212. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • Ceausescuʼs Doubts about the Summit

Ambassador Meeker, when he delivered to Ceausescu the Presidentʼs letter about the Summit,2 had to listen (cable at Tab A)3 to the Romanian Presidentʼs “doubts” about the Moscow communiqué and US-Soviet basic principles.4 Ceausescuʼs comments included:

  • —the SALT agreements did not take account of third state interests and offered no Soviet or US commitment not to use nuclear weapons;
  • —a resultant danger was that some third countries, for example India, would seek to acquire nuclear weapons and other cheap mass destruction weapons, such as lasers;
  • —the Moscow communiquéʼs language about US and Soviet respect for each otherʼs interests implies a joint purpose to establish an “equilibrium” between the two powers. But such an equilibrium would be “fragile” and could be upset by third countries.

Ceausescu thought that international relations should be based on norms applicable to all countries and on international institutions with general participation. At the end of his discussion with our Ambassador, after asking that the President be thanked for his message, [Page 523] Ceausescu did express the hope that the Summit would turn out to be a positive influence.

Ceausescuʼs remarks reflect the Romanian unease, which will not be easily dispelled, that the Soviets may interpret some parts of the Moscow documents as a license to put more pressure on countries within their sphere of influence. The Presidentʼs trip to Warsaw5 demonstrated our opposition to any condominium concepts, and Secretary Rogersʼ visit to Romania this week6 will also be helpful in that regard, perhaps easing some of Ceausescuʼs worries.7

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. IV Jan 1972—. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.
  2. In a June 28 letter Nixon wrote to Ceausescu with regard to the Moscow summit: “It is my firm conviction that this visit to Moscow will enhance the possibilities for obtaining greater security in Europe so that all countries there may determine their own destinies, free from interference and regardless of differences or similarities in their social systems. As I mentioned to Vice President Manescu on March 21, I am determined that as the United States seeks better relations with the Soviet Union and the Peopleʼs Republic of China, it will also continue to improve its relations with Romania…. As we build those relations, you can be sure that the United States will remain committed to the principle that nations have equal rights, including the right to develop their own internal and external policies, and that all nations have important contributions to make to world progress and peace.” The letter was transmitted to Meeker in telegram 110847 to Bucharest, June 20. (Ibid., Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres.)
  3. Telegram 2189 from Bucharest, June 23. Attached but not printed.
  4. For texts, see Public Papers: Nixon , 1972, pp. 633–642.
  5. May 31–June 1. See Documents 163166.
  6. July 5–6. See Document 213.
  7. Kissinger wrote a note at the top of the page: “Have we seen Rogersʼ discussion?”