Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

43. Transcript of a Briefing by the Deputy U.S. Negotiator (Bell)¹

Washington, May 28, 1974, 5 p.m.

I. INTRODUCTION

In faithful reflection of the Contadora Island style of negotiation which the distinguished chief negotiators have chosen, this briefing will be warm, candid, informal, and rambling.

I have a lot of notes here for two reasons.

First, because I want to address myself specifically to a number of questions that have been raised—and a number of fears that have been voiced.

Second, because we have now completed the first stage of the negotiation, and are entering the second. Some refer to it as the “feature attraction.” Perhaps it is rather more accurate to refer to it as the main bout. I would like to set the stage for it carefully.

My remarks break down generally into three categories:

1. Comments on the last round of talks in Panama.

2. The philosophy and tactics underlying the future of the negotiations.

3. How this government should prepare itself for that negotiating future.

II.

The last round of talks in Panama.²

A. The telegraphic traffic presented the picture.

—we completed the “preliminaries” with the agreement on the major issues that flow from the Principles.

—these are a neutral statement of the issues.

—more importantly, they were arrived at jointly. The fact that they are a joint product is encouraging because this has been helpful for Gonzalez-Revilla. That leads me to comment on Gonzalez-Revilla. He is a reflection of General Torrijos, not Tack. That is, he is Torrijos’ man. That Tack would accept a product to which Gonzalez-Revilla made a heavy contribution is significant.

B. I would like to make two comments on this last round of talks.

First, Panama has continued to demonstrate a particular sort of approach to the negotiations. I want to define this approach with some precision, lest there be any erroneous impressions:

a. It is a flexible approach—but not necessarily concessional:

—they are willing to debate, even change their positions. For example, Panama has withdrawn its demand for inclusion of civil and criminal jurisdiction as a major issue. We have not observed that willingness to debate, to change, in quite a number of years.

b. It is an approach which reflects an increasing sense of practicality—a sense of what will, and what will not, work in the real world.

—that is not to say that the Panamanians are off their sovereignty trip—they will be on that forever.

—but, they are beginning to perceive that sovereignty will not be diluted in unacceptable ways by agreeing to practical working arrangements with the United States, on a transitional basis.

—An example of this practicality: the Panamanians have agreed to accord “use” rights to the United States. This is an almost unprecedented action by the Panamanians—one which the negotiators consider to be a major breakthrough. It represents a practicality that we have not observed before.

c. It is an approach that hinges—I repeat, hinges—on the continuation of the style of negotiation Ambassador Bunker has established: the informality, the plain talk, the friendliness which he has offered the Panamanians.

—These things diminish the intensity of what I call the “fright factor”—the fear the Panamanians have of our power . . . of our expertise . . . and of our motivations. This fear has done great harm to past negotiations.

—Any reversion to the more formal style of negotiation, whatever its merits, could cause an intensification of the “fright factor” that could be a cause for failure of the negotiations.

d. It is an approach which reflects, in my judgment, a firm decision on the part of Panama to conclude a treaty as promptly as possible.

—We have not observed this determination to conclude a treaty on the part of the Panamanians in the recent past.

—I sense it is because Torrijos wants a treaty—and that it doesn’t have to be a 100% Panamanian treaty.

e. In sum, it is an approach with which the United States can work. It is an approach which we can exploit, and are doing so.

But it takes an effort on our part to respond as the Panamanians come along; we must persistently tailor our own approach to their approach.

Let me illustrate how the Panamanians are coming along. I raised with Gonzalez-Revilla the question of a Panamanian concession to show Panama’s good faith in the negotiations. Until now, I said, all Panama had done to show its good faith was maintain a good climate for the talks. I thought that now would be a good time for Panama to go beyond this. I suggested some ideas on what I thought would be reasonable concessions. A short time later I received a message from Gonzalez that Panama would recede from its demand for control over schools and hospitals in the Zone while U.S. citizens were still there. Panama regards this as a major concession.

My second comment on the last round of negotiations concerns the problems and awkwardness for the United States of negotiating in Panama, on an isolated island, many miles away from Washington.

