Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

133. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Oahu, Hawaii, September 1, 1972, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister of Japan Kakuei Tanaka
• Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba
• Hidetoshi Ukawa, Chief, Second North American Section, American Affairs Bureau, MOFA (Interpreter)
• President Richard Nixon
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• James J. Wickel, American Embassy, Tokyo (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

• Prime Minsiter Tanaka’s Call on President Nixon

The Prime Minister thanked the President for dinner last night, and following an animated exchange of further amenities the President turned to the subject of Korea.

The President felt that the United States and Japan have an identical interest here in supporting a strong ROK, independent and free of foreign domination, which is indispensible to our defense commitment to Japan. Noting pressures to reduce our troop presence in the ROK, he said that he is doing all he can to resist them. One obvious strong argument to be made is the need to maintain ROK independence. But in addition, the security of the ROK is essential to the maintenance of the security of Japan. He said that we are watching with interest the current meetings between North and South Korea which could reduce tensions somewhat, but in our view he did not think we should read too much significance into them. We should not allow preliminary talks in areas other than security to [lead?] to a lowering of our defense capability. Perhaps the situation is similar to that of Germany, where West and East Germany are beginning to talk about humanitarian matters and personal contacts. However, this should not allow any reduction in NATO strength, which can only be achieved on the basis of mutual reductions by both sides. Our position, he explained, is to welcome the ROK talks with North Korea, but it would be premature for us to talk to North Korea. Our intention, he said, is to maintain our present troop level in the ROK at the present time, until there are definite changes in the security side.

The Prime Minister felt that this reflected a correct understanding of both Koreas. He did not believe that the development of talks between North and South Korea would reduce tensions as much as anticipated. Based on long association with Koreans, he felt that North Korea has its own purpose in talking to the South. Japan also is watching developments carefully in terms of working out its own contacts with North Korea gradually, in humanitarian and academic exchanges.

The Prime Minister believed it important that the ROK develop its rural agricultural areas before allowing full exchanges with the North, because these are comparatively less developed, and the ROK must eliminate possible dissatisfaction among its farm population. Therefore Japan intended to provide aid to develop agriculture and fisheries in the ROK, to insure a higher standard of living in the South than the North. Also, he said, Japan is discussing with the ROK the construction of a steel mill, which would give the ROK a greater steel capacity than North Korea. Japan’s primary intention is to cooperate to create a situation in which disaffected South Korean elements are not tempted to serve North Korean interests. Japan would soon send a six minister delegation to Seoul, headed by Foreign Minister Ohira, to take part in the ROK-Japan Ministerial conference beginning September 4. Japan, he summarized would do its best to assist ROK economic development, but he asked that the United States not withdraw any of its forces from the ROK.

The President wished to say in a general sense that what the Prime Minister said, that is knowing the Koreans well through long association, is also true of a number of other areas in Asia, where Japan is more expert than the United States. In the new era now developing, to which the Prime Minister referred before it is important that we make a mutual effort. We would do the best we could, because of our big presence, but he suggested that the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister or any of their colleagues have ideas for a different approach about the ROK should feel free to raise it privately. Candidly speaking we do not know everything, and we do respect Japan’s knowledge in this area, and he said that the United States did need advice. Continuing, the President said that the question really is one of the future of free Asia. In this connection, what he wished to see develop is not just a United States policy, but a U.S.-Japan policy for Asia, because both countries are the two strongest economic powers. He said that he is confident that we can work together with Japan as a full partner, not a junior partner but continued that we should also respect the sensitivities of the smaller nations, lest their resentment be provoked.

The Prime Minister said that basically Japan and the United States share common goals. Japan does understand the situation in the Asian nations well, and Japan wished to do its share wherever it would be logical and effective for Japan to do the talking.

(Dr. Kissinger returned to the room.) The President reviewed for him that he had told the Prime Minister that what we want is not just an American approach in Asia, but a mutual partnership between the United States and Japan. He noted the sensitivity of the small nations, and observed that the new element is Japan assuming a full partnership.

