Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

102. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 22, 1971, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)
• Nobusuke Kishi, Former Prime Minister of Japan

SUBJECT

• 1) Textile Agreement and Other Economic Issues
• 2) Okinawa Reversion
• 3) Chirep
• 4) Secretary Connally Visit to Tokyo
• 5) President’s Visits to Peking and Moscow
• 6) Prime Minister Sato Succession
• 7) Kishi’s Impressions of Korea and Taiwan
• 8) Possible Initiation for Presidential Visit to Japan
• 9) Press

The President welcomed former Prime Minister Kishi warmly as an old friend.

Mr. Kishi expressed appreciation on behalf of the Japanese people that President and Mrs. Nixon had gone to Anchorage to welcome Their Imperial Majesties the Emperor and Empress on September 26, when they stopped there to refuel enroute to Europe.²

Mr. Kishi also expressed appreciation for the gracious hospitality the President extended Foreign Minister Fukuda and his colleagues during the Joint Cabinet Committee Meeting held in Washington September 9 and 10. All the Ministers, he said, were deeply impressed and fully appreciative.

1) Textile Agreement and Other Economic Issues

Mr. Kishi expressed warm personal appreciation to the President for the message conveyed to him through Foreign Minister Fukuda that he would be pleased to receive him (Mr. Kishi) at the White House any time. He apologized for any inconvenience caused by the several postponements of his visit, and explained that he felt that it would have been awkward to call before the textile issue was settled. He felt strongly that the resolution of the textile issue would benefit the people of both countries.

The President expressed his own appreciation to Mr. Kishi and his colleagues, whose efforts had contributed greatly to the textile agreement. He expressed awareness that the textile issue would now pose a political problem for the Government in Japan, just as it had for the Government here before it was resolved, but stressed that the settlement would now permit both countries to move forward to resolve other issues important to both of them.

Mr. Kishi agreed that there were other subjects on which Japan and the United States should move ahead. Personally, although he did not feel that the relations between Japan and the United States are fundamentally bad, frankly speaking he noted concern about the undesirable aspects of the prevailing mood between both countries. He, too, was pleased that the textile settlement would permit both countries to take up the other economic issues now, including the monetary problem, but in light of our experience in dealing with the textile issue he urged strongly that each nation cooperate fully with the other to resolve the other outstanding economic issues as smoothly as possible.

2) Okinawa Reversion

The President noted his concern over reports that Prime Minister Sato’s Government is facing a political problem in providing the continued use of the land for the American military bases in Okinawa following reversion, and asked Mr. Kishi how he might help the GOJ meet this problem.

Mr. Kishi explained that all of the opposition parties oppose the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, but that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is united in its support of the GOJ. Further, the Japanese people overwhelmingly support reversion. The LDP, which has an absolute majority in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors, could in any case force Diet approval of the Reversion Agreement, but in view of the nature and the significance of reversion the GOJ wished to secure support from at least some part of the opposition, perhaps from the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). As a condition for its support of the Agreement, however, the DSP is demanding the return of some of the bases presently used by the American forces in Okinawa. Mr. Kishi felt that it would be helpful if the United States could make known in some way that it would return some bases, not necessarily in the immediate future, but soon enough after reversion to accommodate Japanese wishes.

The President replied that he would authorize Secretary Connally to discuss this problem with Prime Minister Sato during his visit to Tokyo. He suggested that Mr. Kishi could wire the Prime Minister, on a private basis, that he is prepared to negotiate anything reasonable, because he wished to help the GOJ gain as broad support as possible for the Reversion Agreement. He said that Secretary Connally, after returning to Washington, could discuss the results of his talks with Prime Minister Sato. (The President excused himself to take an urgent telephone call from Governor Holton.)

General Haig explained that the President wanted Mr. Kishi to know, on an immediate and private basis, that the United States is prepared to be flexible in consolidating real estate after reversion. He said that Secretary Connally keeps fully abreast of this problem, and could discuss it in Tokyo; on his return, the special requirements of the GOJ could be studied here and we would then try to work something out. He cautioned that while we have bureaucratic problems with this issue, it could be worked out slowly, over a period of time. (The President rejoined Mr. Kishi.)

