Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

136. Memorandum by Sol Linowitz¹

New York, October 15, 1976

Memorandum of Conversation with Foreign Minister of Panama, Aquilino Boyd —October 15, 1976

On Thursday, October 7th—the morning after the second Carter-Ford debate—I attended Secretary Kissinger’s luncheon for the Foreign Ministers of Latin America held at the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York. Among those present at the luncheon was the Foreign Minister of Panama, Aquilino Boyd, who has been a friend of mine for some years and who previously served as his country’s representative to the United Nations. When he greeted me at the luncheon, Boyd asked whether I would speak with him privately, and I did so after the luncheon. He expressed his “great concern” about the comments made by Governor Carter and President Ford with respect to Panama in the course of the second debate, and he told me that Secretary Kissinger had earlier assured him that the negotiations would be resumed within a couple of weeks along the lines of the principles already agreed upon.² He indicated particular anxiety with reference to Governor Carter’s statements on Panama and asked whether I knew Governor Carter well enough to be able to give him some reassurances on that score.

I did undertake to assure him as to the commitment of Governor Carter to the improvement of US-Latin American relations and said that it was my firm conviction that he would be approaching all hemispheric issues—including Panama—in a spirit of cooperation and understanding. Boyd told me that he appreciated this, but that his President (with whom he had just talked) was anxious and “deeply disturbed” and he hoped something might be done to avoid exacerbation of the problem in Panama. He described the problem as “explosive” and “dangerous”.

Later on I telephoned Cyrus Vance and passed on to him the substance of the concern which had been expressed to me.

During the next several days I talked with a number of Latin American Ambassadors and other leaders who indicated their own anxiety about the nature of the negotiations with respect to the Panama Canal in the light of the observations made in the course of the Foreign Policy debate.

On October 14th I telephoned to Richard Holbrooke at Governor Carter’s headquarters in Atlanta and talked to him about the situation. Dick Holbrooke suggested that he thought it would be helpful for me to telephone Foreign Minister Boyd in Panama—entirely on my own—to reaffirm my conviction that Governor Carter would be approaching US-Latin American relations out of a real interest in Latin America and with a desire to establish a harmonious basis for hemispheric relationships. He also suggested that I stress that Governor Carter would want to give careful attention to various aspects of US-Latin American relations at an early date after the election and that he felt strongly that Latin America and its problems deserved our serious concern.

On the morning of October 15th, 1976, I telephoned to Foreign Minister Boyd in Panama. Set forth below is the substance of our conversation:

I told the Foreign Minister that I had been thinking about our conversation in New York and especially the concerns which he had expressed. I said that I had not talked to either Governor Carter or members of his staff about our conversation but that I did know Governor Carter and did know Boyd and wanted to pass on some things of which the Foreign Minister should be aware.

I told him that I believed Governor Carter to be a man deeply committed to the improvement of US-Latin American relations; that I knew him from personal experience to be very interested in Latin America, a man who has travelled quite extensively in the hemisphere, and one who speaks Spanish. I also said that I thought that of all parts of the world Governor Carter would probably feel most at home in Latin America.

I also told the Foreign Minister that I know from my personal conversations with Governor Carter that he is concerned about the inadequate way we have been dealing with the concerns of Latin America and with the fact that Latin American issues have had such a low priority on our international agenda. I told Boyd that he could be certain that Governor Carter is friendly toward the aspirations of Latin America, that he is eager to develop a relationship of mutual trust and respect, and that he recognizes the importance of assuring that the countries of Latin America are treated with the dignity to which they are entitled.

I then said that I knew the Foreign Minister recognized that we are in the last 18 days of a presidential campaign and that he knew the United States well enough to know that a nation’s policy cannot be formulated specifically during an election battle. I pointed out that I was sure he also knew that this is the worst time to discuss an issue of such consequence as Panama.

I concluded by saying that I merely wanted to assure the Foreign Minister—as a friend and a colleague—that I was confident that Governor Carter would want to give Latin American concerns—including Panama—his early attention if he is elected and that he would approach these difficult and often complex issues in a spirit of cooperation and good will.³

Foreign Minister Boyd then responded:

“We have been, as you know, deeply concerned about the comments made by Governor Carter in the course of the debate. We are especially concerned that it might mean that he would be abandoning a policy of negotiation under certain principles agreed upon.

