms shipments at a time when we would attract a minimum of attention and potential Parliamentary critics are away on vacation would be best for NATO and minimize the sort of debate which will lacerate Greek feelings; the ideal time would be, therefore, in early or mid-August. If we wish to avoid the particular problem of the Scandinavian Parliaments but cannot wait for August, we should at least wait for June 22–23, when the Scandinavian Parliaments have risen for the summer.
5. Background
- a)
-
Depth of Feeling concerning the Greek Question in the European Area: Feeling concerning Greece in Western Europe runs deep and hot in most Western European countries except Spain and Portugal. Sentiments hostile to the present Greek Government spread over the entire spectrum of political opinion in the Western Europe democratic countries; it is particularly intense among Social Democrats, intellectuals and young people. None in high public positions in these countries can risk supporting the regime publicly, and many increasingly feel constrained by public pressures to openly oppose it.
Recent liberalizing moves by the Greek Government have not yet made any significant impact in alleviating anti-Greek sentiments, at least in part because they have been obscured by Greek regime actions that appear to negate what otherwise might be regarded as advances. Moreover, we expect that for some months at least skepticism concerning the extent and effects of these liberalizing moves will be widespread in Western Europe. Generally speaking, over the last three years the Greek Government has handled its public relations atrociously insofar as Western European opinion is concerned. Thus, under the best of circumstances, it will take some time for European opinion to change in a favorable direction, and if political democracy is not restored, the majority of West Europeans and their leaders will continue actively hostile. Since Greece already has been read out of the Council of Europe, liberal activists in Western Europe will now tend to turn their efforts to inspire action against Greece in NATO, with attendant risks to the future effectiveness of the Alliance.
- b)
-
Individual Country Positions: Norway and Denmark have been particularly opposed to the Greek Junta from the beginning. In both countries there is increasing Parliamentary pressure upon the Government to move against Greece in NATO. The Netherlands, along with [Page 707] Norway and Denmark, has also disassociated itself from a military subcommittee report recommending military assistance to Greece; in all three of the BENELUX (Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands) countries the present Greek regime is highly unpopular. Dutch officials, for example, are increasingly pessimistic about their ability to contain Parliamentary pressures for action against Greece at the May 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting.
Public and Parliamentary opinion in Italy is also strongly anti-Greece, particularly among the Government parties. In the U.K. Labor Party and in Germany among the German Social Democrats, anti-Junta feeling is also strong; Conservative parties in both countries are more realistic. Given the fact there is almost certain to be an election in the U.K. this year, the British Government can be expected to be reluctant to take the lead in action which appears to favor Greece, although the British Government thoroughly agrees as to the undesirability of NATO discussion of Greece. Of the Western Europeans in NATO only France and Portugal can be described as more or less favorable to the Greek Government, and there is a good deal of anti-Greek sentiment among the French public, recently fanned by outspoken opponent and leading journalistic figure Servan-Schreiber.
- Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Tascaʼs Report on Greece. Secret. Drafted by Tibbetts and Streator on April 21 and cleared in EUR.↩