Mr. Kishi noted reports that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to conclude hearings on the Okinawa Reversion Agreement rather quickly, but that the Senate might delay a final vote until early next year. He warned that any Senate delay beyond the end of this year would adversely affect Diet consideration of this Agreement. The current Extraordinary Diet Session must be completed by December 25, at the latest, to permit convocation of the Regular Diet Session before the end of the year as required by the Constitution, and the GOJ feels strongly that it must complete the Diet approval process by about December 20. Mr. Kishi cautioned that Senate delay beyond the end of the year would greatly strengthen the opposition parties in their determination to oppose the Agreement by means of delaying tactics in the Diet deliberations.

The President assured Mr. Kishi that the Administration would push for early approval by the Senate.

General Haig noted that the Reversion Agreement might be reported to the full Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee as early as November 2 or 3.

The President directed General Haig to inform Senators Mansfield and Scott of the need for early Senate approval. He assured Mr. Kishi that there was no doubt about Senate approval of the Agreement, and advised him to ignore the inevitable statements which would be made during the Senate debate. He reiterated his absolute assurance that the Senate would give its advice and consent to this Agreement.

The President then asked whether Okinawa reversion posed any other problems beside land.

Mr. Kishi replied that the DSP has set two other conditions for its support of the Reversion Agreement: 1) termination of VOA broadcasts,³ and 2) firm assurance that nuclear weapons have been removed from Okinawa by the time of reversion. However, he said that these latter two conditions were not being taken as seriously by the LDP as the first condition, return of some bases.

The President said that Secretary Connally would discuss this first issue (land) with Prime Minister Sato with a view to working out a solution helpful to the GOJ.

3) Chirep

Mr. Kishi, turning to the UN, said that the IQ Resolution co-sponsored by Japan and the United States still faced great difficulties. Although there is no clear prospect for its adoption, he said that Japan is making an all-out effort to secure its passage. He expressed the hope that the United States would also exert its maximum influence on those governments with which it has greater influence than Japan.

The President noted that he had just reviewed the situation in an hour-long discussion with Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Bush. He assured Mr. Kishi that the United States is doing all that it can, particularly to persuade ten nations now on the fence to support the resolution. He added that Secretary Rogers had asked him to report that the Japanese delegation is doing an excellent job in New York to muster support for the resolution. He assured Mr. Kishi of full United States support, and said that he is doing all that he can to influence the outcome of the vote.

Mr. Kishi said that he himself did not believe that the GOJ would ipso facto have to resign to take the responsibility if the IQ should fail. Of course, the GOJ took this consideration fully into account in assessing the situation before deciding to co-sponsor and is now doing its best to assure victory in the vote, which is expected to be very close, because failure would place it in a difficult political position. Since victory would be most helpful to the GOJ, he appreciated the efforts being made by the United States.

The President said that the UN vote might come as soon as next Tuesday,⁴ and assured Mr. Kishi that the United States is exerting all the leverage it can. For example, he himself has tried to influence some votes by oral messages and telephone calls to some leaders. He emphasized that it would set a bad precedent to expel a member by a simple majority vote in the UN. If this were done, no one could be sure when another country which had lost favor with many other countries, such as Portugal, might be expelled.

The President stressed his belief that it is consistent to favor the admission of the PRC and to oppose the expulsion of the GRC. Support for the PRC has risen through recent years until now a majority favors its admission, but he reiterated that a dangerous precedent would be set if a simple majority were to expel a member.

Mr. Kishi noted his visit to Taiwan just before coming to Washington, and said that Generalissimo Chiang and other leaders he met in Taiwan generally accepted the reverse-IQ Resolution and wished to see it adopted. However, he added, Chiang questioned him very closely on the possible effects on Japan if the GRC should walk out of the UN. Chiang believed that the GRC has been a most loyal member of the UN for more than 25 years, and told Mr. Kishi that he could not bear the humiliation of being expelled by the vote of those more recently admitted to the UN who do not understand the purpose of the UN and who do not behave responsibly. Mr. Kishi said that he interpreted Chiang’s remarks to mean that the GRC would voluntarily walk out of the UN if the reverse-IQ Resolution failed, although, he added, Chiang did not say so in so many words. Chiang only told him that the GRC is considering how to deal with the worst possible eventuality, i.e., that the reverse IQ does not pass, and that the GRC has not yet reached any conclusions on its response to such a contingency.

The President said “let us hope we win.”

