Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa

125. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 20, 1975, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• 40 Committee Meeting, 20 August 1975, 3:00 p.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present: Director of INR William Hyland; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General John W. Pauly; Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. Colonel Robert C. McFarlane. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs L. Bruce Laingen was present for Item 1; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs James G. Lowenstein was present for Item 2; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy, Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts, and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan were present for Item 3; Deputy Chief, Europe Division, CIA, [name not declassified] was present for Items 1 and 2.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

3. Angola

Colby: (Briefed—using charts.)²

Kissinger: Are we still playing around with lifting Portuguese out of Angola?

Sisco: We told Carlucci that we could offer the Portuguese help.³

Kissinger: Depending upon what their policy is. We’re not a charity organization.

Sisco: We’ll remind Carlucci.

Kissinger: They want us to help with the lift, but before we help we want to know what their policy is toward Angola.

Sisco: It would destabilize the situation . . .

Kissinger: Don’t use that word. Let the record show that the word “destabilize” is banned and was not said here.

Sisco: Well, would continue the evolution of deterioration in Angola.

Kissinger: In this we can get both—we need an excuse to ask the Portuguese what they are going to do in Angola.

Clements: How are we going to help? With an air lift?

Kissinger: Fuel, expediting acquisition of a 747 they are trying to purchase.

Hyland: The 747 is in the mill, but they want it now.

Kissinger: We can slow up if we have to, as leverage in Lisbon to discuss Angola.

Clements: Darn good idea.

Colby: (Continued briefing.)

Sisco: It looks to me as if Kaunda is getting a little scared.

Colby: He’s scared of being tainted with CIA.

Kissinger: Okay by me, just so Savimbi gets the arms he needs.

Colby: (Continued briefing.)

Kissinger: I must say that when you guys get started with something, you really can produce.

Clements: Right. Those armored cars. We’ve been discussing those—where, when, if we can get them . . .

Mulcahy: Who is going to pay?

Clements: Right; they cost [dollar amount not declassified] to [dollar amount not declassified] each.

Potts: Mobutu had agreed to deliver 12. We were told that the lead time was such that we couldn’t make the boat. If we can do so, we should.

Colby: I’m getting to that. We’ve spent most of the money the Committee authorized; we’re running out of money.

Kissinger: What do you need?

Colby: There are three choices. We can piddle around which will take about [dollar amount not declassified]

Kissinger: No. That won’t do.

Colby: We can go for a concerted, continuing effort at [dollar amount not declassified] Or, we can go all out to win the war, and that would cost about [dollar amount not declassified]

Kissinger: You’re not seriously suggesting the [dollar amount not declassified]

Colby: No. But my problem is that we are running out of money. By the end of June we had about [dollar amount not declassified]

Kissinger: Has the Committee ever considered bank robberies?

Sisco: Assassination to bank robberies!

Colby: This will be the first time we have run out of funds in the Reserve in all our experience. There’s some money going in, but more is going out.

Kissinger: Isn’t any new money added?

Colby: [2½ lines not declassified]

Clements: You want more dollars put in.

Colby: Yes. We had [dollar amount not declassified] and spent [dollar amount not declassified] already.

Kissinger: Is any new money going in?

Colby: No. We need to take [dollar amount not declassified] out, and we were talking about other draws from the Reserve just 10 minutes ago. We are going to end up with less than [dollar amount not declassified] for the rest of the fiscal year. I think we should go to the Congress and ask for [less than 1 line not declassified] for Angola.

Kissinger: Why not? What do you think?

Hyland: We’ve already given about [dollar amount not declassified] We’ve given them quite a bit already and they haven’t done too much with it. I’d want to see some more solid results.

Kissinger: When do you need an answer?

Colby: Well, they’ve already marked up, but it’s not too late . . .

Kissinger: Congress won’t be back before early September.

Colby: I’ll have to get OMB’s okay, too.

Clements: It’s a calculated risk. You’re including what’s in the budget process now?

Colby: Yes.

Kissinger: Our only concern is that we do what is necessary to win. It is a mistake to consistently try to see how we can get by with the minimum expenditure.

Colby: If we use [dollar amount not declassified] now, then in the next few months we will need another [dollar amount not declassified] and we will end up with nothing in the Reserve. We can’t get a supplemental.

Clements: [1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: I’ll talk to the President tonight. If the decision is to approve [dollar amount not declassified] now, can you put the armored vehicles on the ship?

Clements: Done.

Colby: No problem.

Kissinger: I’ll tell the President that there is no use to ante [dollar amount not declassified] unless we go get another [dollar amount not declassified] for Angola.⁴

Clements: Bill, have you talked to your Congressional contacts about this?

Colby: Yes, I’ve briefed them.

Kissinger: No problems?

Colby: No problems. Some said they didn’t like it, but . . .

Kissinger: What do you call a problem?

Colby: What I am concerned about is a leak.

Sisco: It is bound to blow.

Hyland: We got this cable today . . .⁵

Potts: But that’s not based on anything.

Hyland: Well, they’ve got the facts straight.

Kissinger: (To Colby) Can you get together a white paper⁶ to show what funds have been dispersed by the Soviets and Yugoslavs for the MPLA?

Colby: Yes, that might be helpful to show Congress.

Kissinger: People in my Department worry because there’s not much of a coalition. If a coalition bothers them, there’s the MPLA.

Colby: Talk federation—they can work that out.

Hyland: We can’t do much until Roberto/Savimbi stop the MPLA.

Kissinger: Anything’s better than a MPLA victory.

Sisco: The Portuguese Communists will try to work something out with Neto.

Kissinger: That’s why we must back a coalition.

Colby: Confederation.

Kissinger: We don’t need a total victory.

1. Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on August 21.
2. Not attached.
3. In telegram 197494 to Lisbon, August 20, Kissinger instructed Carlucci to inform Costa Gomes that the United States was prepared to assist in the evacuation of refugees from Angola to Portugal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
4. See Document 126.
5. Not further identified.
6. Not found.