134. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
  • Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira
  • Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba
  • Mr. Hidetoshi Ukawa, Chief, Second North American Section, American Affairs Bureau, MOFA (Interpreter)
  • President Richard Nixon
  • Secretary of State William Rogers
  • Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. James J. Wickel, American Embassy, Tokyo (Interpreter)
[Page 497]

SUBJECT

  • Prime Minister Tanaka’s Call on President Nixon

The President said that he believed it useful for the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister to join this discussion, but did not believe it necessary to review his own earlier discussions with Prime Minister Tanaka or those of the Secretary of State, Foreign Minister and others in the other meeting, since he assumed both covered the same ground. Probably all that remained for discussion was the Joint Statement and the economic package.

The Secretary noted agreement on the Joint Statement and the other statement, both of which had already been released to the press, subject to embargo until 11:00 a.m. Agreement had been reached, he explained, with no serious difficulties, and the statements are satisfactory to us. He wished to congratulate those who had worked to produce them for their labors.2

The President said that one constructive result of this conference we should be sure to understand is that it provides for a continuous belt of communications, not just meetings, for example, of the Joint Cabinet Committee on trade and economic affairs but also at the highest level, not just to discuss problems which have arisen, but regular continuing consultations for foreseeable problems and consult on means to resolve them.

The Prime Minister said that these talks have been most significant in that both sides agreed on the desirability of having frequent, continuing discussions, liaison and consultations about various matters (hopefully not negotiations) before they emerged as full-scale problems. With respect to the annual Cabinet Committee meeting, he realized that one could not be held this Presidential election year, and said that Japan would be pleased to take its turn to host the meeting early next year, to discuss everything, including this year’s portion as well, at the highest level. He said that he looked forward to frequent meetings, as often as possible, not just once a year. He hoped that there could be prior consultation and cooperation on such matters as the President had indicated, including investment and economic cooperation in Asia, the Middle East and Siberia. With respect to economic problems, he said that he personally views Japan-U.S. economic relations as being of paramount importance, and, as he told Dr. Kissinger recently, he believes that these problems can be solved through experts meeting, every month if necessary (not negotiations), to study up-to-date statistics and through constant and adequate liaison. The President said that [Page 498] he had expressed the hope that both sides could explore the possibility of joint enterprises, and that U.S.-Japan cooperation in such areas as Siberia and Iran for example would be good for both countries, politically as well as economically. (The Prime Minister interjected Latin America as another area of cooperation.) In some cases, the President continued, one side or the other might take the lead but such cooperation would be good for both.

Being practical and candid, the President explained, he said there would also be occasions when a Japanese economic enterprise would wish to have an operation with a third country independently, just as American investors would wish to do so independently, but on other occasions both could cooperate in their mutual interest. He cited U.S.-Japan contributions to international development organs such as the ADB, where however indirectly, both countries are working together. However, he cited the exciting new prospect that the United States and Japan, the two most prosperous countries in the free world might work together in other areas. Although he had no examples in mind, he said that he would welcome any suggestions Japan might have to do so.

The Prime Minister said that he would be pleased if he could cooperate. For example, such areas as he wished to discuss included the development of Tyumen petroleum resources and Siberia, another is the Senkaku Islands petroleum resources, and the fields off-shore from Korea. Japan, he said, should not do this alone, but should consult fully with the United States, Iran is another such area, he added.

The Secretary said, on a related subject, that he would not wish to end the meeting without expressing our satisfaction with Japan’s cooperation in space development, with which our space people are pleased.

The Foreign Minister expressed pleasure with other cooperation over a broad range, including culture, education, exchanges of persons and pollution control. This kind of exchange, he felt, could be developed further.

The Secretary assumed that the President and the Prime Minister had covered the same ground, but explained that the Foreign Minister had been explaining Japan’s views about the forthcoming talks with Peking just when the President invited them both to join his meeting. If the President wished, he felt that it would be useful for the Foreign Minister to review here his predictions about what might develop.

The President agreed that it would be useful to hear the Foreign Minister’s analysis.

