Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

101. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 15, 1971, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Nobuhiko Ushiba, Ambassador of Japan
• Yukio Satoh, Second Secretary, Japanese Embassy
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

SUBJECT

• US-Japan Textile Agreement, President’s Trips to Peking and Moscow

Mr. Kissinger remarked that if his job didn’t prohibit it, he could become quite angry with Ambassador Ushiba, who was the only Ambassador who had ever accused him, Mr. Kissinger, of betraying that Ambassador’s country. Mr. Kissinger wondered what Ambassador Ushiba would be doing if he were in Mr. Kissinger’s shoes. Ambassador Ushiba laughed, and changed the subject to that of textiles. He noted that a US-Japanese textile agreement had just been signed by Minister Tanaka and Ambassador Kennedy in Tokyo.²

Mr. Kissinger expressed his pleasure at the signing of this agreement, and informed Ambassador Ushiba that the President wanted three minutes with the Ambassador after the present conversation in order to express his, the President’s, thanks to Prime Minister Sato. Ambassador Ushiba said that the conclusion of this agreement was a great relief for him, to which Mr. Kissinger commented that he couldn’t say that events had always been made easy for him, either. He used to suffer from the illusion that he was dedicated to the preservation of Japanese-US friendship, but when he read the newspaper accounts from Japan these days it appeared that he was portrayed as a villain.

Ambassador Ushiba said that the Japanese Government could not control the press—this was outside governmental power. The same thing was true about the Japanese textile industry, and this was why it had taken so long to conclude an agreement.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the President’s Peking trip, and declared that what we had to do was to find a relationship of confidence between us. If the Japanese thought that we were going to betray them, the situation would be hopeless. In fact, we should be the ones to be suspicious, since the Japanese had many more delegations in China than we did. In any event, we had no intention of shifting our emphasis in our relations from Japan to China. The President was also going to the Soviet Union, but this didn’t mean that we would shift our policy in favor of the USSR.

Ambassador Ushiba, referring to the fact that he was acting under instructions from Tokyo, expressed the hope that when Mr. Kissinger returned from Peking he would tell him what had taken place. Mr. Kissinger said he would of course do so. However, a way had to be found to keep what he said from leaking to the press. The information about his trip would need to be handled in a channel that would not leak. This hadn’t always been possible, but if Ambassador Ushiba could find such a channel, there would be no problem. Ambassador Ushiba stated that he would communicate this information to Tokyo. He had just come back from meeting Emperor Hirohito and Foreign Minister Fukuda in Anchorage, and Mr. Fukuda had expressed considerable interest in Mr. Kissinger’s trip. Mr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Ushiba that he would see the Ambassador a few days after his return. But he could tell the Ambassador ahead of time that his trip would mostly be concerned with technical matters and drawing up the agenda for the President’s trip, with very little of a concrete nature to be discussed. Ambassador Ushiba accepted this, noting that Mr. Kissinger’s trip had already been portrayed as being of a technical nature.

Mr. Kissinger went on to say that of course some substance would be involved, but this wouldn’t go beyond what had been discussed during his last visit to Peking. Ambassador Ushiba asked that if the subject of Japan came up, could Mr. Kissinger emphasize the importance of the US-Japan Security Treaty? This Treaty was, in fact, a big element in the security of China. Mr. Kissinger observed that he had made this point in July, and the Ambassador could be sure that he would make it again. The alternative to the Security Treaty was a re-armed Japan. There just couldn’t be a country like Japan without security and without arms. The Security Treaty was to the advantage of both of our countries.

Ambassador Ushiba said that Chou En-lai should not be misled by some of the pious Japanese who went to China and said things against the Security Treaty. He was personally against a nuclear Japan or a re-armed Japan, and the Security Treaty was a safeguard against this.

Ambassador Ushiba stated that with respect to the President’s visit to the Soviet Union, there was a great interest in Japan over the triangular relationship involving Japan, Peking, and the Soviet Union. Perhaps Mr. Kissinger could visit Tokyo and express his thoughts on this relationship to Ambassador Ushiba’s people. Mr. Kissinger commented that he had offered to do so as early as last July, but various things had transpired which had prevented his visiting Japan. Ambassador Ushiba mentioned that he had asked Tokyo to send its fundamental views about the Japan-China-Soviet relationship, but Tokyo had so far not responded. Perhaps after Mr. Kissinger’s Peking visit, Tokyo would be better prepared to address this issue. Mr. Kissinger declared that he was prepared from the White House side to have the closest relationship with Japan of any other country, and would be willing to go to Tokyo to tell people there what he thought. The relationship would involve the US as well as Japan and Peking.