The President then continued, saying that it takes time to formalize approaches in this kind of matter, but that he is suggesting discussion, and the desirability of contacts with respect to ideas, on a confidential basis if that is desirable. For example, in another area, he recalled Secretary Connally telling him in returning from a visit to Iran of a proposal being discussed in a preliminary stage for Japanese-Iranian cooperation to develop oil resources, which would require American cooperation as well. He said that we would welcome any proposal to cooperate with Japan. There will be cases that the United States and Japan each would wish to operate independently, he noted, but there also would be cases when both would wish to work together with a third country. Primarily our discussions have related to US-Japan relations, and Asia, but he pointed out that Japan is a great economic power, heavily dependent on Middle-Eastern oil, just as the European nations. Therefore, he felt it would be helpful if there is anything Japan or the United States can do to see that strong, friendly countries like Iran survive, and are not overrun, but remain friendly to our interests. Japan, therefore, of necessity finds itself playing the role of a global power. For our part, he assured the Prime Minister, that through Dr. Kissinger we would inform him of any developments in the Middle East which would affect their interests. Should radical governments, like those in Libya and Iraq, gain control of the Middle East they would hold up the price of oil, and choke off Japan’s oil life line. Therefore, it is in our interest to support friendly governments, like those in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Kissinger referred to another area which he has already discussed with the Prime Minister on two occasions, the development of Siberia, for which he understood there is an actual proposal in which preliminary steps are being taken to establish a mechanism to do so.

The President wished to inform the Prime Minister in confidence that he has asked Dr. Kissinger to go to Moscow September 11–13, with the purpose of following up on the Moscow summit, and to discuss matters of mutual interest. On his return, he would see Ambassador Ushiba and report to him in confidence any matters of interest.

The Prime Minister thanked him for this offer.

Dr. Kissinger cautioned that this visit would not be announced until September 6, Japan time.

The President noted that the USSR and the PRC are extremely sensitive about keeping such arrangements secret until announced, although we do inform the UK and Japan, confidentially.

Dr. Kissinger said that the trip is scheduled to be announced at noon, September 5, Washington time.

The Prime Minister said that exchanges of information between Japan and the United States with respect to the Middle East, SEA and Siberia are desirable, and that he would cooperate in maintaining the close contact the President mentioned. Not only in economics, but also in the political field he felt that our ultimate objectives are identical, for which reason Japan wished to share the burden in those areas where it could. As one example, he cited Indochina in the post-Vietnam period, for which Japan is planning to cooperate in stabilizing living conditions and economic reconstruction.

The Prime Minister also took Taiwan as an example. Should Japan be able to open diplomatic relations with the PRC Taiwan of course would become a problem, but Japan desired to continue to maintain its economic exchanges with Taiwan to the maximum extent possible. He could foresee many difficulties, however, for it is conceivable that Japan would terminate its official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Therefore he hoped, and would be pleased if the United States could extend its good offices to Japan vis-à-vis Taiwan. He added that Japan intended to maintain its economic relations with Taiwan as of the present. For example Japan wished to guarantee the rights of the people of Taiwan who are in Japan and their economic interests, but as is evident in the cases of Canada, the UK, and France, all of whom have formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, neither could Japan have diplomatic relations with Taiwan and would have to withdraw its Embassy. This is an unavoidable development with which Japan would have to come to grips. In its heart Japan wished to remain friends with Taiwan, but as a matter of reality there would be no other course. As a real problem Japan’s relations with Taiwan could become triangular, with the United States at the apex. Japan thus would be “saved” by the fact that the United States maintains its relations with Taiwan. Therefore he hoped for United States assistance, in the interest of peace in the Far East.

The President cautioned that the problem there is that three could play, not just us, but also Taiwan.

The Prime Minister said that he is confident that Taiwan will “play.”