—I am afraid that is an awkwardness that we must bear:

—Washington must bear the negotiators’ seemingly unreasonable and intemperate demands for prompt comments on positions.

—The negotiators must bear Washington’s seeming sluggishness in responding.

—But the U.S. can bear this inconvenience. Panama, limited in its negotiating skills, still frightened, gun-shy, cannot.

One point here, at the risk of seeming to indulge in the traditional whine of negotiators:

—there has to be a recognition that

a. the negotiators are in fact negotiating. As the Secretary said during his October 5 meeting with the Foreign Minister in New York, “We cannot impose our will, and neither can you extort from us.”³ The negotiators will not impose the U.S. will on Panama. We are bargaining, and we will try to obtain the maximum, but we will not get everything we want.

b. There will be times when we cannot accept suggestions we receive from Washington. On these occasions, please remember that we are not always wrong. For example, in the last round, there was one suggestion regarding one issue, which, if we had accepted it, would have had serious implications for our position in another issue.

c. We will make errors, or I should say, I’ll make errors. (The Chief Negotiator does not make errors.) But we will count on Washington’s help when we do so.

III.

I would now like to turn to my second major topic, the philosophy and strategy underlying the negotiating future. There are a number of points to be made:

A. First, with respect to guidance.

The negotiators are operating solely on the basis of two pieces of outstanding guidance:

1. The presidential instructions contained in the NSDM’s,⁴ and

2. The agreement on “Principles.”

—There is no furtive guidance from the Secretary or the President.

—There are no furtive covenants with the Panamanians.

If anything is new, it is that the Secretary has made clear that he and the President want an equitable treaty—and promptly.

If Ambassador Bunker ever considers that a change in guidance is necessary, he will recommend it in the established channels. Then the interested agencies will fight it out—openly—and the President will decide.

B. Second, Ambassador Bunker intends to adopt a particular approach to the negotiations:

1. It will be “careful, methodical, but with all deliberate speed.”

2. We will proceed from the general to the particular, carving out areas of conceptual agreement. We will move layer by layer, carefully. This is necessary because:

a. it educates the negotiators on both sides,

b. it reduces Panama’s fright factor, and

c. it draws Panama into a net of agreements.

C. Third, with respect to congressional opposition:

In Ambassador Bunker’s view, we:

—cannot negotiate with the fear of a defeat in mind, but

—We have to be persistently attentive to the opposition.

—As far as possible, we want to build up support for our position on both the public and private level.

—We want to do this in a low key now. We want to avoid premature battle now and save our campaign for selective use when we have a treaty in sight.

—In this regard, we have done some analysis concerning the Thurmond resolution.⁵ Of the 34 sponsors, some will be retiring, some can be otherwise persuaded, and some are up for reelection. We believe that there is a hard-core of about 16 or 17.

D. My fourth point has to do with timing.

The response: who knows when we’ll have a treaty?! The GOP would not be unhappy with a first draft by the end of the year. Neither would the U.S. negotiators. A lot depends upon the reactions of the Panamanians. It also depends on progress we make in the talks and also on getting Ambassador Bunker out of the grasp of the Secretary. Certainly it is in the realm of possibility. We are also mindful of the Vice President’s advice that a treaty should be presented for ratification in the first half of 1975.

IV.

I would now like to turn to my last topic: how the U.S. should prepare for the negotiating future.

A. We think that the idea of a staff support group, made up primarily by members from State and Defense, would be useful. Our idea is that the group would be a “think tank” for the negotiators. It would bring together individuals who are closely involved with the negotiations to analyze identified problems, present creative alternatives, and prepare working documents as needed. The members would be independent of their agencies, but would refer the results back to their agencies.

The basic group will consist of 4 representatives each from State and Defense, and I will serve as chairman. In my absence there will be an administrative chairman representing the negotiators. Individuals with expertise on particular issues would be invited to work with the group from time to time. While the group will not make policy decisions, it will be expected to speed the eventual coordination process by indicating to the negotiators the possible reaction of the bureaus and agencies from which its members are drawn. The first meeting will be tomorrow, May 29, at 3 p.m. in our new conference room.⁶

B. One of the first orders of business for the group will be to analyze the range of U.S. positions on each issue in order to assist the negotiators in deciding on the first issue for substantive negotiations.

