239. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Secretary Kissinger
  • Secretary-designate Vance
  • Dr. Brzezinski
  • Mr. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Ambassador Schaufele, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
  • Ambassador Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
  • Congressman Young, Ambassador-designate to the UN
  • Ms. Holloway, Ambassador Young’s office
  • David Passage, Notetaker


  • Southern Africa

Mr. Vance: May I talk about the practical problems we face in Southern Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Sure.

Mr. Vance: I talked to Peter Ramsbotham. He said Ivor Richard is in South Africa today and will be going to Salisbury either today or tomorrow. He said he thought it would be very helpful if we could say something encouraging to help Richard’s mission.

Secretary Kissinger: (Turning to Schaufele) Did Botha call you on Monday?2

Ambassador Schaufele: Yes, he sent this over (referring to the AF briefing memorandum on the South African note—Tab A).3 It’s not a very encouraging message; they are very unhappy about Namibia.

Mr. Vance: The South Africans are apparently being very difficult with Richard saying the new Administration is not behind the initiative.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is your watch now. But by all means tell Bill what you want and we will be glad to do anything we can to help.

Mr. Habib: Richard is there now?

Mr. Vance: Yes, and he will be seeing people tomorrow. Andy, why don’t you give us your views.

[Page 715]

Congressman Young: Well, I think if we could just sit and talk a bit, there are so many questions coming at us. I have been winging it too often. We need the benefit of your views.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say first that I have asked Jack Reinhardt to join this group. Jack has been in on the initiative from the very beginning. I have sent him in addition on a number of missions to Africa. He has, I think, participated in just about every conversation with Kaunda.

Let me start by giving you a brief description of how we got to where we are.

After Angola, it seemed to me that if we did not take some definite action in southern Africa, events would soon get out of control. The moderates upon whom the continent depends to prevent radicalism from overrunning what democracy there is would be under increasing pressure to adopt guerrilla means in order to achieve majority rule throughout the southern portion of the continent. When we took our first trip, all the Africans wanted was our support for majority rule. I then delivered a major speech in Lusaka, which, I might note, did not get the unanimous approval of the Republican Party, but which had a very salutory effect in Africa. Most people thought we were just talking, but then we set out to implement the policy we had enunciated. We arranged for a meeting with Vorster in Germany. After coming to an understanding of the position he felt he was in and getting some feel for the room which he thought he had for maneuver, we then contacted all of the (Front Line) African Presidents. Up until that time, they had been operating solely in terms of the Nkomo/Smith meetings of last February—that is, within the general context of majority rule. They told us, “We, the African Presidents, think that Rhodesia is insoluble. We don’t believe Smith will ever agree to majority rule. We strongly advise you to try to get Namibia out of the way.”

We intended to get Nyerere behind us, then go to Lusaka, then have a conference, and then independence. This was the basis upon which I met Vorster.

When I first met with Vorster, I explained to him that I saw two possibilities for the unfolding of events in the southern part of the continent. The first was that the problems would simply be solved by force. Matters would be taken out of the hands of those leaders who preferred moderate solutions, and would gravitate towards the hands of the radicals. Sooner or later, foreign forces would probably appear. Or, there could be negotiations.

Vorster asked me what my ideas were. I said I had no solutions. I gave him Nyerere’s proposals on Namibia. He agreed. He said he could not go to Lusaka, but would be willing to go any place in Europe. He said he’d also consider SWAPO participation.

[Page 716]

I then went from Germany to Britain and met with Callaghan and Crosland in the Cabinet Room. The British, you should know, have a new theory on the conduct of international relations. It is that once they have prepared a paper and handed it over to you, they feel they still have the right to completely disavow it on the grounds that it has not been cleared by the Cabinet. Callaghan prepared a paper which he handed over to me in the presence of Crosland and several others of their senior people. The two papers that they prepared were, first, one setting forth the constitutional arrangements for the evolution of power in Rhodesia, and second, the economic arrangements. I then sent Schaufele back to Africa. He was generally well received. Nyerere quite frankly didn’t think that Rhodesia would work out, but he agreed to give it a try. There were three annexes, A, B, and C—the first two of which were relatively inconsequential. The first related to protection for minorities; Annex B were some proposals for the composition of Parliament and voting qualifications. Isn’t that right, Phil?

