32. Memorandum for the Record by Robert M. Behr of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- WSAG “Rump Session”, August 2, 1969
On August 2, 1969, I attended a “rump session” of the WSAG.2 The meeting was called by Under Secretary Johnson for the purpose of reviewing a WSAG Working Group paper detailing a heavy US military response to a major North Korean action against US/ROK forces.3 The group met in Secretary Johnson’s office at 10:00 a.m. and continued in session until 4:00 p.m. Present were Secretary Johnson, Vice Admiral Johnson (OJCS), Ambassador Brown (Chairman, Korean Task Force), Assistant Secretary Nutter (OSD/ISA) and Mr. Karamessines (CIA), attending his first WSAG meeting.
Before undertaking a page-by-page discussion of the draft, the group agreed that additional target options are needed. CIA and the Joint Staff will develop these options which will include airfields, power plants and power distribution facilities, and key industrial plants. Two or three examples within each target category will be selected and arranged in order of military priority.
During the discussion of the draft, at the point in the sequence of events when a Presidential decision is made, I remarked that I [Page 82] considered the paper to be deficient on two counts: (1) the particular decision is postulated (attack on the North Korean air order of battle) without a statement of rationale behind the decision and (2) there is insufficient treatment of the possible risks associated with the US response. My suggestion that these deficiencies be remedied was not well taken. Secretary Johnson stated that these are considerations appropriate for the members of the NSC in their development of recommendations for the President. I said that if the WSAG principals thought it unnecessary to set out the pros and cons of the various options, the NSC staff would have to do so because of the need to (1) cover as much groundwork as is possible on a pre-crisis basis and (2) insure to the extent possible, that nothing is overlooked once a crisis develops. Secretary Johnson replied (somewhat irrelevantly I thought) that the work should be done through “normal staff procedures.” To an extent, my criticisms were later accommodated when the group agreed (1) to call for a draft point paper in which the President would set forth the rationale behind his decision and (2) to amplify the concluding section of the paper by adding a catalog of possible NK, Soviet and PRC responses, with matching guidance in the form of suggested US “rules of engagement.”
The paper was strengthened in two important areas. First, the language was modified throughout to leave no doubt that the response selected would be a “time-phased” operation—that is, carried out through a series of strikes over a period of days. Second, US initiatives in the UN were made more meaningful by broaching the subject of a US response to a call for cease-fire. (The group agreed that if bilateral negotiations indicated the Soviets could “deliver” the North Koreans with a high degree of assurance, the US should respond favorably to a cease-fire proposal.)
Secretary Johnson had reservations about two aspects of the paper. He was, in the first instance, disturbed by a statement in the introductory section which states that US military action could be provoked by “firm intelligence indicating a large scale North Korean attack is imminent.” Although he recognized the legitimacy of a US response to a North Korean military action, he doubted that we would act on receipt of intelligence, however unequivocal it might be.
The second area of concern to Secretary Johnson was the business of command relationships in the area. What he appeared to be seeking was assurance that we could look to one military commander in the Western Pacific to assume responsibility for executing a military response to a North Korean provocation. Admiral Johnson said that the problem is very complex, but reported that the JCS have tasked COMUSJAPAN (who is also CG, Fifth Air Force) to maintain within his situation room current readiness information on military forces in the area that could be called upon to respond in time of emergency. [Page 83] This did not alleviate the Secretary’s concern because he is aware that COMUSJAPAN does not exercise operational control over all of the units that could be involved. His apprehension was obviously generated, at least in part, by the charges made in the recent report of the Pike Committee on the Pueblo and EC–121 incidents.
After completion of the discussion of the Korean paper, Secretary Johnson charged Ambassador Brown with revising the scenario in accordance with the agreements reached at the meeting, setting a deadline of August 8.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]
Colonel, USAF
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–070, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Mtg. 7/11/69 Korea. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 6.↩
- No minutes of this “rump” WSAG meeting have been found.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 29.↩