Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

163. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Warsaw, May 31, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Your Discussions in Poland

Polish Objectives

The Polish leaders will be chiefly interested in showing some tangible results from your visit; the mere fact of your stop has already provided them with the psychological and political benefit of being given special recognition as an important East European nation. Gierek personally undoubtedly sees his meeting with you as adding to his own authority. He has obviously watched closely the style and procedures of the Moscow summit and seems eager to adapt them to his own purposes.

As regards the tangible goals the Poles seek, they are essentially two: (1) further recognition of their Western frontier, the Oder-Neisse line, and (2) access to US credits.

Your Objectives

Your own objective, from a foreign policy standpoint, is to give substance to our intention to treat the East European states as sovereign and independent without at the same time complicating their relations with Moscow or arousing Soviet suspicions excessively. This problem is less difficult for us in Poland, which is welded firmly into the Soviet camp, than it was in Romania, which clearly resisted Soviet domination.

In Poland, you also confront the delicate Church/State problem. The Church retains a powerful hold on the people and in many ways is a parallel government to the secular regime.

The Polish people—and of course Americans of Polish descent—will feel themselves more directly addressed by you through a gesture to their religion than through the regime.

Your Approach in the Talks

Gierek will almost certainly have been briefed by the Soviets on the essence of your Moscow talks on Europe and Vietnam. It is doubtful that he was told much if anything on the Middle East and SALT. He will also be aware of the degree of progress made on economic issues, especially of the fact that you did not actually extend EX–IM facilities. The Poles will of course have examined in detail the “Basic Principles” and the final communiqué.

1. In the course of your meeting with Gierek you should be prepared to give him your evaluation of the Moscow summit.

• —Many concrete accomplishments;
• —Frank and detailed exchanges, perhaps for the first time since World War II, on all aspects of US-Soviet relations and on the international issues in which both the US and USSR have a stake as great powers;
• —A set of ground rules (Basic Principles) for US-Soviet relations which, as they are translated into practice, should not only improve those relations but assist all countries to live in greater security. You should add the sensitive point that we believe the Principles set down a style of conduct by the superpowers which will permit smaller countries to realize their own aspirations and maintain their own identity;
• —A general program of negotiations on Europe by all the countries concerned.

2. You should let Gierek raise Vietnam first. If he does so, he will take the straight DRV/PRG line and may make bitter comments about the mining, which affects Polish vessels. In your comments you should:

• —Give a simple and blunt rationale for our policy;
• —Assure the Poles that we will not deliberately harm Polish ships in DRV ports but our measures will stay in force on the terms you set on May 8.

Note: The Poles probably want the final communiqué to have a phrase that Vietnam was discussed and that the two sides expressed differing positions. Gierek probably needs this to keep his political purity and you should agree to a general formula of this kind if the Poles insist.

3. On Europe, the Poles want our blessing for their Western frontier.² We cannot do this formally because it would impair our rights with regard to Germany. However,

• —Our communiqué draft now picks up language from the Moscow communiqué referring to the principle of “inviolability of frontiers”;
• —We can also “welcome” the treaty between the FRG and Poland, “including its frontier provisions.”³

Beyond that you should, if pressed, explain that:

• —We do not, as a matter of principle, explicitly endorse international borders unless we are a party to the agreement establishing the border involved. (This will not happen in the case of Polandʼs western border until we become a party to a German peace settlement.)
• —At the same time, we have no interest in seeing any particular boundary in Europe revised.

4. As regards the European Security Conference, the Poles feel that this is one of their special initiatives. (Although their formal position is identical to the Soviets, the Poles see the conference as an arena for displaying a certain individuality.)

You should:

• —Reiterate the Moscow position that we will be ready for preparatory consultations later this year to ensure a carefully prepared agenda and conference procedures satisfactory to all countries involved;
• —We think that the actual conference had best wait till 1973;
• —We look forward to the Polish contribution, which we know will be constructive because of all European countries, Poland, the victimof brutal aggression in 1939, has a paramount stake in peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

5. On MBFR, you should note that:

• —There was agreement in Moscow to begin preparatory consultations soon;
• —This should be done in a special forum of the countries directly involved (those with forces and territory in Central Europe, i.e., including Poland);
• —We expect these consultations to run in parallel with those on the security conference.

6. On bilateral economic relations, your position is complicated by the fact that you did not grant EX–IM credits to the Soviets. It would arouse the Soviets if you now went ahead with Poland. You should say that:

• —You are very favorably disposed toward granting Poland early EX–IM facilities;
• —For domestic US reasons it is important that the Poles move to a settlement of their unfulfilled obligation to US dollar bondholders;
• —When this occurs, you will review the matter promptly and sympathetically.

Note: The Poles have indicated a willingness to proceed on the bond issue by the end of June.

Note: The Poles have MFN; there is no issue here.

To sweeten the pot for the Poles, you can also indicate that you:

• —Will sympathetically consider seeking legislation that would make Poland again eligible for PL–480 sales (the legislation involved would make all countries with MFN eligible for PL–480 sales).

On all other economic issues—Polish desire to postpone dollar debt repayment on past PL–480 sales, use of US-owned PL–480 Polish currency (zlotys) for development projects in Poland, joint ventures—you should say that:

• —You are instructing Secretary Peterson to review them promptly and sympathetically;
• —Meanwhile, you note the Poles last year had a 34 million dollar trade surplus with us out of total turnover of 180 million and which certainly can help in financing Polandʼs debt obligations to us.

7. If the Poles raise Radio Free Europe you should:

• —Reaffirm your support of it as an instrument for better communication;
• —Express your conviction that its output is responsible and constructive.

8. You should note:

• —Signature in Warsaw of the long-negotiated consular convention;
• —Initialing in Washington of a new bilateral air agreement;
• —The successful and extensive programs of cultural, educational, scientific and technical cooperation between the US and Poland all of which you support and which will get even more impetus from your visit.

9. You should invite the Polish leaders to the US.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 481, Presidentʼs Trip Files, Presidentʼs Poland Trip, 1 Jun 72. Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2. On April 19 Wojtowicz had told Livingston that the Polish Government, in the wake of the Polish-West German treaty, was hoping for a “clear declaration on the Oder-Neisse Line” from President Nixon during his visit to Poland. (Memorandum for the Record, April 21; ibid., NSC Files, Box 1330, Unfiled Material, 1972, 2 of 8)
3. On May 22 Haig cabled Kissinger in Moscow: “Our Embassy in Bonn believes that the German government would understand the formulation that we ‘welcome’ the West German-Polish treaty, ‘including its border provisions.’ You may wish to consider, prior to the Warsaw stopover, how the West German government should be informed if the President does decide to make such a public statement in Warsaw, which the Poles will certainly want him to do.” (Tohak 71, May 22; ibid., Box 480, Presidentʼs Trip Files, Presidentʼs Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May–Jun 72, TOHAK)