Mr. Habib: Yes, I think so.

The Secretary: Anyway, Annexes A and B were relatively inconsequential. Annex C was what I proposed in Pretoria. You have Annex C I believe, don’t you.

(Mr. Vance nods affirmatively.)

The British then sent a team here to Washington, where we tried to polish up a few of the details. We then sent two of our people to London to try to make the thing more acceptable. Then Schaufele and Duff went off with Annex C to Africa. The basic proposal was for a Council of State, a Council of Ministers, and two years to independence. Bill (to Schaufele), is it correct to say that all of the essential elements were presented to the presidents.

(Schaufele nods assent.)

We gathered that Annex C would be generally acceptable to the South Africans and to the Presidents. Schaufele and Duff returned to London. I then arranged a meeting with the South Africans in Zurich. On the way to Zurich I stopped in London. Crosland handed me a revised Annex C which, that evening, I handed to Vorster. You have that Annex C in your files.

Vorster accepted this version of Annex C. He undertook to sell it to Smith and said that he would threaten to cut off aid to Rhodesia if they didn’t accept it. He said he would see to it that Smith would not wiggle out of it. The British had said in that draft that the Council of State would have a majority of whites. Vorster said he didn’t think the blacks would accept that, so Callaghan changed it that night to a black majority. This was done in a hasty exchange of cables with London. We then said we doubted that Rhodesia would accept a black majority on the Council of State. We agreed to leave things slightly indefinite. It [Page 717] was against this background, then, that we went to Africa. First we met with Kaunda and Nyerere. Nyerere’s attitude was very clear. He said, “If you think you can perform miracles, go ahead. But I can tell you now it won’t work. Smith won’t accept it.” Kaunda had no major objections to Annex C. They all preferred a Governor General, but no one objected to a Council of State.

Reinhardt, I should tell you, pulled one of his more outrageous stunts on this trip by pretending to be one of the soul brothers of the African tribes. (laughter)

Kaunda raised a number of practical problems, which were relatively inconsequential. He suggested that the timetable for independence be shortened. He also suggested that the Council of State have a British chairman. These were minor problems—nothing of any particular consequence. Regarding Namibia, Kaunda was absolutely delighted. Vorster had accepted precisely what he wanted; all the Africans wanted was a United Nations role and some South African participation.

We then went off to South Africa, and I must say we had a bit of a rough time with Vorster, persuading him to accept the revised proposals. But the most painful negotiations I have spent in my eight years in Washington were the seven hours with Smith. It was really painful. I don’t think I will ever be able to describe exactly how painful it was. For him and his colleagues, there was no question that this represented the end. We were asking them to accept the destruction of everything that they and their fathers had built. They were being asked to sign their own suicide pacts. It may well be that they are actors [omission in the original] were there thought that they were acting. Smith saw major problems in selling this to his people. He thought that perhaps if the chairman of the Council of State could be white and if the Defense and Law and Order ministers were white, he would have a slightly better chance. I said I would undertake to try to sell it to Kaunda and Nyerere.

I then went back to Nyerere and said that the proposal was for a Council of State of five ministers with a white chairman and two white ministers. Nyerere was absolutely ecstatic. He said, “My God, you’ve performed a miracle. There is no need to go through all the details; we’ll work them all out at the conference.” Both he and I held a press conference that same afternoon, and he said essentially the same thing. After Nyerere, I saw Kaunda and I told him that I wasn’t really very confident. I sent a message to Smith that evening through the South Africans, telling him what I had learned about Nyerere’s and Kaunda’s thoughts on the Council of State. After the two meetings with Nyerere and Kaunda, we (referring to those who were on the trip) met to discuss what had taken place. We decided to pass a message to Smith to go ahead and put in the proposal for a Council of State of five with a [Page 718] white chairman and two white ministers. Our thought was that if that were the opening negotiating position, we could then fall back to a black Council of State.

