Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

137. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Contadora Island, Panama, October 22–24, 1976.

SUBJECT

• US-Panama Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Mike Kozak
  • Gerri Chester *
  • Dick Barkley *
  • Dick Wyrough *
  • John Becker *

• Panama

  • Romulo Escobar Bethancourt
• *October 24 meeting

On three different occasions during the dates indicated, Escobar raised with me the status of future US-Panama relations. On the first occasion he was entirely sober and on the latter two extremely inebriated. However, at all times he was entirely coherent and consistent. He became much more specific during the last conversation which occurred in the early morning hours of October 24 and appeared to be saying more than he had initially intended to reveal. His basic points were the following:

1. This round of negotiations is terminated. The statement made by the Panamanian team on October 21 was a long way of saying “goodbye.”²

2. Panama has already taken the decision to pursue other means than the negotiations to achieve its ends. They are well advanced in the process of developing a capability to create massive problems for the United States. Their actions at this point are designed to prepare the country for the upcoming action which will occur within the next year. He stated he was not speaking of another set of 1964-like riots. Their capabilities were far beyond that. They were prepared to do things the U.S. could not imagine. They recognize that many Panamanians will be killed and that other serious actions will be taken against them. But they are counting on U.S. public opinion refusing to accept the consequences of an organized struggle. He stated that after both countries had suffered massively, the U.S. will ultimately send negotiators (and they will not be the present ones) who will be fully empowered to negotiate the final withdrawal of the U.S. from Panama. “These negotiations will be completed within 15 days.”

3. He stated he was telling me this as a friend not as a negotiator. He personally had made great efforts to find a creative, diplomatic way to “arrange” the problem and recognized the efforts of the U.S. team in this regard. But we have both failed and the result is now inevitable. He advised that the members of the U.S. team take the personal steps necessary to avoid to the extent possible becoming the scapegoats in the U.S. for the disaster that will occur in the next year.

I responded by noting that such a course of action would be extremely risky for the Panamanian Government, both in terms of the U.S. response it would provoke and, perhaps more importantly for them, the probability that they would unleash forces within Panama which they could not control and which would ultimately bring about their own downfall. Escobar stated that the highest levels of the Panamanian Government recognize these risks but had determined to take them. They simply have no other viable options at this point. The situation is like a Greek tragedy where tragic flaws in both countries were leading to mutual disaster. He is an old man and may well end up in jail next year if the risks they are taking come to pass. He has no choice but to accept this fate. But many members of the U.S. team are young and have a future to protect. We therefore should look to covering ourselves as best we can.

I asked whether he could see anything that either or both negotiating teams could do at this point to avoid the situation he was postulating. He replied that there was absolutely nothing either side could do at this point. Nothing we could do in the negotiations would affect the situation. Forces are moving in Panama, decisions have been made and there is no turning back. After January, events could begin to manifest themselves.

The conversation ended with reiterated warnings from the U.S. side that Panama not underestimate the capabilities of the United States and the risks inherent in Panama’s own domestic situation. Escobar repeated the fatalistic theme that whatever the risks, the forces had now been unleashed that make the result inevitable.

COMMENT: During the first conversations and the earlier part of the last one, Escobar limited himself to a warning that the failure to make progress in the negotiations was leading to a confrontation. The implication of this approach seemed to be that the U.S. should be more flexible and that the U.S. team had a personal stake in avoiding a failure. But as the last conversation developed, he seemed to lose sight of his original objective (if indeed his objective was to press us for more flexibility) and adopted the approach that we should not bother with the negotiations, but should take whatever steps we could as individuals to avoid taking the blame for the U.S. foreign policy disaster that is now inevitable.

The overall impression was that although Panama is advancing threats designed to convince the U.S. to meet their demands in the negotiations, Escobar at least has made the assessment that the U.S. will not be able to do so within the requisite time-frame. Accordingly, he sees little point in arguing with us further and has resigned himself to the consequences of an impasse.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations, Lot 81F1, Box 126, POL 33.3–2/Treaty Negotiations, July–Dec 1976. Confidential. Presumably prepared by Kozak. A typed note on the memorandum specifies it was for the use of the negotiating team only. A series of meetings were held from October 21 to 25. Memoranda of conversation of those meetings are in the National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations, Lot 81F1, Box 126, Binder: October 1976. See also Document 138.
2. The statement of October 21 provided an overview of the Panamanian positions on each of the eight Tack-Kissinger principles, stressed that the Canal issue was a global one, and argued that the United States should act responsibly and conclude a settlement. (National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations, Lot 81F1, Box 126, Binder: October 1976)