33. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

SUBJECT

  • Military Contingency Planning for Korea

PARTICIPATION

  • Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman
  • State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • Winthrop Brown
  • Defense
  • G. Warren Nutter
  • CIA
  • Thomas H. Karamessines
  • JCS
  • Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson
  • NSC Staff
  • Col. Alexander M. Haig
  • John H. Holdridge
  • Col. Robert M. Behr

Summary of Decisions

1.
The heavy response scenario (attack of the North Korean AOB) will be modified in accordance with the instructions given by the WSAG to the Chairman of the Working Group.
2.
The “surgical” response scenario will be brought to the same high quality as the heavy response scenario.
3.
A third Korean scenario will be prepared after the WSAG determines an appropriate military objective.
4.
A Middle East scenario will be accomplished based on Arab attack of Israel, with Soviety military assistance extending beyond the now-existing border between the Arab states and Israel.
5.
The next meeting of the WSAG will be in approximately two weeks in San Clemente. The two Korean scenarios and the Middle East scenario will be the agenda items.

The meeting began at 4:55 P.M. Secretary Johnson briefed Kissinger on the WSAG “rump session” held at State on August 2, 1969,2 during which the principals devoted six hours to a meticulous review of the WSAG Working Group’s draft of a politico-military scenario outlining a heavy US military response to major North Korean provocation. The Working Group had prepared a new draft3 which was now before the WSAG. In addition, the principals tasked CIA and the Joint Staff with suggesting suitable targets other than elements of the NK AOB. The CIA recommendations4 (not yet coordinated with the Joint Staff) had been prepared, copies of which Karamessines had passed out prior to Kissinger’s arrival.

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Turning to revised draft scenario, Secretary Johnson said that he considered it to be in good shape, although another revision would undoubtedly be required. This scenario is the most difficult to handle from a political viewpoint. Moreover, Kissinger should note that it involved more than a single strike. If the intent is to destroy the AOB, not merely to damage its major elements, the job would require effort over a period of time.

Kissinger asked how long this would be.

Admiral Johnson said a total of 1500 sorties would be required to attack 75% of the NK AOB. The success of each sortie would depend upon the delivery aircraft, tactical aircraft having a lower circular error probable (CEP) than B–52’s. The whole effort would take from three to four days.

Kissinger wondered about the probability of success. Nutter thought that a figure of 50% would be about right.

Kissinger suggested that the next Korean scenario should be an adaptation of what has already been done, but with an objective selected from the non-airfield category. He questioned whether the diplomatic effort would fit for either an airfield strike or one against a power plant. He recalled that both had been considered during the EC–121 incident and that some aspects of each seemed to differ at the time. Secretary Johnson thought the work done to date could accommodate virtually any kind of target with only minor modifications to the diplomatic scenario. Kissinger then asked if a different military plan would be needed for each category of target. Admiral Johnson replied to the contrary, saying that all that is needed is to set a military priority for the various targets under consideration. Kissinger pursued his line of thought, seeking assurance that a basic scenario would fit multiple target situations. He wants to avoid a situation where the President would order a response in 48 hours, only to be told it would take from 48 to 72 hours to build a plan. Nutter and Admiral Johnson assured him such would not be the case—for example in a “surgical strike”, only one scenario would be needed regardless of the target. In all cases the timing would be about the same. Kissinger wanted to know if the strike forces would leave stand-by plans covering the targets selected by the WSAG. Admiral Johnson replied affirmatively, the targets will go to the field as soon as the WSAG authorizes release. Kissinger then asked whether we would have options insofar as delivery units are concerned. Admiral Johnson assured him we would. Either tactical air or B–52’s could be used. Secretary Johnson remarked that naval strikes would depend on the location of the carrier task force.

The group directed their attention to the first scenario prepared by the Working Group. Some confusion existed because only Kissinger and Karamessines held the most recent editions of the draft. Colonel [Page 86] Haig solved the problem by providing a common document for all to use.

Kissinger summarized with a statement of requirements for all scenarios except large-scale attack against the NK AOB: (1) complete pre-planning so that only execution delays would be involved; (2) alternative force options with timing for each option. Admiral Johnson noted that the plans would be good only for the present force posture. Kissinger acknowledged this to be true and said that the JCS will be responsible for amending the plans to reflect existing conditions.

Kissinger asked Secretary Johnson what should be done next. Secretary Johnson re-directed the group’s attention to the heavy response scenario, stating that he had no problems with the sequence of events. The concept of the first part of the paper is to mesh the actions of all of the agencies concerned. Early activity will center around the Korean Task Force headed by Ambassador Brown. The WSAG principals will be notified through the procedures internal to their organizations and would await Kissinger’s call. In the way of crisis preparation, each agency would review its procedures and the WSAG principals would insure that the scenario elements relating to their individual agencies would be adequately covered. All agreed that the WSAG papers would be tightly held.

A discussion of the public information aspects ensued. Secretary Johnson said the handling of the PIO releases (both timing and content) would affect the options available. The draft Presidential statement, for example, would set the tone of much that followed. Kissinger cautioned that the scenarios should take into consideration Presidential style. Mr. Nixon would probably not want to make a public statement at the conclusion of an NSC meeting, but would do so close to the time of the US response. All agreed that the President is the key for both decisions and timing and that it is non-productive to try to “blue print” these aspects of the scenario.

At this point (5:31 P.M.) Kissinger was called out of the meeting. In his absence Secretary Johnson asked for opinions on how the problem of subsidiary decisions was handled in the scenario. He called attention to the lack of mention of decisions on “rules of engagement”, saying that enemy reactions would probably be immediate and US forces would have to be prepared beforehand. Kissinger rejoined the group (5:37 P.M.).

