115. Memorandum From the Deputy U.S. Negotiator (Bell) to Multiple Recipients1

U.S.-PANAMA TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Future Scenario

The White House requested, on an informal basis, the Negotiators’ thoughts on how the negotiating process may go in coming months. Ambassador Bunker concurred in forwarding the attached.

S. Morey Bell2
Minister
Deputy U.S. Negotiator
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Enclosure3

SCENARIO FOR THE UNITED STATES-PANAMA TREATY NEGOTIATIONS IN THE COMING MONTHS

Since the resolution of the State/Defense differences and the resulting change in presidential negotiating instructions last August,4 Ambassador Bunker has followed a course of negotiation which can be characterized as steady but measured, and unobtrusive.

That course has been dictated by the fact that the two teams have now reached the most delicate and complex issues in the negotiations, and by the need to keep the negotiations as removed as possible from the domestic political scene in both countries.

Ambassador Bunker believes that by following this course it will not be possible to finish the negotiation until late this year—if, indeed, it proves possible to conclude a new treaty with Panama at this point in history which adequately protects United States interests yet is adequately attentive to Panama’s.

Both negotiating teams are cautiously optimistic on that score, at this writing.

Panama, while it would welcome speedier negotiations, seems to acquiesce in that timetable. (Intelligence reports reflect a desire on Torrijos’ part that the President go to Panama at some point following our elections to observe the signing of a treaty, which might then be presented to the Congress at the first session in 1977.)5

Though acquiescing, Panama will not relax its pressures on the United States to maintain that timetable for—and to make substantive progress in—the negotiations. Those pressures will be applied chiefly through international gatherings (the OAS General Assembly in early June in Santiago; the scheduled meeting of Chiefs of Latin Governments later that month in Panama City; the Non-Aligned Group’s meetings in Colombo in August; the UN meetings beginning in September—with Panama sitting again on the Security Council).

Consonant with the steady but measured negotiating course, there were negotiating rounds in Panama in September, October and November; in Washington (a secret one) in December; and a lengthy one, [Page 309] again in Panama, in February. The Ambassador anticipates that the next round will take place in Panama in early May. Technical-level talks may precede it. Possibly there would be another round in late May or during June, locale uncertain.

This hiatus between the February round and the prospective round in early May results from the fact that State and Defense are reexamining the specifics of the United States’ positions on major issues. Part of that reexamination process has been Ambassador Bunker’s direct consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.6

Both Departments believe that it may be in order for them to return to the President for revised instructions—as he invited—before negotiating rounds subsequent to those held in May-June. Timing is difficult to predict, but the Ambassador does not now anticipate returning to the President before, say, the late summer. He hopes to be able to present, again, unified State/Defense recommendations.

In the period before the May-June round, and intermittently thereafter, the Ambassador wishes to undertake the consultations in the Congress which the President instructed and which, if not undertaken at this stage of the negotiation, will result in great problems for the Executive Branch later, when a treaty is at hand.

These would consist of one-on-one private interviews with approximately 10–12 members of the Senate and 10–12 of the House.

A few of these in each body would be the leaders. The Ambassador has seen them before on the treaty matter, and seeing them again would be designed to bring them up to date.

The remainder in the two bodies would encompass members whom the Ambassador has not before consulted, but who seem to be both interested in the Canal matter and in a position to be helpful.

Mere “consultation” is not the only objective. The Ambassador will be seeking also the Members’ counsel on (a) the “shape” of a possible treaty package, and (b) the strategy and tactics involved in moving any Panama treaty through the complete congressional processes, including the timing.

Because these visits to Members must be fitted around both the negotiating rounds and the congressional recesses scheduled from now through the National Conventions and thereafter, it is prudent to begin them now.

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One visit is essential. Senator Goldwater, having announced a change of heart on the merit of negotiating a new treaty, wishes a briefing from the Ambassador.7 Another is not essential but useful: a freshman Member of the House has asked the Ambassador to brief a group of his colleagues.

Over the months ahead we can anticipate a number of requests for the Ambassador’s appearance before congressional committees and subcommittees. The Ambassador intends to ask that any such hearings be in Executive session, to protect the confidentiality of the negotiation.8

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 3, General. Secret; Exdis.
  2. Bell initialed “SMB” above this typed signature.
  3. Secret. Drafted by Bell on March 19; cleared by Bunker.
  4. See Document 95.
  5. Not found.
  6. Bunker met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 5 to discuss the upcoming negotiations, focusing on duration of U.S. rights, lands and waters, civilian employees, and nuclear safeguards for ships transiting the canal. (National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 3, DOA–DOD, Liaison With)
  7. No record of a meeting has been found.
  8. In a March 24 memorandum to Scowcroft, Low conveyed many of Bell’s suggestions, including that the Congressional consultations should remain private and that the number of consultations should remain limited, unless demand for them increased. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Box 6, Panama [3])