We need to arrange the issues in a sequence which affords the highest probability of initial agreement.

Panama has already suggested jurisdiction.

We might want to start with a consideration of U.S. rights.

Defense has suggested that we begin with an examination of Panamanian participation in administration.

We should keep in mind, though, that we might want to start with another issue.

The staff support group should consider that question promptly. I would hope that there would be a decision before mid-June for use during a possible trip by Ambassador Bunker at the end of the month.⁷ I should add that I expect that the group will meet daily.

V. CONCLUSION

Someone has asked me what sensations I have respecting the chances that we can conclude a mutually satisfactory treaty with Panama. I have some hesitancy in speaking of those sensations because in such cases one’s words almost inevitably tend to turn out to be famous last ones.

But, having said that, let me say that, looking at the past, one has to be pessimistic. Looking at the present, one has to be optimistic. The present negotiators are trying to strike a fine balance—and I hope that they have. We realize that it requires hard work, but we can’t be negative. Thus, I believe that a satisfactory treaty is definitely possible—and possibly sooner rather than later.

I attribute this sensation to the application of Bunker ian skills and charms to what is, for the Ambassador-at-Large, only the most recent in a long string of bouts gauged as being impossible to win.

The Ambassador recently celebrated his 80th birthday. I ask you to join me in a birthday salutation, in absentia, for health and a long life.

I’ll take questions now.

Brian Bell (ARA/PAF): Why do you think Panama now wants to reach agreement with us on a treaty? What’s in it for Panama now?

Answer: Torrijos has apparently made up his mind that now is a propitious time for Panama to accept a treaty with the United States. We must remember that his is a simplistic mind—I believe he feels that at the present time Panama will be able to get as much as it ever will from a new treaty.

Steve Low (NSC): Considering your comments on Panama’s willingness to maintain a good negotiating climate, how do you interpret Panama’s initiatives in the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU)? (Note: Panama has raised in international meetings of these organizations the question of Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone.)

Answer: The United States and Panama have a sort of gentlemen’s agreement for the duration of the negotiations. We recognize that Panama needs to maintain the international support it has on the Canal issue and that it will seize any chance it has to publicize its position. We have told the Panamanians that we understand their need to do this. But we have warned them not to press these issues, except in those cases where it doesn’t hurt the United States from a substantive point of view. I have told Gonzalez-Revilla not to press these types of things to a vote. Panama must not be overly provocative.

Question: Then Panama won’t push the ITU and UPU issues to a vote?

Answer: We don’t know yet for sure.

Col. T. Swett (DOD/ISA): Do the issues that have been discussed recently in the PRC also fall within this “gentlemen’s agreement?”

Answer: Yes. In this regard, I think that the mini-PRC is a good sign. At least I sense this in the squatter area. However, it is the kind of thing we will have to learn to live with. Tack realizes that some of this can be counter-productive with the Congress. His last trip here opened his eyes to this.

Dick Bloomfield (ARA/PLC): We know that the United States Government doesn’t always act in a rational, coordinated manner, and yet we assume that other Governments do. Couldn’t this be the case with Panama?

Answer: Well, we must admit that Torrijos’ own left hand doesn’t know what his right hand is doing. The Panamanian Government certainly doesn’t display close coordination.

Question: I think we should take this factor into account when faced with these apparent harassing actions.

Answer: I hope we can.

Brian Bell (ARA/PAF): I still have questions about why Torrijos feels at this time that it pays to settle with us.

Answer: To really know the answer requires getting into Torrijos’ mind. Perhaps it is because he feels so secure in his domestic position. I also have the feeling that he is bored with government and will want to turn over the reins. However, he wants a treaty during his tenure, so he is willing to get what he can now. I also sense that he’s bored with the negotiation. It is too massive, too complex for him to grasp.

Dick Howard (ARA/PAN): Don’t you also think that the appointment of Ambassador Bunker also raised Torrijos’ expectations that the two countries could reach agreement now?

