80. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting1
[Omitted here are a list of attendees and discussion of unrelated matters.]
[Mr. Rogers:] Also, on Panama, you’re aware that Ellsworth feels that he would like to get back before the end of the month. He’s under significant pressure from Torrijos, who was saying that his time is running out.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, we better decide what we’re going to do.
Mr. Rogers: That’s the basic issue—whether or not aid to a country initially soon or so can be done at first, and then an amendment on instructions.
Those papers I think are pretty well completed in the White House. There’s one more paper going in this afternoon.
Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean “White House”?
Mr. Rogers: At the NSC. These are what Clements made May 23rd,2 which are things he was supposed to produce.
Secretary Kissinger: No, but I don’t want Clements against everybody. I want opposition and Clements position. That’s two alternatives.
Mr. Rogers: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: What’s your view?
Mr. Rogers: (a), that we should amend Ellsworth’s instruction; (b), that he should be encouraged to go back and work out an initial conceptual agreement as soon as possible.
[Page 226]Whether that needs to go public or not is another question, although my opinion is there’s no reason not to.
Secretary Kissinger: It can’t be kept secret. In fact, if it is supposed to do Torrijos any good, it has to be public.
Mr. Rogers: Mr. Secretary, it puts the President in an absolutely impossible position.
Secretary Kissinger: Why?
Mr. Rogers: That he should offer Torrijos the possibility of postponing the treaty until January of 1977 invites the charge of duplicity, both in terms of domestic politics and in terms of international relations.
Secretary Kissinger: Besides, it would get public, so we pay exactly the same price.
Mr. Rogers: It invites initial repercussions.
Secretary Kissinger: But it is a major problem because these Panama people are getting a tremendous head of steam up.
Mr. Rogers: Well, I think there are two things to be said about that. In the first place, there are plenty of Republicans and Democrats who say, “If you get that treaty up there this year, with a good strong Presidential support we’ll get it through for you.”
Secondly, with respect to the resolution that Thurmond wrote and got 34 signatures on, there’s less to that than meets the eye. That was a very carefully written resolution designed for people to get the broadest possible support and command the signatures of those who—
Secretary Kissinger: You know, the political problem for the President is that all the opponents are right wing Republicans—or most of them.
Mr. Rogers: It’s a political problem in both directions. You know, we’re that far out on a limb that if he fails to move the matter for now within the next 18 months and we have an international blow-up, it’s going to have a major effect on his international reputation.
Mr. Ingersoll: Clements failed to put in the land/water distribution also. He didn’t come up with anything on that.3
Secretary Kissinger: Well, that I think is stupid anyway, because if we give away the land and water just to get 18 months, we won’t have any bargaining material.
Mr. Ingersoll: No. I mean for the long-range issue.
[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Lot 78D443, Box 7, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, June 9, 1975. Secret. The minutes are mistakenly dated May 9.↩
- See Document 79.↩
- A June 11 memorandum from Ingersoll to Kissinger, conveyed a point-by-point rebuttal of Clements’ May 23 memorandum. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–77, Box 7, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations [3])↩