Mr. Kishi urged that both countries continue to push as hard as they could up to the vote on Tuesday.

The President wholeheartedly supported continued cooperation in this effort.

4) Secretary Connally Visit to Tokyo

The President said that he would authorize Secretary Connally to discuss fully during his visit to Tokyo how both countries might make progress toward resolving the monetary and other problems. The GOJ could talk to him with great confidence, but he pointed out that Secretary Connally would not be able to make decisions by himself while in Tokyo.

Mr. Kishi said that just before leaving Tokyo he had discussed Secretary Connally’s visit with both Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda, before it was announced publicly. To prepare for frank and fruitful discussions of all the economic issues, including of course the monetary problem, Mr. Kishi said that Minister Fukuda, Finance Minister Mizuta and Minister of Trade and Industry Tanaka would meet to discuss and coordinate Japan’s position.

The President said that Secretary Connally would also be prepared to discuss these subjects fully. He added that this would be Secretary and Mrs. Connally’s first visit to Japan.

Mr. Kishi expressed the hope that the Secretary and Mrs. Connally could set aside half a day in their busy schedule to come to his home in Gotemba on the slopes of Mount Fuji. He noted that Roving Ambassador Kennedy had come there twice for discussions.

5) President’s Visits to Peking and Moscow

The President assured Mr. Kishi that in any relations with Peking he has uppermost in his mind the paramount importance of our friendship and close association with Japan. He is aware, he said, of concern that the United States is seeking new relations at the expense of old friends. That, he denied emphatically, is not true. He assured Mr. Kishi that we would continue to maintain close contact with our Japanese friends through this period. He was sure that Mr. Kishi understood the great stakes involved, and asked him to reassure any doubters that United States-Japan friendship is at the top of the list if we are to maintain peace in the Pacific.

The President assured Mr. Kishi that the same is true with respect to his visit to Moscow. Further, he assured Mr. Kishi and his colleagues that the United States would consult fully with Japan, both before and after his visit to Moscow, on any discussions which involve the interests of the United States and Japan.

The President said that Mr. Kishi is aware that his approach is very pragmatic. He knows communism, he said, and is fully aware of the differences in our and their views of the world, which his visits will not change, but, he stressed, the important thing is to talk, not fight. He said that he is under no illusion that his meetings in Peking will cause all the differences in views and ideology to evaporate. Both we and the Chinese know that, he said, and would meet to discuss areas where we could find common ground. He said that he would not discuss anything, either in China or the Soviet Union, except on this basis.

Mr. Kishi said that the announcement of the President’s visit to Peking had prompted the press in Japan to conclude immediately that the United States would normalize relations with the PRC, and that Japan had fallen far behind. At the same time, the press severely criticized the Sato Government. However, Mr. Kishi noted his own belief that normalization could not be achieved that easily. Nations like Canada, with no special relationship to Taiwan, could normalize their relations with Peking easily, but countries like Japan and the United States could not ignore Taiwan as Peking insists without disposing of their treaties and other obligations to Taiwan. He said that he knows that the United States would not do so, and expressed appreciation for this clear reassurance by the President which confirmed his own belief that the United States would not sacrifice old friends in its discussions with the PRC.

The President asked whether it would be useful to consult with the GOJ about his trip to the Far East, either here or in Japan, in the same manner he planned to consult in advance with the European nations about his visit to Moscow. He felt that Secretary Rogers could stop off in Tokyo, if he were travelling in the Far East about that time.

Mr. Kishi interjected that consultations would be most useful. If the President perceived no obstacle, he strongly supported the desirability of previsit consultations before both the President’s trips, to Peking as well as Moscow, either directly through Prime Minister Sato, or though Foreign Minister Fukuda via the Department of State.

The President agreed that we would work out a procedure for consultations, directly with the Prime Minister if he so desired, or through Foreign Minister Fukuda, whom he knew the Prime Minister trusted.⁵

6) Prime Minister Sato Succession

Turning to domestic affairs, Mr. Kishi explained that the main reason for moving Minister Fukuda from the Ministry of Finance to Foreign Affairs in the cabinet reshuffle this past summer was the belief that he would be the best man to improve Japan-United States relations. Conditions within the LDP are such that Minister Fukuda is also considered most likely to succeed Prime Minister Sato when he steps down soon (although no date has been decided yet) not just because Prime Minister Sato wants him to, but because the situation requires it.