Answer: I think that that may have been a factor. Perhaps because Ambassador Bunker’s appointment reduced what I earlier called the “fright factor”, the Panamanians are less reluctant to reach an agreement. I must say that Torrijos was terribly impressed by Ambassador Bunker’s nomination.

Question: What assurances do we have that the hard-liners won’t be successful in torpedoing the efforts of the moderates?

Answer: Torrijos and Tack have made a decision to negotiate politically. All other advisors have been isolated. The hardliners are without a power base; they do not have sufficient popular appeal.

Barney Koren (ODUSA): Could you be more precise about the next phase of the negotiations? What do you expect will come out of the next round?

Answer: One thing we will want to do is see how our positions fit into the framework of the 8 principles. As I view it we must arrive at “threshold agreements”. By this I mean general statements of how the negotiators will want resolution of the issues to go. These will be used by the treaty drafters in writing the actual treaty language. The threshold agreements won’t be the actual language itself.

Jeff Smith (DOD/JAG): Given the complexity of the issues, can we have a simple treaty by the year’s end and would we want to table before the Congress a simple treaty without annexes?

Answer: In previous negotiating phases, the United States has always expressed its desire for a simple treaty and the Panamanians have wanted all the details written in. Now when the Panamanians say that they want a simple treaty, the doubts about the wisdom of this come from elements of this government. I believe that there will have to be some annexes. The Foreign Minister has said that there should be some, but he also said that they too should be simple. I think that the Panamanians have moved to the idea of a simple treaty because for the first time in the negotiating history they believe that they will have participation in Canal activities.

George Wallace (DOD/ ISA): In this regard I just want to warn that we proceed with caution. If we have a simple treaty, then we should have as many of the differences between us as possible written down on paper.

Answer: As I indicated to you at lunch, George, our approach will have to be geopolitical. If we confront the evils now, it means we will not get a treaty. It may be hard for us if we postpone meeting the evils until later, but it gives us a chance to get a treaty.

Ben Walton (ODUSA): Will Ambassador Bunker go to the Under Secretaries Committee if he feels we need to rewrite the U.S. position?

Answer: As I stated earlier Amb. Bunker is operating on the basis of the existing guidance in the NSDM’s and the 8 principles. He will carefully consult with all agencies of the U.S. Government as he proceeds in the negotiations.

Charles Corbett (DODJCS): To what extent will the United States be able to influence whether it will be a simple or a complex treaty?

Answer: We have to be careful how we approach this, since we could scare the Panamanians off. I think we can get a simple treaty with a number of annexes. If we make a contribution in the matter of providing Panamanian participation in administration, the Panamanians will be more accommodating, mainly in permitting us what we need for operations. I don’t think that defense rights will be a major hurdle, provided we find the right trappings.

Barney Koren: I would just add that that depends upon the art and skill of the negotiators.

Answer: I fear it does. Wish us luck.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiation Files, Lot 81F1, Box 124, Treaty Negotiations, April–June 1974. Confidential. The briefing was held in the Panama Room at the Department of State. A list of participants was not attached.
2. Deputy Negotiators Bell and Gonzalez-Revilla began meeting on Contadora Island on April 29. Status reports on the talks are in telegram 2564, May 6; telegram 2621, May 8; telegram 2708, May 11; and telegram 2756, May 15, all from Panama City. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740108–1100, D740112–0579, D740116–0297, and D740119–0905) The last report noted that the two sides had agreed on a “major-issues” paper prepared by the Deputy Negotiators dated May 10.
3. See Document 21.
4. See footnote 5, Document 18. Additionally, on June 10, 1974, President Nixon issued NSDM 257, which mandated “giving close attention to negotiations with Panama, continuing them in the spirit characterized by the negotiation of the Statement of Principles signed on February 7.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–248, National Security Decision Memoranda, NDSM 257)
5. See Document 38.
6. The account of what might be the May 29 Staff Support Group meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 1, Negotiating Round (Deputies) May 1974. Meeting participants included Koren, Corrigan, Wallace, Low, Bowdler, and Bell.
7. Bunker was in Panama for negotiations from June 26 to 29. See Document 47.