Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

231. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Conversation—Dr. Kissinger and Yugoslav Ambassador Crnobrnja, Friday, September 10

Crnobrnja began the conversation by informing Dr. Kissinger that he would be leaving Washington for good. Looking back over his five years, Crnobrnja said that he felt much had been accomplished in US-Yugoslav relations. Dr. Kissinger said he was sorry to see the Ambassador go and that he felt our relations were exceptionally good. Following a discussion of the Ambassadorʼs as yet undecided future plans, Crnobrnja noted that he would be leaving before the Tito visit. He denied that there was any connection between his departure and the departure of the American Ambassador from Belgrade and stressed that, in his own case, a successor had already been designated (Granfil). Later in the conversation, Crnobrnja asked whether the US would also nominate a new Ambassador before the Tito visit. Dr. Kissinger said he had just made a positive recommendation on this matter and that the Yugoslavs could be assured that Ambassador Leonhartʼs replacement would be a top professional. Dr. Kissinger said he would see to it that the nomination would be speeded up.

Crnobrnja then turned to his main point, the problem of extremist émigré activities in the US. He said these activities would not stop the improvement of US-Yugoslav relations but progress would be faster if the irritant were removed. Dr. Kissinger agreed. Crnobrnja continued that the Yugoslav émigrés were more aggressive than those of the other Socialist countries, and he urged Dr. Kissinger to reappraise US policy with respect to them. Dr. Kissinger asked what we could do. Crnobrnja said we should make a public statement that the activities of the émigrés were contrary to the national interest. In response to Dr. Kissingerʼs question, Crnobrnja described some of the activities of Yugoslav émigré groups. He handed Dr. Kissinger a note on the matter (see attachment at Tab A).² Dr. Kissinger asked what the occasion for a statement might be. Crnobrnja said the fact that he had handed over a note. Dr. Kissinger said he would see what he could do before the Tito visit to find an occasion for a statement. Crnobrnja stressed how sensitive Tito was on this whole subject. For example, because of a bad experience in New York when he was here to visit President Kennedy, Tito had made clear he would not again go to New York City.³

There then ensued a brief discussion about the possibility of Tito spending a night at Camp David. Dr. Kissinger said he would see what could be done. He pointed out that only a few visiting heads of state or government had been invited to Camp David but, of course, the President had exceptionally high regard for President Tito and regarded his visit as an exceptional event. Crnobrnja said the Yugoslavs were not making a formal request and recognized the exceptional honor involved.

Reverting to the previous subject, Crnobrnja said Tito was well aware that Ceausescu had experienced no embarrassment while visiting the United States. Dr. Kissinger commented that Romanians seemed to be less heroic than Yugoslavs. Crnobrnja laughingly agreed. Dr. Kissinger then said the problem should be separated into two parts: one, what we do before the Tito visit to avoid incidents and, two, the more general problem of émigré activities. He went on to say that we would do our best to prevent demonstrations, including a public statement to discourage them. He would talk to the Attorney General and would give the Ambassador or his successor a precise description of what might happen. In any case, we would do what we could to prevent anything from happening. The Ambassador could be absolutely sure that we would use our influence if we have any. In this connection, the Yugoslavs should not make the mistake of believing that if no demonstrations occur, it proves that the Administration runs the groups involved. Crnobrnja said he understood, and then asked about a more lasting US policy to curb the émigré groups. Following an interruption by a phone call, Dr. Kissinger said that in regard to the Ambassadorʼs last point, he would also talk to the Attorney General.

