113. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- The Secretary’s Conversation with Juan Antonio Tack
PARTICIPANTS
- Juan Antonio Tack, Chief Canal Negotiator for Panama
- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- William J.Jorden, American Ambassador to Panama
- Stephen Low, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
- Neil A. Seidenman, Interpreter
Secretary: The question is, how much of southern Florida do we have to give you, as well as the Panama Canal? (Laughter)
Tack: All of it.
Secretary: Alright, I’ll give you Florida if we can keep the Canal. (Laughter)
Tack: First, I would like to thank the Secretary for the interview. I know this is a very important trip. I also understand you must be very tired.
Secretary: No, I have been meeting with people I like, which I can’t say for my trips to other parts of the world.
Tack: I’m sure Ambassador Bunker has told you about our last negotiations. We finished a new stage of the Canal negotiations.2
Secretary: When we leave, I’ll take off my shirt and hand it to you. It will confirm what Thurmond is saying about me. Are you satisfied with the progress?
Tack: Yes, we are.
Secretary: I told President Perez in Caracas that we want to conclude an agreement by the end of the year.3 I appreciate your cooperation in this. In the present climate, a crisis could cause us to lose everything. Of course, I could be popular if I said we don’t want a treaty. For some reason the Panama Canal issue has people worked [Page 301] up. I talked to Senator Hart. He supports our position. But he says that in the middle of Colorado people are yelling about the Panama Canal. After the election the President will be in a good position. In the meantime, we should conclude the negotiations. Rogers and I are convinced. I use every opportunity to support the treaty, sometimes in language you don’t like—as the time I answered Wallace’s questions.4 So it is not easy.
Tack: The Panama Canal is a simple problem, but a complex issue. We have to proceed in a statesmanlike way. I fully understand the problem and have no intention of provoking a crisis. We can manage the waiting period. This is fundamental to both countries. What we have to do is proceed on the basis of wisdom toward a solution which is comprehensive. For Panama the problem is not international, but one of national dignity. From our standpoint it is a question of recognizing that the Canal is essential to the US. On the other hand, we hope the US recognizes what Panama needs. It can no longer have territory mortgaged to the Canal Zone. Bunker is clear on this. The choice of Ambassador Bunker is most apt.
Secretary: He is a most distinguished diplomat; a man of towering integrity.
Tack: Our problem is historical, based on the manner in which the Canal was built and arrangements made for its operation. Under present arrangements, Panama would concede to the US three things for the life of the treaty: primary responsibility for the administration of the Canal, primary responsibility for the defense of the Canal, and a guarantee that the Canal would remain open on a nondiscriminatory basis to all countries. In agreeing to these, we have met the objectives of the United States. At the same time, Panama’s terms have to do with sovereignty which should be incorporated into the treaty.
Secretary: These principles are not at issue. The issue is a concrete one. It is the question of defense. It has come to be involved in our domestic policy. We can agree on operation and sovereignty. These are manageable problems. Defense is the one we will have the biggest problem with. We are all decent men, but this is the area where the greatest ingenuity will be needed. If I make public statements on defense, you will have to keep in mind our strategy. If we separate privileges of Canal Zone residents from defense, we can take care of the lobby. No American cares about defending special privileges.
Tack: I have no comment because I like the way you say it. The privileges are very significant because they give a colonial character [Page 302] to the Zone. The military problem can be handled. You have done this with others in a SOFA.
Ambassador Jorden: Mr. Secretary, you want to make a distinction between golf courses, theatres, and stores, on the one hand, and workers’ rights and benefits on the other.
Tack: Yes, these are details. There is a conceptual problem we should be aware of. There will be an agreement which we will sign. The Canal will be returned to us at the end of the treaty. Panama agrees to the right of use for operation and defense of the Canal. We have a problem which came up at the recent stage in the matter of defense rather than operation. There is a contradiction between the sovereign rights of Panama and the rights of use to be granted to the United States. We believe that user rights pertaining to land and waters should at no time contradict the disappearance of the Canal Zone. This is the basic problem we addressed.