The President said that it is in Taiwan’s interest to survive as a viable economic entity. To the extent that continued economic relations with Japan serve this interest perhaps Taiwan would look with favor upon such an arrangement. However, he said that he would be less than candid if he did not mention that our exchange with the Taiwan Government showed that they are watching the Prime Minister’s visit to Peking closely to see what happens.

The Prime Minister said that he understood.

The President added that Chiang Kai-shek is a very proud man, who has spent his entire life fighting for his beliefs; being advanced in age it would be difficult to predict his reaction. We are doing all we can to preserve Taiwan’s seat in international financial organs. There is a fine line, he warned, between what can be done to have full diplomatic relations with Peking and continue to have economic relations with Taiwan.

The Prime Minister understood. Unlike East and West Germany, and North and South Korea, however, both Peking and Taiwan claim to be the sole legitimate government of China. He explained that Japan, in unofficial discussions with Taiwan, has pointed out that it has no other choice as long as Taiwan insists on an either-or type choice. When asked for Taiwan’s feelings about becoming a separate country, they say this gets into the 2-China theory and that while they understand Japan’s question they can’t reply with a definitive position. He said that he knows that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is a very proud and great leader, as well as his deputy Chiang Ching-kuo. They have a deep understanding of reality, but will not respond on the point relating to 2 Chinas. He agreed that we would have to wait and see, as the President said, what the conditions are to be discussed in Peking. It will also be crucial afterward, he added, for Japan to have the good offices of the United States vis-à-vis Taiwan.

The President observed that we have found one thing in our discussions with our friend Chiang Kai-shek and with Chou En-lai, that is that while they disagree on many points they agree on one point, that there is only one China.

The Prime Minister said that this poses the most difficult problem.

The Prime Minister then said that he would be pleased to hear whatever the President wished to say about Vietnam and his visit to Moscow.

Before the President could begin speaking about Vietnam, Dr. Kissinger insisted there be no press briefing by the Japanese of anything the President might say about Vietnam. The morning papers here are reporting stories from Tokyo that the President had indicated to the Prime Minister that a peaceful settlement would be reached during 1972. This is not true, and the President said no such thing.

The Prime Minister said that he would keep everything in strict confidence, and stated that neither he nor Foreign Minister Ohira had talked to the press. He pointed out that the Japanese press engages in “creative writing.” He understood how a leak could create an obstacle in the negotiations, and promised to keep secret whatever he heard. However, if there is any risk, he said, he could do without anything on Vietnam.

The President assumed that the Prime Minister has followed the public reports that we have had a number of meetings in Paris, and that Dr. Kissinger has been meeting the North Vietnamese privately. Both sides have agreed to say nothing about the substance of these talks. He then explained that in his speeches of January 25 and May 8 we have put forward a complete proposal for peace, offering a ceasefire, total withdrawal of our forces, an internationally supervised election and a return of all POWs by both sides. However, the one sticking point (well publicized) is the North Vietnamese insistence on the condition for a settlement that we join them in overthrowing our ally, the Government in Saigon. Much as we wish to end the war, we will not do so. This would be morally wrong for the 17 million people of South Vietnam, many of whom would then be slaughtered. However, more importantly, if the United States overthrew its ally in South Vietnam, when the military situation did not even require such extreme action, this would mean that all our friends and allies throughout the world could no longer depend on the United States word. If our word is not good in one place it is not good anywhere, in Japan or Europe or elsewhere. We are willing to go an extra mile in trying to arrange a settlement with North Vietnam, but are not going to sacrifice our ally and overthrow the Government of Saigon to help install a communist government. The fundamental keystone of our foreign policy is that we will not desert an ally; Japan, ROK, Europe, Israel, all can rely on that. Once we break our word and desert our ally, difficult as the war may be, no one would rely on our word.

The President explained that in our discussions with Chou En-lai, and with Brezhnev and his colleagues we made it clear unequivocally that we desire better relations with these governments but would make no secret, or public deals to do so at the expense of our friends and allies. They do not agree with us but he said if we were to say that we would throw over an old friend to become friends with you they would have no respect for us. Our new friends would have no confidence in us if we were to break our word to an old friend. On their side too, he observed, they stand by their friends, and respect us for doing so too.

