76. Airgram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1

A–443

SUBJECT

  • Strains in U.S.-Japan Relationship

Summary: Recent high level Japanese expressions of concern at deterioration of U.S.-Japanese relations, primarily because of current economic problems are reflection of growing feeling in Japan that some sort of anti-Japanese campaign is developing in the U.S. Worst of all, feeling has begun to develop that this wave of criticism may have at least tacit support of USG.

Problems between U.S. and Japan are real and some are quite serious, but at root are underlying psychological problems stemming from mutual misunderstandings and cultural differences. Japanese media further complicate matters by disproportionate coverage they [Page 209] give to all U.S. stories remotely concerning Japan and by crisis mongering manner in which they are frequently played.

Although Japan has virtually achieved super-power status in terms of GNP, it has not yet developed any coherent plan concerning its role in Asia and rest of the world. Insecurity and uncertainty characterize many of their responses to outside world. Combined with vestigial feelings of inferiority toward West in apposition to their own national pride, Japan is faced with overcoming formidable psychological difficulties in coming to terms with newly-achieved power status. Buffeted by these factors, Japan is often irrationally affected by outside criticism.

While foregoing cannot justify Japanese actions or failure to act on certain problems, it does represent fact of life in dealing with Japan. This is particularly true in criticism of Japan from U.S. sources owing to heretofore “special relationship” which has existed and which has tended to buffer the shock waves of specific problems in the past.

Japanese leadership elites now gradually becoming aware of intensity of American dissatisfaction over certain aspects of relationship, and it is much in our interest to accelerate progress in adjusting to new power relationship, but the way we go about it is extremely important at this juncture. In order to eliminate much of impending sense of crisis in Japan about relationship with U.S., Embassy strongly recommends that U.S. official statements and actions be designed to defuse inherent emotional content of complicated issues by putting them into perspective rather than by stimulating anxieties through rhetoric. We also believe that more intimate forums outside of the glare of publicity should be developed to promote frank exchanges between leaders of two countries.

Because of intimacy and interdependence of Japan-American relationship, we have no lack of tools to influence quietly and pressure Japanese policy in favorable direction. Most of all, despite current difficulties, there exists in Japan a broad reservoir of good will towards U.S. which, because it is such a rare thing in today’s world, is something not only to be exploited but to be prized and preserved. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the airgram.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL JAPAN–US. Confidential. Drafted by William C. Sherman, a political officer at the embassy on June 8. Deputy Chief of Mission Richard Sneider approved its contents, and Meyer cleared it in draft.