I then returned to Washington through London, and then a strange thing happened. The British totally disavowed their own paper. Crosland told me it had not been submitted to the Cabinet and therefore it had no standing. Now I must tell you, Cy, that in my own discussions I never asked an ambassador whether his papers were cleared within his own government. I simply assume it. Anyway, there in the Cabinet room they disavowed their own paper. Frankly, I must tell you, Cy, I will believe to my dying day that if Smith had gone off to the conference and had proposed the essence of Annex C with a Council of State with five ministers, a white chairman, and whites in the Law and Order and Defense ministries, and independence in two years, that the blacks would have accepted it on the spot. Mark Chona as much as told us so here in Washington last week.

But what happened next was that the British wasted an incredible three weeks in Geneva on the most trivial of issues—in fact, one which was not an issue when Geneva began—the timing of independence. No African had ever objected to two years. Then we saw further internal haggling among the Rhodesians which made the Patriotic Front look positively organized. But it was Ivor Richard’s show. When Richard collapsed on the independence issue, which was the one non-controversial point, everyone having agreed on two years, that simply made everyone think that he’d collapse on anything. And it came apart from there.

On Namibia you’ve seen the seven-point proposal. We have letters from both Kaunda and Nyerere saying that it’s okay. We never surfaced the seven points, however, because we didn’t want two conferences going at the same time. But the second reason was that if we ever put out the seven points, then you’d simply end up in the same sort of situation that we’ve had over Rhodesia. There would be a Front-Line Presidents’ meeting and they would have to reject it. It is a proposal on which everyone agrees. But the minute it is surfaced, each side will take it as the maximum demand from the other side, and they would have to reject it or haggle endlessly over it.

But frankly, I’ve never accepted that Namibia was a difficult problem. The South Africans want rid of it. Vorster won’t talk directly to SWAPO, but beyond that, there are no real substantive problems.

Frankly, Richard’s odyssey through Africa baffles me. He has absolutely no one lined up on anything. He is selling bits and pieces of paper to people, but nothing concrete, and nothing that everyone can agree on. Your problem is going to be to try to reestablish coherency. You have some things going for you. No one wants war to start up [Page 719] again. The Front Line Presidents are united in their desire for a negotiated solution. On Namibia, I think Nujoma will probably come around. What I would recommend would be to organize another conference and find a solution to this problem. Once you have a solution to this problem, the implication will be that you can resolve the other problem.

Mr. Vance: I talked to Chona and the Tanzanian ambassador earlier this week. They were eager of course for some word about what our policies would be. I told them first that the policy was under review. Second, that we placed the highest priority on a negotiated settlement. Third, that we strongly support the British effort to find a solution to the problems, and fourth, that we will maintain the closest possible contact with the Presidents (of the Front-Line states). Regarding Namibia I told them we would maintain our role as an interested observer. Secondly, that we attach highest priority to a peaceful settlement. And third, that we would be in touch with Kaunda as soon as we finished our policy review. My own feeling, very strongly, Andy, is that we should say nothing more until the review is finished. I don’t think anything could possibly be worse than to give the impression of lack of confidence in the British efforts or of some change in our own policy. I talked to Peter Ramsbotham at lunch and he said that they had just put Richard’s proposals into writing. He (Richard) is going to try to get Vorster on board. Regarding Namibia, the Tanzanian ambassador said Nyerere still thinks it’s the easier of the two problems to resolve.

Secretary Kissinger: Me, too. The fact that the South Africans said they’d send someone to the conference gives Vorster a fig leaf, which is important since Vorster said he would never meet with SWAPO. And SWAPO says the Windhoek people have to be part of the South African delegation, which is also probably acceptable.

Mr. Vance: Chona said that today. I asked him whether it was realistic. He said yes, he thought it was.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I’d firm up the seven points. They’re so close together now, there should be no problem at all. The basic essentials are independence by 1978; the points introduce SWAPO into the conference; since SWAPO is recognized by the OAU, there should be no further problem there; it gets the South Africans into the conference; and it binds the South Africans to the results of the conference. If we can bridge these relatively small differences, the South Africans tell us that there should be no further problem from their standpoint. All we’re talking about are minor semantic differences. I’ve told the Africans I think the South Africans will release the prisoners that SWAPO wants.

Mr. Vance: Yes, SWAPO wants some of those people on their delegation, don’t they?

[Page 720]

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. There is one, of course, the South Africans say they’ll never release. But what you have to do is define the frame of reference adequately.