Secretary Johnson said we don’t really have a body of supporting decisions. Instead there are two orders of decisions, the first involving such things as rules of engagement and DEFCON levels, the latter being important from a political as well as military standpoint. DEFCON levels represent “signals” of resolve and will be of particular significance to the Soviet Union. More work is required in developing the [Page 87] catalog of decisions. Kissinger said the President should be told what decisions he has to make long before the particular decision will be translated into action. The WSAG should recommend a schedule of times when the various decisions should be put into effect. In this context, the scenarios should reflect the time necessary to implement each of the corollary decisions contained in the paper.

Kissinger asked about probable losses. Admiral Johnson said he thought the White House had this information. Colonel Behr confirmed this fact. Probable losses will be available to the President for each of the alternative military responses.

Secretary Johnson then brought up the subject of probable enemy responses. He is generally in agreement with the plausibility of those responses identified in the scenario but believes the comments relating to them are somewhat superficial. Kissinger recalled the lesson of the EC–121 incident that was foremost in his mind. The trick in a crisis is not to do a certain thing but to do it in a way that prevents something worse. But you also have to consider what you will do if your act fails to prevent any escalating response. Would you not, for example, in the event of an attack against the NK AOB have to start ground forces moving west? Admiral Johnson replied that we have to be prepared for the worst, but that certain actions meant different things to different people. A general discussion of possible US and enemy responses followed ending with direction to Ambassador Brown to take another hard look at this part of the paper.

Karamessines said that each response was connected with other events. They did not occur in a vacuum. For instance, while the US may move troops, contact with the USSR (diplomatic and by MOLINK) would signify the willingness of the US to observe a “cease-fire” if the Russians thought they could “deliver” the North Koreans. Kissinger agreed, pointing out that in the Cuban crisis the public statements made by President Kennedy had a direct bearing on the behavior of the Soviets.

Kissinger wondered whether a military action should not be done “ferociously” in order to obtain the full deterrent effect. Secretary Johnson said the WSAG needed to make a fundamental decision in order to provide guidance for the Working Group. Do we play it cool or look fierce? Karamessines said there are pros and cons to each approach. If we take a very determined line, the Soviets will probably believe us—the Red Chinese may not. All agreed that in the heavy response scenario an increased SAC readiness posture should be called for as well as such obvious signals as moving air units westward and alerting the 82nd Airborne Division for movement. Kissinger concluded this portion of the discussion by requesting that the Working Group break out the various decisions on a contingent basis—the reparable ones should be grouped apart from the irreparable.

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Secretary Johnson flagged an area of disagreement between State and Defense regarding when the US Embassies in London and Tokyo should be notified. State wants them notified at H–2; Defense at H–Hour. After a full exchange of views Admiral Johnson deferred to State on the timing, requiring only that the time of notification be delayed until absolutely the last minute which would still allow the diplomats time to do their job.

Secretary Johnson took exception with the Joint Staff’s optimism regarding NK ability to retaliate by, say, a strike against Seoul. Admiral Johnson explained the concept of operations at length, stressing airborne radar surveillance and air defense capabilities. He agreed, however, that an air attack against Seoul was possible, but it would probably be light.

Returning to the subject of diplomatic conversations, the possibility of leaks, and the possibility of degrading the US effort, Kissinger questioned the value of getting detailed recommendations and opinions from our diplomatic posts. Unless the President has personal knowledge of, and confidence in, a given Ambassador he is unlikely in a crisis to accept advice from anyone who is not a principal. Secretary Johnson agreed and directed Brown to re-work the paper to reflect that judgment.

Kissinger asked what kind of provocation was the basis for scenario being reviewed. All agreed that only a massive NK attack would call for so drastic a response.

Kissinger inquired about the operational aspects. Who is going to run all of this? No one responded.

Kissinger turned to future events. He called for re-work of the heavy response scenario in accordance with the instructions of the group. This should be followed by revamping the “surgical strike” scenario, bringing it to the same high quality as the other paper. He asked about the status of Middle East planning, asking Admiral Johnson if it were not still true that the military have no plans for a USUSSR confrontation in that area. Admiral Johnson said that is so, but work is in progress. Lack of both bases and forces are the main problems. Secretary Johnson reported on the work being done by Rodger Davies’ Working Group. This work is not up to the quality of the Korean plans, but a great deal of time is being devoted to the problem because of the existing critical situation in the Middle East. Kissinger asked if a draft would be available in two weeks. Secretary Johnson said yes; Admiral Johnson said maybe. Kissinger then said he wanted, of the possibilities which had been discussed, a scenario for the Middle East which postulated the Arabs as aggressors and with Soviet military involvement beyond the now-existing border lines. All agreed this was the most difficult scenario and the one which should be developed as a straw-man.

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Kissinger concluded the meeting by suggesting, tentatively a WSAG meeting at San Clemente with attendance broadened to include the Attorney General and possibly the President. The two Korean plans and a rough cut at a Middle East plan would be the agenda items. The meeting adjourned at 6:36 P.M.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970 [6 of 6]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Situation Room at the White House. Behr forwarded the minutes to Kissinger through Haig on August 11.
  2. See Document 32.
  3. On August 9, under a covering memorandum to Kissinger, Behr forwarded two WSAG Working Group papers: “Surgical Strikes” and “Strike Against AOB.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–071, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Meeting 8/8/69 Korea/Middle East)
  4. On July 15, Cord Meyer, Acting Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, sent to Kissinger a memorandum listing possible targets in North Korea for a surgical strike. The unsigned CIA memorandum listed five power plants and contained the summary: “the electric power industry of North Korea is unique in that it represents the most critical component of the nation’s economy. The individual generating plants are remote from the population centers and they are vulnerable to attack by limited numbers of aircraft.” (Ibid., Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69)