“You know of our great respect for you and how much trust I and my colleagues have in you and, therefore, it is very good that you have telephoned to talk to me about this. What you say about Governor Carter is most important for us to know. Although you have indicated that this conversation is between you and me, I would like to report it to our President.

“We understand, of course, what has to be said in a campaign in the United States during a Presidential election, but it is very important that we know what comes after the campaign. We are realists and I believe that Governor Carter will be elected.⁴ I hope that after his election he will want to send a representative to talk with us about the whole problem. I hope you will communicate to Governor Carter that the backbone of this whole problem, in our judgment, is the duration of the Treaty, and this we will have to talk about and reach an understanding about.

“Meanwhile, it has been very helpful for you to have given us your comments about Governor Carter’s position—especially because it comes from someone who is such a good friend of Latin America and our country. Governor Carter should know that we will now await the election results in a friendly spirit.”

I then took the liberty of saying to the Foreign Minister that [1 line of missing text] light of our conversation—if there were comments during the next couple of weeks which were adverse to Governor Carter, and he said he understood.

The Foreign Minister again thanked me for telephoning, and repeated his statement that he thought that the conversation had been very helpful and he appreciated it.

Although the conversation was obviously extremely friendly and most understanding, it is important to recognize that Boyd is the Foreign Minister of this country and very likely not in a position to have a decisive influence on what is said by President Torrijos or perhaps others in the Cabinet about the issue. My strong impression is, however, that he will try to be helpful in every way he can. Much will depend, of course, on whether there are internal developments within Panama in the next two or three weeks which could precipitate unfriendly actions or statements on the part of high officials or others.⁵

Sol M. Linowitz⁶

1. Source: Library of Congress, Papers of Sol M. Linowitz, Government Service, Box 117, Pan. Canal Treaties, General Correspondence, 1975–1976. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Richard Holbrooke, Jack Watson, Anthony Lake, and Cyrus Vance, all on Governor Carter’s staff. Linowitz, Chairman of the Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations, became President Carter’s chief negotiator for the Canal treaty.
2. See Document 134.
3. On December 27, in an interview with reporters on St. Simons Island, Georgia, Carter stated that the negotiations for a Panama Canal treaty “ought to be resolved quite rapidly.” (“Carter Says He Will Probably Meet Brezhnev in 1977, Possiby in U.S.,” The New York Times, December 28, 1976, p. 1)
4. On November 20, Kissinger met with President-elect Carter, Vice President-elect Walter Mondale, and Mondale’s foreign policy adviser David Aaron to discuss the Panama Canal negotiations, along with other issues related to foreign affairs. The Secretary “described our commitment to consultations with appropriate members and committees of the Congress once the USG has worked out the contents of the treaty with the Panamanians. He [Kissinger] emphasized that nothing has as ‘yet been put on paper’ and that our commitment to consult presumes that this will take place before the specific language of the treaty is committed to paper.” (Memorandum for the record, November 20; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Henry Kissinger, CL 329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy Transition Papers, Meeting 20 Nov. 1976, Chronological File, November 1976) The memorandum for the record is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976, Document 219.
5. On December 1, Linowitz met Boyd for lunch. Linowitz assured Boyd “of the President-elect’s commitment to the furtherance of hemispheric relationships. Boyd reiterated his anxieties regarding the status of the Canal treaty, stating he wished to “ascertain the attitude of President-elect Carter and to be assured that the President-elect would want the negotiations to move forward along the lines of the principles agreed upon between the United States and Panama in the Kissinger-Tack memorandum of understanding.” Boyd then asked if it would be possible for him to “see a representative of Governor Carter.” Linowitz stated he would pass on Boyd’s request. (Memorandum, December 1; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Sol M. Linowitz, Government Service, Box CL 1, Pan. Can. Treaties, General Correspondence, December 1, 1976)
6. Printed from a copy with this typed signature.