With respect to the Soviets, the President said that his visit was constructive in developing new areas of cooperation in space and health on the side of peaceful activities, and on the side of arms in beginning to limit arms.

The President noted an interesting point, as the Prime Minister knows, that the Soviets and PRC agree on nothing these days, but our discussions with both disclosed that they agree on one point, they have a healthy respect for Japan, whose economic might has impressed them. Also, they both need Japanese investment and know-how. Thus Japan’s position is not weak. He said Japan has something they want, which makes Japan’s position strong in talking to Brezhnev and Kosygin, and to Chou En-lai.

(The President reviewed these last few remarks for Dr. Kissinger, who returned after another brief absence.)

Dr. Kissinger affirmed this estimate, noting that the USSR is interested in securing Japanese investment to develop Siberia. China also has great respect for Japan, and has a high estimate of the ability of the Japanese to achieve a dominant position in a number of regions in Asia. He felt that this respect has motivated the rapidity of the tempo of China’s decision to talk to Japan.

The President said that neither the USSR nor PRC say so, but both are aware that in today’s world it is impossible to be a major military power without a strong economic base. He understands that Japan has no idea of doing more in the military field, except in the area of self defense, but Japan has this great economic power, which has gained it great respect from every country, and has the potential to become powerful in other respects as well. It is good that Japan is strong. However, the more Japan protests it does not intend to become a military power the more they do not believe Japan. This, he felt, is good.

The Prime Minister said that Japan’s constitution explicitly forbids the use of force to resolve an international dispute. Nor does Japan intend to rearm, or become a military power. A ⅔ majority in both the upper and lower houses of the Diet is required to amend the constitution. He expressed wry appreciation that the United States had drafted such an excellent constitution for Japan.

The Prime Minister then asked one question, whether the United States intended to seek full diplomatic relations with the PRC, or would continue along the line of the Shanghai Communiqué.

The President replied “the latter”, because the PRC will not have relations with any nation which has relations with the ROC, and we are supporting the ROC. However we would explore by all means how to have healthy relations without formal diplomatic relations. Dr. Kissinger has been to Peking and we have found a channel in Paris. Dr. Kissinger could go to Paris again to keep open that channel.

The President stressed the importance of non-interference in domestic affairs, with the possibility of a diplomatic mission from the PRC.

The Prime Minister said that the point was raised when Gromyko visited Japan this past spring,² at which time it was agreed that Japan would open peace negotiation with the USSR this fall, perhaps at the highest level. One condition Japan intended to insist on for a peace treaty is the return of the four northern islands, the Habomais and Shikotan, and Etorofu and Kunashiri.

The President hoped the USSR would be as generous as we were in returning Okinawa.

The Prime Minister appreciated that American gesture, and could now tell the Soviets that the United States returned Okinawa out of friendship and that Japan hoped the Russians would do the same with the northern islands.

The President was sure that would be an interesting conversation.

Dr. Kissinger noted that if Japan got back territory from the USSR then others would also demand that territory be returned, especially the USSR’s Eastern European allies. Of course, Japan is free to make demands, but the Europeans have all concluded peace treaties.

The Prime Minister said that he could not get popular support for a peace treaty without the return of these islands, which conditions is non-negotiable.

The Prime Minister explained, in response to the President’s question, that the Soviets expelled all Japanese from the islands when they occupied them after the end of the war. Before the war the population was about 10 to 20 thousand.

At the President’s suggestion the meeting recessed to await the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister, who would join this group for further discussions.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [1 of 4] Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted by Wickel. The meeting took place at Presidential Suite of the Kuilima Hotel.
2. Tanaka is apparently referring to a visit by Andrei Gromyko to Japan, January 23–28. Ushiba provided U. Alexis Johnson with a briefing on this visit. (Memorandum of conversation, February 1; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 USSR)
3. See Document 134.