I have to tell you I think the UK has mishandled the whole thing. By giving up right away to the Africans in their insistence on raising the timeframe for independence—which was a non-contentious point—they wasted time and they created the impression that nothing was sacrosanct. Now no one is prepared to believe that the British will hold to anything. The British position is too close to that of the Patriotic Front. In every decision that they have had to make, they have come down on the side of the blacks. That could hardly have been calculated to inspire confidence in either Vorster or Smith that the British can be counted upon to be fair and objective.

Richard is now running around like a travelling salesman. As I see it, you have two options. You can either get the whites to agree to your proposals and then go to the blacks and say “the whites have agreed to this—will you sign?” Or you can get the Africans to agree to a set of proposals, and then you go to the whites to say “here is what the blacks agree to—is this acceptable?” What Vorster’s nightmare is, is that he will agree to a set of proposals and then the Africans will reject it. Is that a fair description, Jack (to Reinhardt)?

Ambassador Reinhardt: Yes, it is. I personally just don’t think it (referring to the Geneva conference) will work. There is now too little confidence on both sides.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. (Turning to Mr. Vance) But please tell Vorster that whatever he would like me to do, I will agree.

Mr. Vance: The one thing I don’t want to do is pull the rug out from under Richard. I don’t think we can do anything else (except support him).

Secretary Kissinger: No, and the most important thing is, you can’t let it be said that Richard’s effort failed because you did not give him support.

Mr. Vance: Should we say anything to Smith?

Secretary Kissinger: I never said anything to him. My tactic was to be active all around him to increase his nervousness, to get everyone else signed up, and then to tell him what I wanted.

Mr. Vance: I saw in the paper that he said the incoming Administration didn’t support the United Kingdom proposals.

Secretary Kissinger: We never told him what we would do or what we would not. We told him we didn’t think he would be pushed beyond Annex C, and I think if you tell him now that you’re fully behind Richard’s proposals, you’ll get an explosion. Why not just wait to see what Richard gets. Why should the new Administration rush to get it[Page 721]self into a bind. I think it’s a waste of time to talk to Smith right now. Get Vorster’s agreement to a set of proposals, then get the Africans behind it. Then tell Smith what you’ve got. If you go to Smith now, he can only reject it. He will claim—I can see exactly what he will say. I can give you a perfect script. If you go to Smith now, he will be forced to reject it. He will claim betrayal. He will quote you Annex C and he’s absolutely right.

Congressman Young: Smith has some sort of private communications channel through Andrews of Allegheny Ludlum Steel, doesn’t he?

Mr. Habib: He’s been in.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I personally believe there is no sense in talking to Smith now until you have a concrete program which you want him to agree to—to which you want a yes or no. If you go in now, Vorster will simply say in Pretoria that he will study it and he will study it to death. In my view, Richard should say to Vorster, look, I’m not asking you to approve this. This is what I’m thinking of. If I get black approval, will you accept it?

Mr. Vance: I think I understand. He should give the proposals to all of them and then he goes home.

Secretary Kissinger: It is mathematically certain that Smith will reject it if Richard goes to Salisbury now. He has no other choice. My advice is to stay out of it.

(Universal agreement)

Mr. Vance: Okay. First we’ll go to Vorster through Botha and say that we understand that these are the proposals and we’re studying them.

Secretary Kissinger: Richard can say to Smith, “I don’t have a consensus yet.”

Mr. Vance: We could say this through Peter (Ramsbotham).

Secretary Kissinger: Especially since he hasn’t seen Nkomo and Mugabe yet.

Ambassador Schaufele: If he’s insistent on going to Salisbury, we could of course ask the South Africans to advise Smith not to say anything, publicly at least.

Secretary Kissinger: Basically, I fundamentally do not believe in diplomatic trips where you believe failure is certain. After I got Vorster signed up, I gave him two weeks to work on Smith. I said I wouldn’t agree to meet with Smith unless Vorster could guarantee that Smith would agree. Even if Vorster agreed to Richard’s proposals tomorrow, he’s still got to work on Smith. Vorster isn’t going to agree to Richard’s proposals right away. What kind of position does that leave him in vis-à-vis Smith?

