Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973

112. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)¹

Washington, September 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Chile—22 September 1970

1. At a meeting in Dr. Kissinger’s office at 8:00 a.m. this morning, attended by Dr. Kissinger, Under Secretary of State Irwin, Alexis Johnson, Dave Packard, Tom Moorer, Pete Vaky and Mr. Helms, I described the general situation and our own actions as follows:²

a. The Allende forces have been continuing their propaganda and coercion efforts and threats. The Generals, while talking among themselves about the possibility of a coup, are clearly not about to do anything unless Frei gives them the word. Contact with Frei has been almost entirely through emissaries between Frei and Amb. Korry. Amb. Korry has clearly indicated to Frei through Ossa that the military should move. There is general agreement that the parliamentary contraption is a dead duck. Newspapers and other media around the world are picking up the problem of Allende and papers such as the New York Times and the Post have carried editorials. We have been active in much of the overseas press work, and American publications of influence are important in overseas replay, particularly in Chile and Latin America generally. [3 lines not declassified]. We note that USIA and VOA have been putting out material which could be considered pro-Allende and this should be watched. We also have noted through State traffic that the Inter-American Development Bank has or will approve a $4 million loan any day now for the technical university which is a hot bed of Marxism and whose radio is constantly on the air rabidly for Allende.

2. There was discussion as to channels to Frei, and I pointed out we do not have them because both Ambassador Duggan and Korry have not wanted us to have them. I also pointed out that the military are thinking twice about a coup since they believe that U.S. attitude might be the same as it has been for the Greek Junta and they would have difficulty getting military aid and support. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Johnson and the State Department would draft a message to Korry telling Korry to get the word to Frei that he will have our support if he goes into an election as a result of a coup scenario, and also passing the word to the military that they will continue to receive military help from the U.S. if a military coup takes over.

Thomas H. Karamessines³

p.s. Secretary Johnson also undertook to look into the Inter-American Development Bank item and the USIA–VOA matter.

Addendum⁴

Washington, September 22, 1970.

Track II

When the meeting adjourned Mr. Kissinger asked me to stay behind for a moment at which time I told him of our sending George Donohue down today to see Frei and Ossa and to convey the very messages that will be conveyed by Amb. Korry but to assure Frei that if necessary he will have twice the amount he had for the 1964 election and also that military aid will continue. He is also to assure Frei that, if Frei makes the effort and it fails, we will help Frei to get himself resettled overseas if that is what he chooses to do. Mr. Kissinger said that our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up.

T.H.K.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Chile–ITT–CIA 1963–1977, Lot 81D121, Chile/CIA 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2. See Document 111.
3. Karamessines signed “TH Karamessines” above his typed signature.
4. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.