90. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japanese Ambassador to the United States
  • Mr. Yutaka Normura, Economic Counselor of the Japanese Embassy
  • Mr. Takasugi, Japanese Consul General in Los Angeles
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: It is nice to see you.

Ambassador Ushiba: It is nice of you to give me this time. Prime Minister Sato sent me a cable concerning my seeing you. Is there any message from you or the President that you would like me to convey?

Dr. Kissinger: We had a surprise announcement for you on July 15 and another surprise announcement on August 15. I promise you there will not be another one on September 15.

Ambassador Ushiba: The last one was on a Monday morning with the market already open and there was confusion. I recognize Sunday evening was good for you and Europe, but for us it was a delicate time.

Dr. Kissinger: You are keeping your nerve. You are buying so many dollars. I am not an economist.

Ambassador Ushiba: We are not entirely unhappy. We are buying dollars.

Dr. Kissinger: I am told that you can force us to devalue the dollar by dumping.

U.S.-Japan Relations

Dr. Kissinger: I talked to the President yesterday. He knows you are here. We want to restore good relations. We consider our friendship [Page 273] with Japan the keystone of our Pacific policy. We have had some unfortunate misunderstandings and difficulties. We must make sure that our basic traditions are not affected. One reads reports about our replacing Japan with China—this is an absurd proposition. The Chinese are opponents, though maybe with our policy we can make them a little less aggressive. But you are our friends. We will not trade our friends for opponents. Therefore as regards the basic direction of our policy, nothing has changed. I explained our China moves to you.

I assume that what I say is not reported by your press officer.

Ambassador Ushiba: I will send it immediately to the Prime Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: There is one thing I find that is not working too well in our relations. On textiles, for example, there was a price paid out of proportion to the intrinsic value. I was partly to blame. I did not take this issue seriously when I first came into office and hoped it would go away.

We have had discussions on such matters as textiles and yen devaluation. But we don’t really have fundamental discussions on where we both want to go. Who should we talk to if the President wants to talk, knowing that the conversations with the Prime Minister will be kept in that channel. For example, if there were developments we could tell you or some other designate about, something personal for the Prime Minister, and you would not tell the bureaucracy and we would not tell the bureaucracy.2

Ambassador Ushiba: I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: We could feel freer to discuss basic philosophy or approaches.

Ambassador Ushiba: I am designated.

Dr. Kissinger: I am delighted. It is up to the Prime Minister to designate. I believe we should have that exchange because right now there is almost no such contact; everything is more bureaucratic.

Ambassador Ushiba: It is done in a more normal way.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not being critical.

Ambassador Ushiba: I understand the reasons for what you say. I will tell the Prime Minister that it is very important to have a direct channel.

[Page 274]

Textiles

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to work seriously to improve our relations. I don’t know where the textile negotiations stand; they bore me. I have no specific proposals to make. Can we settle this in the next two to three months?

Ambassador Ushiba: I am in a similar position. I have been given no information by the government on the Kennedy negotiations with the Trade Minister and the Prime Minister. I gather Ambassador Kennedy still insisted on a formulation along the lines that Mr. Flanigan proposed to me in December of last year. This makes negotiations almost impossible.

Dr. Kissinger: With election year coming certainly the President will do something. Unfortunately the textile industry only concerns a few states. It would be better if it were spread over the country. I do not want to get into this. With Japan we always talk textiles instead of the direction of the next ten years. I was very naive at the outset. In the first month of the Administration there was a proposal that a mission go to Japan on textiles. I said we could not open our relations with Japan on an issue like textiles. Now here we are. I leave it to people who understand this.

Ambassador Ushiba: The pattern of our exports has changed radically. The bulk of our exports is in yarns, raw material which the textile people buy. It is a mistake to treat Japan on the same level as Korea, Hong Kong or Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: We are moving and your side should recognize that the Japanese Government should show minimum progress. Secretary Rogers will raise this with your Foreign Minister on a private basis when he comes. There will be no experts present.

Ambassador Ushiba: Let us put this aside.

Dr. Kissinger: We will try to be constructive. You should try to be constructive. If I never hear about this again I will be only too happy.

Ambassador Ushiba: I hope you will be interested in the final stage.3

Dr. Kissinger: If we get to the point where there are only two issues left, I will be glad to go to the President if you come to me. We are not there yet.

