184. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger1

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry.

K: Just for your information but not—I won’t use it at the WSAG—the Soviets came in around 3:00 o’clock this morning with a proposal for a new move which we are now exploring.2

[Page 522]

S: Very good.

K: Which would go back to the ceasefire idea of Saturday3 and just link it to Resolution 242 which we can live with.

S: Good.

K: You know—but that we want to keep very quiet yet. I think we—the thing obviously they are sweating out is the—I think we should just keep going all out now on the supplies.

S: OK. You want to move in those additional six . . .

K: I would move them tomorrow.

S: OK. Now there is one little leery(?) [area?] I am worrying about and that is the resupply of 175 mm ammo. As you know they have got their self-propelled 175 threatening Damascus and we ought to think very carefully about supplying ammo for the destruction of Damascus. I don’t want an answer from you now but I ah . . .

K: OK. Well, let me see whether I can make sure that they won’t shell Damascus.

S: OK. They are also pressing for bridging equipment and the bridges equipment in view of the dearth of rivers, obviously is directed towards the move into Afghan(?) crossing this canal. Well, think about those and . . .

K: Let me think about that.

S: OK.

K: Good.

S: Anything else?

K: No, I just wanted to give you that latest reading which I won’t—I’ll just mention at the WSAG(? ? ?).4

S: Splendid.

K: That the diplomacy is going along.

S: Good.

K: Good. Bye.

S: Bye.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, Box 23. No classification marking.
  2. In his memoirs, Kissinger wrote that on the morning of October 15, Dobrynin informed him that “Moscow was studying our proposal to link a cease-fire not to Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders but to a general reaffirmation of Resolution 242, which—at least in Israel’s interpretation, not challenged by us—was ambiguous on that point. If such a formulation were fianlly accepted, this would lead to rapid progress in the Security Council. (Years of Upheaval, p. 524)
  3. October 13.
  4. The question marks are in the original. See Document 186.