The Foreign Minister explained that the date for Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit has not yet been finalized, but when decided could [Page 499] probably be the last part of September or the first part of October. His principal work when he went to Peking would be to discuss the fundamental problems involved in establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC. Should agreement be reached there could be an immediate opening of formal diplomatic relations. Having renounced all claim to Taiwan in the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, Japan, in the strictest sense, has no conditions, and cannot determine by itself that the territorial title to Taiwan is vested with the PRC. Therefore, he expected that if Japan is to have diplomatic relations with the PRC these would be based on a joint communiqué. If relations are thus established a treaty of peace and friendship, and a treaty of FCN, as well as agreements on civil aviation, fisheries and the like could be negotiated subsequently.

The Foreign Minister stated his analysis that Peking has shown no reactions differing decisively from Japan’s views. He anticipated that diplomatic relations could be established while Prime Minister Tanaka is in Peking.

However, the Foreign Minister explained, the Prime Minister’s great concern is how to deal with the Taiwan question. Japan would shift its diplomatic representation from Taipei to Peking, but to the extent possible wish to make its greatest effort to continue to provide for personal travel between Taiwan and Japan, for trade and investments, and to continue measures for tariff preferences for Taiwan.

The Secretary noted that the formula Japan plans to use is interesting. Canada and Italy “took note” of the PRC position on Taiwan, and in our own Shanghai Communiqué we used different language, that is, that the people on both sides claim there is only one China, and that we did not challenge this view. Japan, he noted, seems to favor the Netherlands formulation.

The Foreign Minister explained that Japan has relinquished all claims to Taiwan in the Peace Treaty. The question of the title of Taiwan, therefore, is in the hands of the allied powers who signed the Treaty of San Francisco, he said, but the allied powers have given no indication with respect to the title of Taiwan. Japan is not in any position to say that Taiwan belongs to the PRC. Therefore, Japan can say no more than “it understands and respects” the PRC view that Taiwan is an integral part of China. He recalled that the UK “acknowledged” Peking’s claim, the Canadians “took note” and the United States “did not challenge,” all of which formulations differ in nuance, but the Netherlands has gone farther than anyone else. Therefore, he felt that Japan would have to go at least as far as the Netherlands, but said that Japan would not go beyond “that fence.”3

[Page 500]

The President offered one word of advice to the Prime Minister before his visit to Peking—get lots of sleep because the Chinese stay up all night to work on the Communiqué. They feel language is very important, therefore, he advised the Japanese to be prepared to stay up all night.

The Prime Minister said that the Americans are more fortunate in working out a Joint Communiqué in English and Chinese, aided by the different nuances between Chinese and English, but since Japanese and Chinese are both written in the same characters the problem of nuance is more difficult.

The President assumed that he meant that the English and Chinese texts are each subject to their own interpretation, but that this is not possible because Japanese and Chinese are written in the same script.

The Prime Minister said that he would not talk all night.

The President, in all fairness to the Chinese, said that they are meticulous in their use of words. Subsequent analysis of both texts of the Shanghai Communiqué at the State Department revealed that in the Chinese text wherever a word was subject to ambiguous translation, the Chinese invariably chose the nuance more favorable to the United States side rather than their own.

The President also pointed out that the Chinese bargain very hard but are meticulously scrupulous about honoring agreements when reached; the reason for the meticulous use of language by the Chinese is that they wish to have no misunderstanding.

The Secretary recalled that the PRC Foreign Minister said that the American interpreters were good, but unfortunately all spoke prerevolutionary Chinese.

The President asked whether the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister could read Chinese.

Neither could, they said, but the Foreign Minister said that he reads English.

The President recalled that the Foreign Minister addressed the Japan-American Society in Tokyo recently in English.

To conclude the talks with a light touch before the photographers entered, the President allowed that the interpreters for these talks were adequate enough, but could not really compare with the Chinese interpreters—all of whom are pretty girls.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [1 of 4]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Presidential Suite of the Kuilima Hotel. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Rogers and Ohira joined Nixon and Tanaka at 10:20 a.m., remaining with them until 11:20 a.m., at which time the meeting ended. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
  2. The “Text of the Joint Statement” and the “Announcement on U.S.-Japan Economic Talks” are in Department of State Bulletin, September 25, 1972, pp. 331–333.
  3. The eventual Japanese communiqué stated that Japan “fully understands and respects” the PRC’s viewpoint on Taiwan. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Bristol: Keesing’s Publications, 1971–1972, vol. xviii, 1971–1972, p. 25517) See Document 136.