Dr. Kissinger then asked about the forthcoming Brezhnev visit to Yugoslavia⁴ and whether any threats were involved. Crnobrnja said that threats were not involved, that the visit was intended to be friendly and private and had been pending for a long time. The Yugoslavs had originally suggested an official visit but the Soviets said they preferred it to be semi-official—whatever the distinction may be. In any event, there would be talks and probably a joint statement; in other words, it would be a working visit at least in part regardless of what it was called. In response to Dr. Kissingerʼs question about Brezhnevʼs objective, Crnobrnja said that it was to secure Soviet influence in the Balkans or at least to prevent it from decreasing. Dr. Kissinger asked why Brezhnev would go to Yugoslavia for this purpose. Crnobrnja speculated that it was because of Yugoslaviaʼs opening to China and its improved relations with the US, as well as the Romanians and Albanians. Crnobrnja went on that on the basis of his own involvement in previous Yugoslav-Soviet meetings, he would expect the discussions to deal principally with bilateral relations although the Soviets would seek to place the entire onus for improvement on the Yugoslavs. (Dr. Kissinger commented that this was standard Soviet practice.) Crnobrnja went on that the Soviets would probably demonstrate interest in better relations on specific issues, particularly economic ones. Basic differences would remain, e.g., in regard to Yugoslaviaʼs independent position. Tito would insist on reaffirming the 1955 and 1956 declarations.⁵ The Yugoslavs would never change their fundamental position. Dr. Kissinger interjected that we were quite sure of this. After noting that in the past Brezhnev had refused to go to Yugoslavia because of its position concerning the Czechoslovak events, Crnobrnja said that apart from bilateral relations the Yugoslavs would exchange assessments with Brezhnev on such matters as China and Europe.

Dr. Kissinger then turned the conversation to the forthcoming Tito visit. Crnobrnja said that Brezhnevʼs prior visit to Yugoslavia would be one of the topics on the Yugoslav side. Dr. Kissinger welcomed this and said that he assumed that our China policy would be of interest to Tito. Crnobrnja said that he would be giving us a list of topics of interest to Tito ahead of time. Dr. Kissinger noted that the President considered Tito one of the few real statesmen in the world today, a man of vision. He had had one of his best talks with Tito last year. The President would always value Titoʼs assessment on such questions as China, the Soviet Union and Europe. Dr. Kissinger agreed with Crnobrnja that the Middle East, in which Tito is personally interested, would also figure in the talks. There would be two meetings as well as an opportunity for talks during the State Dinner which the President would tender. Dr. Kissinger said he would tell the Ambassador specifically what the President would be interested in talking about. He then asked the Ambassador to let him know how Tito wishes to arrange the private meeting with the President. Dr. Kissinger could come into the meeting after the picture taking and Tito could have an adviser as well if this was agreeable. Crnobrnja said he would check.

Crnobrnja then noted that the Yugoslav-Italian frontier question remained unsettled. In the past the US role had been fairly objective as demonstrated by the fact that neither the Yugoslavs or the Italians were entirely happy with the situation. US policy had been very wise. Noting that he was not speaking from instructions, Crnobrnja said it would help if, in an appropriate way, the US could assist with the problem. The territory involved was very small. The attitude in Yugoslavia was that if the Germans and the Poles can get treaties settling their frontiers, why should not the Yugoslavs also. All that was required was a small legal touch. In response to Dr. Kissingerʼs question, Crnobrnja said he felt that the Italian Government was quite capable of taking action at this time. Crnobrnja went on that the matter would not be raised at the Presidential level; he merely wanted to call it to our attention. Dr. Kissinger said he would look into it. Crnobrnja continued that it was important to clear it up because people in Yugoslavia otherwise would say that problems can only get solved if one is a member of the Warsaw Pact. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Yugoslavs wanted us to raise the issue with the Italians without the Yugoslavs having raised it officially with us. Crnobrnja said he would check this out in Belgrade.

Crnobrnja than complained about the fact that Congressman Derwinski of Chicago continued to refer to Serbs and Croats as “Captive Nations” and asked whether we could not do something to have this stopped. Dr. Kissinger said he would try.

Crnobrnja, in conclusion, asked whether he could see the President before returning to Yugoslavia. Dr. Kissinger said he would do what he could. The President would be away for a few days later this month, but he thought it perhaps 98% sure that a meeting with the President could be arranged.⁶

HS

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 734, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. III 1 Sep 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on September 27.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Tito and Kennedy met on October 17, 1963. For a memorandum of their conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 162. Tito then proceeded to New York where he faced hostile demonstrations while attending the UN General Assembly.
4. September 22–25.
5. For text of the June 2, 1955, statement, see Keesingʼs Contemporary Archives, 1955, p. 14266. For text of the June 20, 1956, declaration, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 504–509.
6. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary does not indicate a subsequent meeting between the President and Crnobrnja. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)