Office of the Historian

87. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting1

Washington, July 7, 1975.

[Omitted here are a list of attendees and discussion of unrelated matters.]

Secretary Kissinger: No problem. Bill?

Mr. Rogers: On Panama, it’s desirable to stop things coming out lately. Things are fairly quiet in Panama. I talked to Jorden yesterday evening. Things are fairly underground.

Secretary Kissinger: Did you send that message?2

Mr. Rogers: Yes, sir. But I asked him what kind of message he could propose. Torrijos has called Gonzalez back for a full-scale policy review. Gonzalez will be coming into the Department this morning with the usual question on his tongue—when Bunker is returning.

That’s one decision.

The other decision: Obviously, we face under any circumstances—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you can tell him that Bunker will return. On any hypothesis we’re going to send him down.

Mr. Rogers: Well, I think if we can strike a bargain on [with] Defense with respect to the two open issues—

Secretary Kissinger: It won’t work.

Mr. Rogers: Don’t be so pessimistic.

[Page 237]

Secretary Kissinger: They’re now opposed to an agreement altogether.

Mr. Rogers: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn’t make any difference what your terms are.

Mr. Rogers: We looked at the question you asked me on Saturday—whether or not we can postpone the initialing of the treaty until after the elections, and my answer is yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Then we have a chance.

Mr. Ingersoll: I was surprised to have Callaway say that he was for a treaty at one time. But now he’s turned against it completely.

Secretary Kissinger: He made a mistake, and he’s letting it go up for discussion. As long as they thought a treaty was inevitable, we would cooperate. Even that may not do it because if they feed a public debate on whether there’ll be a treaty, which [we?] may not be able to initial it even after.

Mr. Rogers: Well, I think let’s take it piece by piece and not go to the man on the big issue. (a), if we can hold off that—

Secretary Kissinger: That we have to do on constitutional grounds. It’s absolutely independent—that’s totally independent of the merits of the Snyder amendment. But if we permit Congress to determine what we can negotiate about by withholding funds, we’re going to shift the balance in the foreign policy field totally. If the Congress precludes itself from passing on the merits of the negotiation by withholding funds, I think we have to be very, very tough on them.

Mr. Rogers: Right. The second thing which I think is crucial: Bunker —to get back there. We’re now facing up to the fundamental issue of a treaty, when it will be signed. I’ll get an analytical paper up to you.3 But this is going to have a very serious effect on our capacity to hold things together back here.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated matters.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Lot 78D443, ES177, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, July 7, 1975. Secret. The minutes list both an 8 a.m. and a 9:10 a.m. start time for the meeting.↩
  2. Telegram 4007 from Panama City, July 7, reported that Ambassador Jorden had conveyed a message from Kissinger to Torrijos by telephone, which emphasized the continuing U.S. commitment to obtaining a treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])↩
  3. The July 7 paper outlined a compromise position to “stretch out” negotiations. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 14, Briefing Memoranda, 1975, [1])↩