Ambassador Ushiba: Yes.

[Page 275]

China

Dr. Kissinger: Let us forget textiles and talk about the next ten years. With dramatic events let us not forget the fact that U.S./Japanese friendship is a key element in our foreign policy. First, it is inevitable that as you grow stronger you become the object of hostility. Secondly, our relationship must be redefined. Many Americans remember you from right after the war, and they forget you have your own views, that you have 2,000 years of history. It is a psychological adjustment we must all make. In these conditions how do we harmonize our policy? You are undoubtedly a great power which will pursue its own interests. We and you have to raise our sights above the purely economic matters of the post-war period.

Ambassador Ushiba: I agree. Mr. Sato is trying to raise sights.

Dr. Kissinger: We read accounts that the Chinese are worried about you. Maybe this is so. In any event that is their problem, not ours. We are prepared, we are eager to strengthen relations with you. There is much the Chinese accuse you of which you don’t wish to do.

Ambassador Ushiba: Our taking over Korea or Formosa is nonsense.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t have the impression that you are preparing an expeditionary force.

Ambassador Ushiba: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: You are a major industrial country and there is no avoiding that.

Ambassador Ushiba: I can understand the Chinese fear because of many generations of past policy. I don’t blame them. But they should not look at the past but at the Japan of today and the future. Then there will be solutions and grounds for mutual understanding. For that we must try to have more contact with China.

Did you see any strong views of the Chinese while you were in Peking?

Dr. Kissinger: They said some of the things which they said to Reston,4 but in better balance. I didn’t give them as much encouragement as Reston.

Ambassador Ushiba: Chou used the interview skillfully with Reston to impress his opinions on the U.S. public.

Dr. Kissinger: If you took the names out of the interview, you couldn’t tell who was speaking for which side.

[Page 276]

Ambassador Ushiba: Right. Most of the statements that Chou made to Reston he has made now for several years, so we Japanese know that way of thinking.

Dr. Kissinger: He has said these things to Japanese delegations.

Ambassador Ushiba: Many times. This is the first time in the American press. It must make a rather strong impression.5

Dr. Kissinger: The New York Times doesn’t know what to do. It is probably anti-Japanese as well as anti-Administration. If we were anti-Chinese they would support China but they haven’t made up their minds on what to do now. This affects only the Eastern intelligentsia.

Ambassador Ushiba: I heard New York business people with very strong views attacking Mr. Reston.

Dr. Kissinger: Against?

Ambassador Ushiba: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: His behavior was outrageous.6

Ambassador Ushiba: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: For example, his acceptance of the Communist line on the Laos invasion; his suggestion that Dr. Kissinger deceived Chou; his view that the President was not being courageous.7

Ambassador Ushiba: It was outrageous. I have spoken with the Chinese; Japanese often do. They say that Sato is responsible for all the difficulties.

Dr. Kissinger: The English never do that.

Ambassador Ushiba: No they never do.

Dr. Kissinger: Humility is not the outstanding trait of Mr. Reston. Will he visit Japan too? He is still in China.

Ambassador Ushiba: Maybe the Chinese asked him not to visit Japan. They did so to some Germans.

Do you have an idea when the President’s visit to China will take place?

Dr. Kissinger: We have not set a date. We want to let things cool off.8 We will set a date by November. I don’t think it will be this year. [Page 277] I think it will be the first quarter of next year. As soon as we have a date set, we will let you know. We would like to let you know through a private channel.

Ambassador Ushiba: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We will try not to surprise you.9

Ambassador Ushiba: Please.

The Soviet Union

Ambassador Ushiba: The other day I had a long talk with Ambassador Dobrynin. He is obviously very concerned about the purpose of the President’s policy. He said that his point of view was that this announcement would upset Japan and the Asian countries. He wonders what would compensate for this disadvantage and achieve success. What is the purpose of the President? He is obviously concerned with our country.

Dr. Kissinger: Dobrynin tells me that he thinks you are planning to link up with China and divide up Siberia between the Chinese and the Japanese. Is that true? (Ambassador Ushiba laughs.)

Please give us advance warning.

I don’t believe that anything we do in Peking will affect Japanese interests. You know that American interests forced us to try to get maneuvering room. We will not change the Taiwan policy in the UN. We will stick with it and fight for it. As for Japan we will not go along with the proposition that you are the villain in Asia. We will see if we can get a neutral posture from China for Southeast Asia during the period we want to wind up the war.

