185. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Goodpaster)1

Gen—Can you hear me?

CJCS—Yes, can you hear me okay?

Gen—I can hear you not too clearly, but I think if we talk slowly we can make it.

CJCS—Well, we got this message from Jim Eade about information that he needed. I just wanted you to know that we had instructed the people at Lajes—both at MAC and TAC—to make USCINCEUR information addee on every movement and, I think, that the problem has probably been a communications saturation. But, in any event, the plan now for this week (unless it is changed and, I am telling you, things are changing back here every one or three hours). First I was told not to land anybody in Israel except at night; then we were told to take the material as far as Lajes and then the commercial air would pick it up and then we were finally told that all restraints were off and to start a stream of supplies to Israel. So, now, the plan is every 24 hours you will have four C5As and 12 C141s, every 24 hours. We’ll send you the exact schedule. It is generally speaking, there are times when they have got these planes going off at 30-minute intervals. Now we are having another meeting at 10002 which is in forty minutes from now, and an NSC Meeting this afternoon at 16003 and, if anything comes out of it that has anything to do with policy, I’ll send you a message. As a matter of fact, I can (or else) call you in the morning, would, perhaps be better the first thing in the morning to call you. What they are trying to do now, of course and the rationale for making this supply is we are saying that the Russians did it first when they got up to 3,000 tons about then we started supplies ourselves. That is the public statement that is being made. Also, there are 8 F4 Phantoms already arrived in Israel and there are 6 airborne right now; that should get there within the next two hours. That will make a total of 14 F4s and we have 8 more standing by in the Azores and that decision hasn’t been made yet.

We are looking also at the possibility of “leapfrogging” some A4s through the carriers begin[Page 524]ning with Kennedy and, then, to Roosevelt and then to Independence and then to Israel.

Gen—That’s probably good. You are getting the static, I am sure, about and the concern about making use of any of the bases in the NATO countries.

CJCS—Yes, the only one we are using is the Portuguese.

Gen—Or, in Spain.


Gen—The Europeans, NATO, I think the Italians or even the Greeks and, certainly the Turks. In fact there is, an awful lot of sensitivity over here about doing anything—supporting anything out of Europe and, even, to the extent of sensitivity over pulling any equipment out of here to go down there. I might just say that, my own feeling is that our Allies are being given pretty much of a free ride on that. I guess we’ll get it straightened out later or it will have to be straightened out by somebody if we really come to need to take that kind of action.

CJCS—You ought to know that (yes) Senator Jackson has been pressing us hard to take equipment out of Europe to show the NATO allies that this is their responsibility, too.

Gen—Who has been pushing you on that, Tom?

CJCS—Scoop Jackson, Senator Jackson. But, we have, as you know, haven’t taken any equipment out of Europe, yet.

Gen—I don’t disagree in principle; I think it is a practical question but whether you want to take on that much more grief because it’ll be a lot of pain and noises about that. On the other hand, I have to sympathize with his standpoint because these people sure are taking a free ride by coughing up to the Arabs while the US takes care of Israel.

CJCS—Exactly and it kind of makes HAK mad as hell you know. Anyway, right now, we haven’t given any consideration to any augmentation. We might send (we’re giving serious thought) to sending another nuclear-powered submarine into the Mediterranean; and we have that request from Jim Eade to move two destroyers further East and I’ll take that up this morning.

Gen—You have also got Jim Eade’s message (attached)4 there that should (he discussed it with me) on starting to get some of the Americans out of these countries if the temperatures (which may go up pretty fast) when the extent of this resupply . . . aerial resupply becomes known.

CJCS—Yes, you’re right. That is about all I have now, Andy, because the rules of the game have been changing almost hourly.

[Page 525]

Gen—I can understand that. I’ll pass this on to Jim right away.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East war.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Diary, October 1973. Top Secret. The transcript is an entry in Moorer’s Diary. Moorer was in Washington; Goodpaster was in Brussels.
  2. See Document 186.
  3. No NSC meeting was held.
  4. Attached, but not printed. General George J. Eade, USAF, was Deputy Com-mander in Chief of the U.S. European Command.