[Page 722]

Congressman Young: One thing that could be pointed out to Vorster is that there has been some progress in putting together a coherent black leadership group. Up until this time, it seemed as though the Front Line nations had no control over the nationalists and there was no unified leadership. As of the most recent Lusaka conference,4 at least they have now agreed to deal through the Patriotic Front, and the Patriotic Front appears to be in control of the military situation. They simply couldn’t back Muzorewa. Now, at least, Vorster would be agreeing to someone who had some military control. As I understand it, they’re not committed to the Patriotic Front as the ultimate government, but only to the Front as a negotiating instrument. Muzorewa can always, of course, participate or even recover power through elections. But at last there is some organization in the black ranks. This is the first time this has been the case in 15 years, so if Vorster wants some element of control, this may well be better.

Ambassador Schaufele: Mugabe?

Secretary Kissinger: He’s out of control. He’s absolutely untrustworthy. Even though Mugabe has some authority over guerrillas outside Rhodesia, Mugabe has no power inside Rhodesia. That, at least, is the perception of the South Africans, and probably of Smith.

Ambassador Schaufele: It certainly is.

Secretary Kissinger: If I could have picked someone from the beginning, it would have been Nkomo. Muzorewa has been all over the map. First he was on the side of the guerrillas, now he’s on the side of the peacemakers. He’s certainly no great hero. Nkomo is the best. What I don’t understand is, is he just a figurehead for Mugabe or does he have power of his own?

Congressman Young: Chona at least seems to feel that once agreement is reached, the guerrillas can be dealt with by sending one battalion to Tanzania, one to Zambia, and so on and so you can get rid of them.

Secretary Kissinger: Look, if Chona can deliver and you can hold elections without a guerrilla threat, that’s the ideal script. But the trouble is, as soon as you get the Africans to agree, then they raise the ante.

Congressman Young: I believe Kaunda and Nyerere and even Machel believe they can keep the Patriotic Front supported and under control.

[Page 723]

Secretary Kissinger: My own judgment is that if you could go to Vorster and say here is a concrete plan; I have the black Presidents and the Patriotic Front agreed to it. The civil service will stay in place; Vorster will agree. But if you give him nothing, he’ll simply recite a long series of betrayals, dig himself in and you’ll get nothing.

Congressman Young: The Nigerian role was interesting. Garba says he’s never heard of Mugabe; that Mugabe is a plant.

Secretary Kissinger: (laughing) Is he our plant? (Turning to Vance) I never did get AF under control.

Mr. Habib: Mugabe may be a bit more responsive to control by Nyerere and not so much by Kaunda.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s a bit like dealing with the Harvard faculty. (laughter)

Ambassador Reinhardt: He certainly has no following inside the country.

Congressman Young: My own feeling is that Muzorewa and Nkomo basically had no following with the guerrillas and no feeling for what they wanted.

Secretary Kissinger: If someone could plausibly tell Vorster that the Patriotic Front is only an instrument for arranging for a ceasefire and an interim government and will then be disbanded, my guess is that Vorster would probably go for it. I think there’s about a 60–40 chance. But if this is simply put in some sort of vague form, Vorster is not going to agree.

Congressman Young: Chona has a plan to disperse the mercenaries.

Dr. Brzezinski: The white mercenaries?

Congressman Young: Yes. I don’t know precisely how it will work.

Mr. Vance: Well, as I see it, we have a couple of things to do. First, I’ll talk to Botha and tell him what we’ve agreed to. Then I’ll ask Peter Ramsbotham whether they really want to go forward.

Congressman Young: I would think the British must be getting awfully tired of this by now.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and you watch. They’ll try to stick us with failure. Frankly, I think Richard should go home after he sees Vorster.

Ambassador Schaufele: My own fear is that the British will say look, we’ve got the nationalists on board, now you produce South Africa. The British, you know, haven’t always kept us very well informed about what they’re up to. We don’t have any real idea what they’re telling the nationalists.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in my own view, the convincing argument why Richard should not go to Salisbury now, or even in the fore[Page 724]seeable future, is if you’re going to depend on Vorster to bring pressure on Smith, it’s going to be harder if Smith is already on record as having rejected your proposals.

Mr. Habib: Publicly.

Secretary Kissinger: Publicly.

Congressman Young: I just can’t see Ivor Richard with enough energy to push anything through right now. He should go home and rest.