Secretary: What is the concrete issue question?
Assistant Secretary Rogers: We have not talked with Bunker, so we have no report on the latest round.
Tack: It is a bit intricate. I only wanted to convey to you my concern.
Secretary: If you state it as a principle, the essence of which is the disappearance of the Canal Zone, we have no interest in evading that principle. If we can agree on the defense question, we can work out a practical arrangement.
Tack: The Ambassador has the details, but I wanted you to think about this. It is something we cannot keep in isolation. It will spread. We still have to solve duration, expansion, new facilities, and terms of civilian employees.
Secretary: (To Ambassador Jorden) Is that what you were talking about?
Ambassador Jorden: Yes.
Secretary: But you think we are making progress.
Tack: In a sense the differences have been delineated and in some cases narrowed. We are aware we cannot expect to conclude an agreement prior to the election in November, but we would ask you if we can keep up our progress and your interest in the talks.
Secretary: As long as there is no publicity, we can work. We can complete an agreement conceptually by the end of the year. There will be some drafting, but we can begin the campaign for ratification even while the drafting is going on. By January or February next year, it will become an American domestic problem and not yours. This is the schedule we are working on.
Tack: We understand perfectly. In international diplomatic meetings, of course, we will have to bring the matter up. There will be a [Page 303] meeting of Latin American presidents here in June, and then in September the Non-Aligned meeting will take place in Sri Lanka. We will participate and mention the problem.
Secretary: It will help if in June the heads of state can say that they think it is urgent that a new treaty be worked out, and that they are satisfied that the negotiations are going on, without congratulating us or even saying that the negotiations are going well because we would be asked why. If Latin Americans say it is urgent, that might be helpful, but if the Non-Aligned say it, it would be negative. Most Americans are sick and tired of the Non-Aligned. Moynihan represents American public opinion. Be careful of what happens in Sri Lanka. I will spend months stressing the importance of Latin American relations. My trip has been positive (despite the press). If in June the presidents of the Americas say it is important that a treaty be completed and that the negotiations are going on, we can use it. In Sri Lanka be careful if the Arabs get involved. That might put the whole thing in the middle of another argument. If Reagan runs against Jackson, I make no promises on a deadline. Eventually, of course, both would be forced to do it.
Tack: I always dislike wasting your time. This is a good conversation, but you should be aware of two problems. First, we must try to have a duration which is acceptable to us both. It is very important that the treaty terminate in a way that is acceptable to both countries, and we must work hard and as rapidly as we can.
Secretary: This is the most difficult problem.
Tack: Second, I remember when we met in Washington the Secretary said to me that in negotiating a treaty, where there is a political will, treaties can be concluded in a week.5
Secretary: My view is that every bureaucratic problem can be resolved in a certain two-hour period (I modified that to six hours) and every treaty can be negotiated in a week—after the election.
Tack: After November?
Secretary: The end of November or the middle of December. I am disposed to conclude rapidly after the election. In the meantime, you and Bunker continue to work hard.
Tack: This is significant. Ambassador Bunker agreed that after he returned to Washington we would maintain contact. I am at your disposal for any time that you would like a meeting to take place.
Secretary: I am going to try to keep myself out of this but will follow it closely. If I get involved, everyone will think that a treaty is near to being concluded. What are we going to say to the press? Shall we [Page 304] say that we reviewed the status of the negotiations; that you concluded recent negotiations with Bunker; that you will continue the talks with Bunker?
Tack: Yes.
(End of Meeting)
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–1124. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Low; approved by Covey. The meeting was held in the Cariari Hotel. Kissinger was in Costa Rica to meet with President Oduber, Foreign Minister Facio, and other Central American Foreign Ministers.↩
- See Document 114.↩
- Kissinger was in Caracas February 16–18. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976. ↩
- See footnote 6, Document 99.↩
- See Document 40.↩