Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

162. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 17, 1963, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US-Yugoslav Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • Governor Harriman
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. N. Andrews
• Yugoslavia
  • President Tito
  • Mr. Todorovic, Vice President of the Federal Assembly
  • Mr. Popovic, Foreign Minister
  • Ambassador Micunovic
  • Dr. Presburger, Counselor

Turning to bilateral matters, Tito referred to the long talks he had held with Ambassador Kennan, to whom he had explained extensively everything relating to Yugoslavia’s policies.¹ Tito said he wanted to tell the President that the basis of Yugoslavia’s policy was to seek cooperation with others on the basis of no discrimination on either side. Tito referred to “even Stephen cooperation.” He said Yugoslavia wanted to increase her economic exchanges and to abandon old forms of economic relations such as those based on aid from other countries. He said Yugoslavia was growing industrially and agriculturally. In a few years’ time Yugoslavia would be able to satisfy all her needs. She was already doing so with regard to corn. Soon she would be able to switch from extensive to intensive agriculture. This year Yugoslavia would have one million tons more wheat than she had last year (4.4 million tons instead of 3.4 million tons). Corn had not done quite as well this year. He said that Yugoslavia wanted to trade as much as possible with the United States on a basis of nondiscrimination. There should be a new basis of relations. Yugoslavia was not asking for anything. He said that the United States had given Yugoslavia a great deal when she needed it. Now she wanted to stand on her own feet. He had explained all this to the Soviet Union which also saw it this way. He repeated that Yugoslavia was not asking for anything. He said that the Most Favored Nation clause amendment in US legislation posed difficulties.

The President outlined the United States Government position against the MFN amendment. He said that the Trade Expansion Act was a very important measure, so it had to be signed although it included that particular amendment. The President hoped that perhaps in the next two weeks the Senate would restore MFN treatment to Presidential discretion. It was a sensitive matter because every member of Congress wanted to avoid being called pro-Communist. He said it was hard for Congressmen to distinguish among the Soviet Union, Communist China, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The President said he hoped that things would turn out all right.²

Tito said Yugoslavia was having difficulties with the Common Market, and would like to work something out. There was great interest in finding some way of improving commercial relations with Western Europe.

The President said he would like to clarify the United States position on certain other matters. There had been very difficult moments with the Soviet Union over Cuba last fall. This had been almost a disaster for the United States. The memory of those events had rendered passage of the Test Ban Treaty difficult, and had reduced the prospects of making progress or having any faith in the Soviet Union. He said that every effort Yugoslavia made to show that she wanted to live in peace with the United States, and to maintain her own independence, the easier it would be for the United States to cooperate with Yugoslavia. Tito said that the wheat sales to the Soviet Union showed that discrimination can be surmounted and gotten rid of. He said that economic exchanges were one of the most important factors for the promotion of political agreements. The elimination of discrimination made the solution of political issues much easier. He said he was glad to have had the chance to present some of his views to the President, and hoped that the President realized that he believed that US-Yugoslav relations could evolve positively. The President said that the experience of last fall with regard to Cuba had made us somewhat cautious “before we embrace the bear.”

The President said he was interested in Tito’s statement that he has confidence in the peaceful objectives of the Soviet Union. Tito said he was confident that he was not wrong. He said he knew the whole situation. He had known it several years ago, two years ago, and today. Small steps should be taken and we could thus move forward. There had already been the UN resolution on prohibition of putting nuclear weapons in outer space. It also would be useful to make progress on disarmament. He had always been in favor of a gradual approach. With progress in these fields, tremendous resources could be made available for aid to the less developed countries.

The President asked Tito what he thought of the political evolution with regard to Eastern Europe, and whether there was less of an iron grip on these countries. Tito said he thought that agreements with the Soviet Union would help this process. The Eastern European countries did think more of economic and less of political matters. He believed that the great question today was the polarization between those who want peace and those who want to continue the cold war. We are dealing today with criteria which are different from those of the past: today the question is not who is in the bloc and who isn’t, but rather who is for peace and who is against peace. More and more countries are interested in nonalignment.

President Tito asked the President what he thought about Yugoslavia and the possibilities of better relations between us. He personally felt that there were great possibilities, and that we should have greater confidence in each other. The President agreed that relations had been improving. The low point had been reached at the time of the conference of nonaligned countries in 1961. Now relations had improved, and the US Congressmen who had recently attended the Interparliamentary Union Conference in Belgrade³ had been able to see things for themselves and had received favorable impressions. He said he thought there had been a steady climb since the low point of September 1961. He said that the reception for Tito in the United States today was better than it would have been two years ago. It was important to take into account US history and experience. The President said he wanted relations between our two countries to improve.

President Tito expressed his great thanks to the United States Government for the aid which it had given to Skopje following the earthquake disaster there.⁴ The President said that we wanted to do something more with regard to housing. He said we had some prefabricated housing units stocked in France, capable of housing up to 10,000 people, and we would be glad to make these available if this would be helpful. The President said he did not know how much time it would take to get them down to Yugoslavia but thought this could be within about a month or so. Tito expressed his warm thanks for the President’s offer, which he accepted. He stressed the great need for housing in Skopje and said that housing for 120,000 inhabitants was needed before December and that ultimately some 200,000 units of housing would be required.

The President said he was glad to have been able to repay some of Yugoslavia’s hospitality to members of his family, to various government officials and to Congressmen. He hoped that more tourists would go to Yugoslavia. He told Tito that he might get a few pickets on his way around the United States but he wanted him to understand that the President himself gets picketed and that Governor Harriman is also used to this. Tito said he hoped the President would one day visit Yugoslavia where he would be warmly welcomed. The President said, “Thank you very much.”

Mr. Harriman recalled that when he had visited him in 1951,⁵ Tito was gravely concerned that Stalin would unleash an attack on Yugoslavia, and he wanted Tito to know how gratified we were to see a change in his relations with Khrushchev. He said that President Kennedy had said last June that things would be much easier if each country were left to settle its own affairs by itself. He hoped that Tito would use his influence with Khrushchev in this direction. Tito said that things have changed very much since the time when Stalin had said that he wanted to make Yugoslavia one of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and that Yugoslavia firmly intended to maintain her independence.

The President asked Tito how much of an influence he thought Yugoslavia’s policy had had on other countries in Eastern Europe to follow a more independent course, e.g., Bulgaria and Poland. Tito said he thought Yugoslavia’s influence had been quite considerable. He said that in spite of difficulties, Eastern Europe had prospered economically. The Yugoslav people were proud and courageous people and he wanted the President to know that they had great sympathy for the people of the United States.

The meeting then broke up at about 5 o’clock.

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by the White House on October 22 and by M on October 25. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part 5 of 5”; four separate memoranda of conversation dealing with the Algeria-Morocco conflict, Yemen, Cuba, and aid to underdeveloped nations are ibid.
1. Kennan had resigned his post and left Belgrade on July 27.
2. Congress was then considering legislation restoring MFN status to Yugoslavia. The legislation passed and was signed into law as Section 402 of P.L. 88–205 on December 16.
3. September 12–20.
4. July 26.
5. See Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. IV, Part 2, pp. 1842–1843.