Ambassador Ushiba: That is certainly very important. You had a very successful policy containing the Soviet Union and Europe. At this end (Asia) the Soviet Union is on your mind?

Dr. Kissinger: Not particularly. Only in the sense that we won’t let Moscow speak for all communist countries. We can’t give serious military assistance to China. We don’t look at this as an anti-Soviet move.

Ambassador Ushiba: I understand that your talks on SALT and Berlin are going well.

Dr. Kissinger: They are going quite well.

Ambassador Ushiba: The Russians have not changed their attitude since the Chinese developments?

Dr. Kissinger: No, if anything the negotiations have been accelerated.

[Page 278]

Ambassador Ushiba: We have territorial questions with the Soviet Union. I raised it with Dobrynin. He said that the Soviets would give us back the Islands if it were only a question of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. The main question now is that the problem with China which might raise claims on the border question. They have such difficulty with China. The Chinese have proposed that there be no big change in the borders but that the Russians admit that the treaties which are a hundred years old are unfair. They will not initiate any big change at this time. The Russians believe that if they give the Islands back to Japan, China will come out again with big demands on the borders. That is the difficulty on the Islands.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you alter your relations with Russia?

Ambassador Ushiba: I don’t think so. The territorial question is the big obstacle. Relations in the economic field will present no difficulty.

Dr. Kissinger: Why did Dobrynin talk to you? Why do you not work through the Soviet Ambassador in Japan?

Ambassador Ushiba: Because I raised it. He is also an important man in the Communist Party.

Dr. Kissinger: He is on the Central Committee.

Ambassador Ushiba: This question came up after other discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: I once was in Moscow for a radio show involving Japanese, Americans and Russians. There were one or two Japanese there. The Russians were attacking me until the Japanese mentioned the Kurile Islands. Then the Soviets attacked Japan and I was neutral.

Ambassador Ushiba: The Russians are certainly using the Chinese problem for their own purposes.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Ushiba: We are inevitably involved to some extent in this power game.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem is for both sides not to let themselves be used against the other by the communist countries. China wants to use the U.S. against you. The Soviet Union wants to use Japan against us. This is important.

Ambassador Ushiba: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not nervous about your relations with the Russians.

Ambassador Ushiba: It is very clear historically. It is not only a question of territory. There are no friendly feelings towards the Russians, while there is a certain deep rooted friendly feeling for China.

U.S.-Japanese Visits

Dr. Kissinger: There will be a White House dinner for your delegation on September 10.

[Page 279]

Ambassador Ushiba: We deeply appreciate this. Also the visit of the Emperor.10

Dr. Kissinger: It was announced yesterday. It will not be too long.

Ambassador Ushiba: We understand. It is because of our schedule.

Dr. Kissinger: It is mostly symbolic.

Ambassador Ushiba: It is very important symbolically.

Dr. Kissinger: Will your Foreign Minister be along?

Ambassador Ushiba: Yes. Will Secretary Rogers accompany the President?

Dr. Kissinger: We may ask Alexis Johnson to accompany him too. You have two Ambassadors in Washington. You and Alexis Johnson.11 I don’t know what you do to our people. For example, former Ambassador Reischauer always tells me to be nice to you.

Ambassador Ushiba: That gives us three Ambassadors. Reischauer was very effective.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not permitted to forget Japan. Of course, I do not want to. I am scolded at regular intervals by Reischauer.

Ambassador Ushiba: In the economic field what kind of developments do you foresee now?

Dr. Kissinger: Now that we have made such big steps, let’s concentrate in meetings on the big issues, and not on nitpicking. It would be terribly helpful symbolically if we have one or two announcements which show that we are working together and agreeing together. Peterson will talk with you.

Ambassador Ushiba: Yes. We will give you some concrete ideas.

Dr. Kissinger: That will be very helpful. We will be constructive on our side.

Ambassador Ushiba: Secretary Rogers said yesterday that the prospects for Okinawa were better. The State Department will submit this to the Senate right after the Ministerial Meeting with strong recommendations by the President. That will be very helpful.

Dr. Kissinger: We certainly plan to do that in September. Your moves would help.

