71. Action Memorandum From Ambassador at Large Bunker to Secretary Kissinger1

Panama Negotiation

Problem:

In order to make it possible to secure a treaty in a time frame acceptable from foreign- and domestic-policy viewpoints a rapid decision on relaxation of the Presidential negotiating instructions is required.

If the decision is to be delayed—or be unfavorable, which would mean no treaty—I should start now to slow the negotiating pace and otherwise try to minimize the unpleasant consequences.

The NSC staff has my recommendations to you. Copy attached.2

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Discussion:

Concluding a treaty hinges on the President relaxing the instructions on two issues:

—its duration

—how much land/water area we keep.

I believe that Defense is not immovable on that relaxation. Without it I will have inadequate bargaining counters to reach an agreement which protects US interests yet is acceptable to Panama.

If in your NSC role you recommend the relaxation to the President—and he agrees—before your Latin American trip,3 I can return to Panama with viable new positions by the end of this month.

Tactically, I should be negotiating there just after your trip . . . and just before the OASGA here.4

My objective would be to have a treaty ready for you to sign in late June or early July.

Delay beyond that in delivering it to the President for submission to the Congress would seem inadvisable. Growing election-campaign concerns will make for increasing disinclination to address an issue such as this. The treaty might have to be put over until 1977. That could lead to a situation of confrontation with Panama, injurious also to our efforts in Latin America.

On the other hand, if a more accommodating posture toward Panama is not in the cards, then we should begin moving now to minimize our certain losses.

Recommendation:

That this matter be given priority consideration.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 1, Nodis Msc Documents, Tels, Etc, 1974–1977 (3). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bunker.
  2. The March 28 memorandum to Kissinger, which provides justification for relaxing the negotiating instructions, is not attached; a copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–78–0058, Panama 821, Jan–Jun 1975.
  3. Kissinger did not travel to Latin America until February 1976.
  4. The OAS General Assembly met from May 8 to 19 in Washington.