77. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • Japanese Cabinet Reorganized

On July 5, Prime Minister Sato formed what most observers believe will be his last Cabinet.2 On the basis of the new Cabinet lineup, Sato has sought to accomplish two things before his anticipated retirement in the Fall of 1972:

—First, by switching Takeo Fukuda from Finance to Foreign Minister, he has sought to broaden Fukuda’s experience and contact with foreign affairs, and by adding to his already extensive economic experience, further qualify him to take over the reins from Sato.

—Secondly, the Fukuda appointment together with that of Kakuei Tanaka to the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry, has brought two of the most influential Japanese politicians to positions of key importance to the U.S.-Japan relationship. If Tanaka cooperates with the Sato policy of easing economic tensions with the U.S. as expected, Fukuda will be able to claim some status as a diplomat/statesman, Tanaka will have manuevered himself into a good position to succeed Fukuda, and Sato will be able to exit under conditions in which the relationship is not under so much pressure as at present.

In terms of U.S. interests, the new Cabinet lineup promises to offer some hope for greater cooperation from Japan in the economic sphere, including, perhaps, textiles. According to the Japanese press, Sato, Fukuda and Tanaka see the first principal tasks facing the Cabinet as the alleviation of strains in the US-Japan relationship created by economic issues. Should this Sato strategy fail, the succession could be in question [Page 211] and we may be faced with mounting, rather than decreasing, economic frictions with our best customer and the strongest nation in Asia.

Robert C. Brewster3 Acting Executive Secretary
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 71. Limited Official Use. Sent to Kissinger under a July 26 covering memorandum from Holdridge, which Kissinger initialed.
  2. Sato informed Ambassador at Large David Kennedy that the reshuffle was designed to improve relations with the United States and also resolve the textile issue. Kennedy wrote that Sato “told us that in the selection of ministers who have responsibility, particularly MITI, he would be fully informed that the textile issue was their number one priority item to be settled immediately after assuming office. He went so far as to say that the MITI Minister would be told that the textile issue must be favorably settled before even accepting his appointment. The implication was that it was a pre-condition for his appointment.” (Trip report by Kennedy, July 31; ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Box 1, Peter Peterson, Subject Files, Textile Negotiations, April–July 1971)
  3. Eliot signed for Brewster over Brewster’s typed signature.