Ambassador Ushiba: Do you plan to go overseas before China? Why don’t you visit us sometime?

Dr. Kissinger: In principle I would be glad to visit Japan. In Washington whenever I go abroad officially it generates a great deal of [Page 280] jealousy. If there could be some excuse, if I could speak to some group, not the press, in principle I would be glad to visit. In fact I am quite eager to do so. I have not really been there since 1962 when I was there for about a week. In principle I would like to go. Mr. Nakasone invited me. I can’t go as the guest of the Defense Minister; that would be under the wrong auspices.

Ambassador Ushiba: We can find better auspices I am sure.

Dr. Kissinger: If you can find a better way, particularly one that would not trigger my colleagues’ resentment,12 that would be helpful. I have thought of going. How long would it take?

Ambassador Ushiba: About twelve hours altogether.

Dr. Kissinger: If I went, I would go by military plane.

Ambassador Ushiba: The polar route is much shorter.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe I could go during the late fall, the end of November, for four or five days. But I am afraid of your press.

Ambassador Ushiba: We are all afraid of your press.13

More on Textiles, China, and U.S.-Japan Relations

Dr. Kissinger: You did a good job with the American press. They all think we have hurt you badly.

Ambassador Ushiba: We have stopped doing that now. We are concentrating on the future now. We have very little sympathy in the American press, recently because of economic problems.

Dr. Kissinger: First of all they do not understand them. I know nothing about economics. Our businessmen are furious. We are under enormous pressures from our businessmen.

Ambassador Ushiba: It seems almost customary to attack Japan in conversations among your business people.

Dr. Kissinger: Economic leaders are usually political idiots. They don’t understand our basic interests and wouldn’t know how to bring them about if they did.14

Ambassador Ushiba: That is true of Japanese businessmen.

Dr. Kissinger: Your textile industry, for example.

Ambassador Ushiba: They are so emotional. That is what makes it so difficult.

Dr. Kissinger: It will be impossible to write a history on the textile negotiations. I understood them for two weeks last year when the Prime Minister was here.

[Page 281]

Ambassador Ushiba: We wrote the communiqué in the office.

Dr. Kissinger: Why did the Prime Minister come back to this subject?

Ambassador Ushiba: He was determined to finish this business. After returning to Japan the situation became even worse.

Dr. Kissinger: There have been more Japanese emissaries than American secret envoys. You have seen your share of Americans. We are showing you some even rougher than Mr. Stans.

Ambassador Ushiba: Some people on your side are bitter.

Dr. Kissinger: The biggest price you paid was with the President. It was a mistake for the Prime Minister to raise the issue a second time without knowing he could settle it. The first time with the President it was OK. We didn’t want to raise the issue again. Mr. Kishi also promised.

The President considers we are friends. You paid an intangible price. I would like to think our basic policy is not affected by irritations and it is not, but these little things are damaging.

Ambassador Ushiba: Yes they are very unfortunate.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to be sensible and now find a way to deal with fundamental problems. You certainly have great good will in the White House. Both the President and I want to strengthen our relations with Japan. The President will travel all night to spend one hour with the Emperor. This symbolizes our attitude. The President has a bed in Air Force One, but the rest of us will be very tired.

(There was then some small talk on Ambassador Ushiba’s travel arrangements to the airport to go back to Japan.)

Ambassador Ushiba: How did you find Prime Minister Chou?

Dr. Kissinger: He was very intelligent.

Ambassador Ushiba: He expresses his views in a very subtle way.

Dr. Kissinger: Much subtler than the Russians. He is quite tough. He is very eloquent in his expressions. Have you dealt with the Chinese before?

Ambassador Ushiba: In very small ways. I have talked to some Chinese in Taiwan. They are all very cultured people.

Dr. Kissinger: A lack of intelligence is not their national problem.

He is very intelligent. Most press speculation (on Kissinger trip to Peking) is quite wrong. They all assume there was some deal. You have experience and know this can’t happen. What deals are possible?

Ambassador Ushiba: They are so fundamental issues, for which you must have time to solve.

Dr. Kissinger: We have managed to talk about textiles for two years. Why would we solve Taiwan in ten hours?

Ambassador Ushiba: It seems now that the attitude of Taiwan is very flexible on the UN.

[Page 282]

Dr. Kissinger: We have a very good position.

