Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

79. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 23, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations

This memorandum is a follow-up to the recent NSC discussion of measures which may permit the United States to meet its commitment concerning a new Panama Canal Treaty without incurring unacceptable domestic political costs.

While I am convinced that it is in the interest of the United States to continue to negotiate for a new Panama Canal Treaty in accordance with the Tack-Kissinger agreement of February 1974, I am equally convinced that to attempt to achieve a new treaty before the 1976 Presidential election would be both impractical and politically damaging. In order both to spin out the negotiations and to avoid a serious confrontation, I believe that we should embark on a series of steps designed to create a sense of momentum toward a mutually satisfactory treaty relationship; to this end, I suggest the following actions:

1. President Ford should invite the Panamanian Chief of Government, Brigadier General Torrijos, to visit Washington and the United States. During this visit, President Ford would

—Explain in complete candor the political problem which would result if the Administration were to confront the Congress in a treaty ratification fight before the election.

—Convince Brigadier General Torrijos of the good faith of the United States Government in continuing steadfastly to pursue the objective of a new treaty despite significant Congressional opposition.

—Establish a target date of early 1977 for initialling the new treaty and initiating ratification procedures in both countries.

—Convince Brigadier General Torrijos of the futility of violent Panamanian reaction to this delay in achieving a treaty, since such a reaction would clearly preclude treaty ratification for many years.

—Propose to Brigadier General Torrijos the actions enumerated in the following paragraphs.

2. Propose a differential duration concept, with a treaty duration of no less than 25 years for Canal operation, and between 40 and 50 years for Canal defense.

—Panama has stated that it cannot accept a 50 year treaty duration while the United States is currently committed to a minimum of 50 years’ duration.

—The United States and Panama should both compromise on this issue, as described above.

3. Propose that, consistent with the current U.S. concept for the defense of the Canal against external aggression, Panama participate in that defense and share designated training areas.

—To facilitate implementation of this shared responsibility, a U.S.-Panama Combined Canal Defense Board should be established.

—The Combined Defense Board would make appropriate recommendations to the senior United States and Panamanian military commanders having responsibility for local Canal defense.

4. Propose that Panama and the United States agree conceptually upon a bilateral mutual assistance arrangement for post-treaty Canal defense.

5. Propose that, between now and early 1977, the U.S. should unilaterally take a series of steps which meet some of Panama’s aspirations for gaining control of Canal-associated activities, while reducing somewhat the U.S. involvement in them.

—Unilateral actions envisioned include only those which the Executive Branch could take without Congressional action.

—List of actions is at Tab A.²

6. Attempt to increase Panama’s revenues from the Canal, either by authorizing for Panama funds derived from increasing tolls, or by appropriating funds for this purpose. (NOTE: Legislative action would be necessary.)

W.P. Clements, Jr.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–78–0058, Panama 821 (Jan–Jul) 1975. Secret. A copy was sent to Ingersoll.
2. Tab A, entitled “Unilateral Actions (Require No Congressional Action),” undated, is attached but not printed. Among the proposed unilateral actions were: using Panamanian license plates on Canal Zone privately-owned vehicles; consolidating and reducing the SOUTHCOM structure; leasing lands to Panama; and increasing the utilization of Panamanian employees in the Canal Zone work force.