Ambassador Ushiba asked, was Mr. Kissinger confident that by May major US–USSR problems would be solved? What about a SALT agreement? Mr. Kissinger replied affirmatively. Our impression was that the Soviet Union was serious about solving problems. Mr. Kissinger remarked jokingly that the real truth was that we were going to give Okinawa to Russia before giving it back to Japan. Ambassador Ushiba commented, equally jokingly, that this was indeed big news. Mr. Kissinger said, speaking more seriously, that he didn’t expect any Asian problems to be on the agenda for discussions with the Soviets. This agenda would address such matters as SALT, European security, and so forth. Ambassador Ushiba asked if Mr. Kissinger thought the subject of a European security conference would be on the agenda, and Mr. Kissinger said, “yes.”

Ambassador Ushiba raised the possibility that the President’s visit to Moscow would neutralize his visit to Peking. Mr. Kissinger remarked that we couldn’t let either communist country have a veto over our relationship with the other communist country. We would not become involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and he frankly didn’t care where the Sino-Soviet border was. We did not want to become involved. When Ambassador Ushiba wondered whether the Chinese and the Soviets might come closer together, Mr. Kissinger asserted that this was out of our control. We would neither drive them apart nor closer together. We would have to let them work out their relationship, and would deal with both.

Ambassador Ushiba asked for Mr. Kissinger’s opinion on what would happen if, after Mr. Kissinger’s trip to China, and if the UN Chirep vote was unfavorable for us, Nationalist China walked out of the UN. Mr. Kissinger declared that we would naturally continue to maintain our relationship with Taiwan. Ambassador Ushiba asked, would Mr. Kissinger make this clear to Peking? This was a most important issue. Mr. Kissinger stated that there was absolutely no question of our maintaining relations with Nationalist China, regardless if the vote went against us. The Japanese would not be faced with any surprises in our relations with Taiwan, and if we should ever consider changing these relations we would certainly let the Japanese know. But there was no such consideration now, and none could be foreseen for this term of the President. Mr. Kissinger explained he was only putting it in this way because the President’s present term was all the farther he could look ahead.

Mr. Kissinger informed Ambassador Ushiba that we wanted to send Secretary Connally on an Asian trip. Secretary Connally was being sent to attend the inauguration of President Thieu, but we thought that he might take this occasion to visit Japan. Ambassador Ushiba wondered, would Secretary Connally have full power to negotiate on the exchange rate, and on economic matters? Mr. Kissinger noted that we were not going to hit the Japanese over the head; we merely felt that while Secretary Connally was in the Far East it would be useful for him to visit Japan. He had never been there before. Ambassador Ushiba indicated that he felt some confusion over where to go to discuss all these various economic matters. He had been told that Secretary Connally had full power, that Ambassador Kennedy had full power, that Mr. Peterson had full power—. Mr. Kissinger interjected to say that he personally had full power. Ambassador Ushiba laughed. He observed that the textiles question had been brought to a conclusion, but hoped that we wouldn’t take this as a precedent for handling any other matters. Mr. Kissinger told Ambassador Ushiba not to construe Secretary Connally’s visit as an attempt to pressure Japan. We had the impression that one of the innumerable Japanese emissaries had told Secretary Connally that Ambassador Ushiba’s Government wanted to see him. But Ambassador Ushiba could be assured that Secretary Connally was not coming to force Japan on the exchange rate. Another thing, he, Mr. Kissinger, would have just come from Peking and Secretary Connally could fill in Prime Minister Sato about this. Was this inconvenient?

Ambassador Ushiba asked when Secretary Connally might be coming, and Mr. Kissinger replied that we were thinking of early November. The inauguration of President Thieu was on October 31, and Secretary Connally could get to Japan by about November 7. He again assured Ambassador Ushiba that we had no intention of using this visit to force a discussion of something else.³ Ambassador Ushiba said that the Japanese would be happy if Secretary Connally were to come over the exchange rate. Mr. Kissinger again told Ambassador Ushiba that this was not the reason for Secretary Connally’s visit; we just wanted him to get to know Japan and thought that the visit would also be a friendly gesture. Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Ushiba to let us know by early next week if the visit would be convenient.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 537, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VI, October–31 December 1971. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. According to an October 21 covering memorandum from Froebe to Haig, Kissinger approved the October 15 memorandum and requested that no further distribution be made. (Ibid.)
2. On October 15, David Kennedy and Tanaka agreed to a “Memorandum of Understanding,” which restricted Japanese exports of wool and synthetic textiles to the United States. Kennedy and Ushiba signed a formal agreement to this effect on January 3, 1972. (United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 23, pt. 3, 1972, TIAS 7495, pp. 3167–3189)
3. Connally visited Asia October 28–November 14. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy; 1969–1972, Document 187.