Ambassador Ushiba: If we fail in the UN, what will happen?

Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean?

Ambassador Ushiba: Will you recognize Peking?

Dr. Kissinger: No. It will not affect the basic relations. We will not recognize Peking for the foreseeable future. I can’t say what will happen in three or four years. We have no intention now. In the future as far as I can see we have no intention of recognizing Peking.

Ambassador Ushiba: Will both you and Secretary Rogers be going?

Dr. Kissinger: To Anchorage, yes.

Ambassador Ushiba: I mean Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Ushiba: There will be a lot of press people.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t know what to do, but I hope there will not be too many. We could take 2,000; several hundred want to go. We will try to keep the circus to the minimum. They will have nothing to do there. We can’t tell them what we discuss in the meetings. The Chinese have had many barbarian invasions. They have never seen American journalists, not to speak about the advance men. People have wondered whether something political might interrupt the trip. That part is alright. What will interfere is the behavior of our people.

Ambassador Ushiba: You are very security minded.

Dr. Kissinger: If 750,000,000 people attack us, there is no way to stop them. I think the security will be very good.

Ambassador Ushiba: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: If it happens it will be by design not by accident. If it is by design, no one can help the situation.

Ambassador Ushiba: You foresee no political difficulties?

Dr. Kissinger: No. We would not have agreed to the trip. They have their own reasons. They do not do us a favor.

Ambassador Ushiba: Of course.

Dr. Kissinger: They are not in the business of doing favors for others.

Ambassador Ushiba: They will continue to be very tough on Japan in the near future.

Dr. Kissinger: We will not cooperate in that. If you were to expand militarily . . . but this is not at all likely.

Ambassador Ushiba: I can assure you that this is out of the question.

Dr. Kissinger: I can conceive of no difference of views between us. We won’t cooperate in isolating you. We want to strengthen our relations with you.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 71. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s San Clemente office. Lord transmitted the memorandum to Kissinger on September 8, under a memorandum indicating that another Kissinger-Ushiba meeting would take place that day and noting: “I have given a sanitized account of this meeting to Holdridge’s shop to help them prepare your basic talking paper.” (The sanitized version is ibid.) Kissinger’s talking points for the August 21 meeting with Ushiba were contained in an August 19 memorandum from Holdridge and Hormats in which they noted, “Your conversation with Ambassador Ushiba on July 23 was extremely valuable, I am told, in dampening down elements within the Japanese leadership who, as a result of the President’s China initiative, argued for a more independent Japanese foreign policy. However, there are now new complications in US-Japanese relations resulting from the President’s recently-announced economic measures.” For a memorandum of conversation of the July 23 meeting, see Document 83.
  2. This paragraph and the subsequent exchanges on this topic (concerning a secret channel of communication between the United States and Japan) were removed from the sanitized memorandum of conversation sent to the Department of State. At this point, the sanitized version of this document continues with the discussion of the textile issue.
  3. The sanitized version did not contain this remark by Ushiba, or the subsequent exchange between Kissinger and Ushiba. It moved immediately into the discussion of China.
  4. James Reston wrote a series of articles for the New York Times during a 6-week visit to China during July and August. His articles of July 17 and August 4, 6, and 13 discussed China’s fear of Japanese militarism.
  5. The sanitized version of this memorandum neither contains this remark by Ushiba nor Kissinger’s response.
  6. The sanitized version neither contains this remark by Kissinger nor Ushiba’s response.
  7. In the sanitized version, Kissinger comments: “Reston’s acceptance of the Communist line on the Laos invasion was curious; so were his suggestion that Dr. Kissinger deceived Chou and his view that the President was not being courageous.”
  8. The sanitized version does not contain the rest of this paragraph, or Ushiba’s response.
  9. In the sanitized version, Kissinger says, “We will not surprise you.”
  10. A memorandum of conversation of Nixon’s discussion with the Emperor is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—The President/Emperor Hirohito, Sept. 26, 1971.
  11. The sanitized version does not contain the rest of this paragraph, Ushiba’s response, and Kissinger’s counter-response (which ends with the word “Reischauer”).
  12. The sanitized version does not contain this subordinate clause.
  13. The sanitized version does not contain this comment by Ushiba.
  14. In the sanitized version, Kissinger notes: “Economic leaders don’t understand our basic interests.”