Secretary Kissinger: My strong advice is I didn’t have enough fire power in the remaining days of this Administration to compel either the nationalists or the Rhodesians to be sensible. But I think a halt has to be called to the nonsense. You put together a package that the blacks can agree on, you then can go to Vorster and say this is what we have gotten them to agree to. The white judiciary and civil service and defense will stay in place for the interim government. You tell the Patriotic Front if the whites don’t get this, they don’t agree. Chona recommended that they agree. I have no reason to believe that they would not agree.

Congressman Young: Is there any financial responsibility, Mr. Secretary, that we might have to take to Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there is none apart from the Zimbabwe development fund, which you know about. We have commitments from a number of countries.

Congressman Young: Are we talking about very much—perhaps a billion dollars?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we’re only talking about three or four hundred million and that over a period of five years.

Congressman Young: Would this be administered only by ourselves or could it go through an international institution such as the World Bank?

Ambassador Schaufele: The World Bank is interested in it.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no fixed ideas.

Mr. Vance: What’s the best way out of this?

Secretary Kissinger: I should stay out of it.

Ambassador Schaufele: I’ll talk to Botha and Peter Ramsbotham. Shall I refer to this meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but just make sure that it’s understood that it comes from Cy.

Mr. Vance: Yes, that’s fine.

Congressman Young: We can say there’s been a meeting of the two Administrations and a review of the policies to see where we are now. We can say we’re encouraged by the progress shown so far.

Mr. Habib: I think they are simply waiting it out.

[Page 725]

Mr. Vance: Yes, but if they know we’re both behind it, it would be an encouraging sign.

Ambassador Schaufele: The South Africans, you know, are being very “iffy” about this. The latest note is very negative.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I’m surprised and frankly, I gave Botha hell the other day.5

Ambassador Schaufele: He was quite negative on Namibia too. Maybe they’re just posturing. I think the South Africans are just afraid the new Administration is going to be very hard on them.

Mr. Vance: Phil?

Mr. Habib: Part of the message to Botha might well be that Richard is going to fail and that they, the South Africans, should not drop the effort to find a negotiated solution just because Richard fails.

Secretary Kissinger: Now wait a minute. The message should be that the new Administration is behind the British effort and will do everything possible to help it succeed.

Mr. Vance: Yes. We want them to know that we will continue to be supportive.

Mr. Habib: And the second part would be not to leave the impression that Richard should go to Salisbury.

Mr. Vance: Oh, no. This is their decision that they have to make. We’ll simply say that we believe that with good will and serious intent both sides can find a reasonable solution.

Secretary Kissinger: (laughs at the reference) You know, did I ever tell you the great one that Le Duc Tho played on me? He came up to me at the end of one of the Vietnam meetings and looked me in the eye and said, “You know, I want to talk to you with good will and serious intent—frankly, sincerely, open-heartedly—you’re a liar.” (great laughter)

Mr. Habib: What should we say to Ramsbotham?

Secretary Kissinger: Tell him exactly what you told the South Africans so they (the British) can’t stick you with not having kept them fully informed. Secondly, you can say that we seriously question whether Richard should go to Salisbury because if he does go to Salisbury, Smith will simply reject it and it will complicate the burden Vorster will have of trying to sell Smith.

Ambassador Schaufele: There is an additional problem. If Andy Young goes to Zanzibar, he’s going to get stuck with all sorts of questions.

[Page 726]

Congressman Young: I think I should simply say that I’ve been sworn in less than a week. I’m there to listen. I’m not there to make policy.

Mr. Vance: That’s absolutely right, Andy.

Secretary Kissinger: What’s going on in Zanzibar?

Ambassador Schaufele: It’s the tenth anniversary of the Declaration of Arusha.

(Meeting ended at 7:30 pm.)

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 97, Geopolitical File, Africa, Chronological File, January 15–20, 1977. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Initialed by Passage. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
  2. January 17.
  3. Not attached.
  4. The Front Line Presidents, meeting in Lusaka January 8–9, issued a communiqué supporting the Patriotic Front headed by Mugabe and Nkomo. (“Five Black African Countries Back Patriotic Front in Rhodesia Dispute,” The New York Times, January 10, 1977, p. 3)
  5. See Document 238.