The President said that he too believed that Minister Fukuda is an excellent man, and wished him well.

7) Kishi’s Impressions of Korea and Taiwan

Mr. Kishi reviewed his impressions of the situation in the ROK and Taiwan, both of which he had visited immediately before this visit to Washington. In contrast to the “healthy, stable” economy of Taiwan, he observed that the ROK economy has been shaken by three events this year: (1) devaluation of the won, (2) the President’s dollar defense program announced August 15, and (3) the floating of the yen by Japan. As a further element of instability he noted the high degree of dependence of the ROK economy on foreign loans. The GOJ, he said, is giving the ROK all the aid it can, as indeed it should.

Mr. Kishi then noted the widespread impression in Japan that a “peace mood” prevails in Korea as a result of the opening of the North and South Korean Red Cross talks at Panmunjom to relocate members of families who have been separated. In fact, however, he found no such peace mood in the ROK: North Korea has recently stepped up its infiltration of armed guerrillas; Kim Il-sung continues to train even North Korean women and children in the use of arms; the Soviets and Chinese Communists continue to supply arms aid to North Korea, which is itself making great progress in developing an indigenous arms industry; and the ROK air force is not necessarily superior to the North Korean. Consequently he found a great deal of uncertainty in the ROK, which is heightened by the withdrawal of half the American forces and the fear that the remaining half might also be withdrawn.

Mr. Kishi said that he had been told that North Korean agents recently infiltrating into the ROK are armed with poisoned needles, rather than pistols or knives, which could be used to assassinate key leaders (the poison is fatal in two hours) or to commit suicide in case of capture.

Despite PRC statements that it will liberate the island by armed invasion across the straits, Mr. Kishi found Taiwan calm. In contrast he found the South Koreans apprehensive about the North Koreans from whom they are separated only by the 38° parallel, and not a strait. He said they well remember the invasion of 1950.

The President said that discussions like this with his old friend of many years are most helpful. He suggested that Mr. Kishi talk freely about these subjects with the other ten or twelve guests at dinner at the White House later this evening.

8) Possible Invitation for Presidential Visit to Japan

Mr. Kishi said that he would be delighted to invite the President to visit Japan, but felt that it is more proper for the GOJ to first consult his wishes and then extend an official invitation. Oriental etiquette, he explained, would require a prior visit to the United States by Their Imperial Majesties the Emperor and Empress, in view of Japan’s indebtedness to the United States for its great post-war assistance, at which time the President might be officially invited to Japan. However, Mr. Kishi stressed that it would be proper for the GOJ to arrange for the invitation through official channels.

The President commented that he would like to visit Japan.

9) Press

The President suggested that Mr. Kishi might tell the press that they had discussed (1) the whole range of United States-Japan relations, (2) Okinawa Reversion problems, and (3) economic and monetary problems, and that he had expressed the desire of the United States Government to work closely with the GOJ for the satisfactory resolution of these problems, which Secretary Connally would be prepared to discuss fully during his forthcoming visit to Tokyo.

Mr. Kishi suggested that he might also mention the President’s assurances that he would do nothing in Peking to improve relations at the expense of old friends.

The President agreed, and suggested that Mr. Kishi might say that the President assured him that he would do nothing during his visits to Peking or Moscow to seek to improve relations at the expense of old friends.

Mr. Kishi suggested that he also tell the press that he had informed the President of his impressions of Korea and Taiwan.

The President agreed, and added that Mr. Kishi could also say that they had discussed the UN vote, since both countries are working closely in support of the IQ Resolution.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—The President, Former PM Nobusuke Kishi, Oct. 22, 1971. Secret. On October 21 Haig sent Nixon a memorandum in preparation for the meeting with Kishi. In this memorandum, Haig reported that Kishi “is coming as the unofficial emissary of the Sato Government and the LDP.” (Ibid., Box 537, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VI, October–31 December 1971)
2. See Document 90, footnote 10.
3. The U.S. Government used Okinawa as a base for VOA broadcasts.
4. October 26.
5. Additional remarks made between the President and Kishi about Nixon’s upcoming visits to Peking and Moscow are in a separate memorandum of the same conversation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 537, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VI, October–31 December 1971)