111. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the 40 Committee1


  • Chile


  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
  • John Irwin, II
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • Defense
  • David Packard
  • CIA
  • Richard Helms
  • Thomas Karamessines
  • JCS
  • Admiral Thomas Moorer
  • NSC Staff
  • Viron P. Vaky


1. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Karamessines are to prepare a message to Korry.

2. Mr. Johnson is to compile facts about assistance to Chile and will discuss this again with the Committee.

Dr. Kissinger referred to two telegrams received from Ambassador Korry which described (a) confused situation, and (b) his own role as very activist.2 He asked whether since Korry is an Ambassador he was not doing too much and placing himself in an exposed position.

Mr. Johnson said he had not seen the telegrams. (Copies were made and passed out to the principals.) After reading the messages, Johnson said that Korry apparently has the feeling that the parliamentary formula is dead.

[Page 293]

Mr. Karamessines, at the Chairman’s request, gave a short briefing on the situation. He described the activity of the Allende forces, the reluctance of General Schneider to make any move, and the crucial role Frei plays. He also described propaganda activities we have undertaken. He mentioned as problems: (a) the delicate question of whether [1½ lines not declassified] and (b) an Inter-American Bank loan of $4 million to the Catholic University.3

Mr. Johnson asked what it was we wanted Korry to do or not to do. Does he need to be cautioned?

Dr. Kissinger said that he thought there were two poles to be taken care of: first, Korry should be told that he should keep a low profile and that he is not the man to be performing all of these activities; secondly, Charlie Meyer needs to understand “the President’s view is not Tad Szulc’s views; that the President is eager to get this done. Both are leaning too far in opposite directions.”

Mr. Helms said that much of what Korry is reporting is, of course, private conversation. His personal presence is not as evident as one might infer.

Mr. Johnson asked if Korry had to be the spokesman.

Mr. Helms replied that the Station had been forbidden by the last two Ambassadors to be in touch with Frei; consequently, they had no assets and no channel to Frei. Korry had to do it.

Mr. Karamessines, in reply to the Chairman’s questions, said that he believed there was increasing concern in Chile and that Frei remained the last chance if he could be encouraged. Asked what Frei wants, Karamessines said he probably would like to be assured of support in another election. He might also like to be assured that the military would be helped and not ostracized should they make any move.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether we could not get word to Korry to pass as quickly as possible to Frei two points: first, that in any new election he would have our support; and secondly, that the military should know that they would not be ostracized if they were to act.

Mr. Johnson said that he and Mr. Karamessines would prepare a comprehensive message back to Korry. He said he would also have a talk with Charlie Meyer.

Dr. Kissinger said that the President wanted all aid to Chile cut off. He had not taken action to implement this because he wanted a chance to talk to the Committee principals. He asked whether we could not turn the screws a little bit on MAP and AID.

[Page 294]

Mr. Johnson said he would look into what the facts were, the pipeline, etc. and would be back.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 777, Country Files, Latin America, Chile 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office at the White House. Although the meeting was held on the morning of September 22, it was originally scheduled for September 21. An October 22, 1971, summary of unrecorded meetings of the 40 Committee (see footnote 2, Document 92) states that the Executive Secretary did not attend this meeting due to illness.
  2. Documents 108 and 110.
  3. Karamessines’s briefing is described in greater detail in Document 112.