158. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rogers1
A Status Report on Contacts Between North and South Korea
It has been just slightly more than a year since the Government of the Republic of Korea had its Red Cross Society call publicly for talks with its Northern counterpart on divided families. This relatively brief period has seen considerable progress. Presently there are active North-South contacts at two levels—the public Red Cross discussions and secret meetings at Panmunjom between trusted representatives of ROK CIA Director Yi Hu Rak and North Korean Party Organization Director Kim Yong Ju, younger brother of Kim Il Sung. The Panmunjom talks follow the July fourth agreement to establish a coordinating committee to work toward reunification.2 The Yi–Kim channel has been used to resolve impasses in the public Red Cross discussions. Developments in the public Red Cross forum affect very basically the positions of each side in the more political and official private talks.
[Page 409]Red Cross Meetings
The first two plenary sessions of the Red Cross talks just completed in Pyongyang and Seoul indicate that there is little chance for rapid progress toward reuniting divided families. But the travel of the two delegations to their rivals’ capitals was a momentous first step for each toward understanding the society of the other. Both seemed to have been impressed and surprised at the experience. The Southern delegates were surprised by the totality of discipline and control by the Northern leadership over its people. The ROK government was immensely pleased and probably somewhat surprised at the spontaneously hostile reaction of its own press and public to the Northerners’ propaganda-loaded speeches. The North was taken aback by the vehement Southern reaction to these speeches, although undoubtedly believing the whole thing had been staged by the Seoul government. The sessions were more ceremonial than substantive, with no agreement reached beyond the time and place for two more sessions—October 24 in Pyongyang and November 27 in Seoul.
Both Northern and Southern leaders seem to feel the ROK benefited most from the first round. Pyongyang feels the South broke its agreement that neither side would criticize the other, by allowing vociferous press criticism of the Northern speeches and has responded by publishing scathing accounts by North Korean journalists who visited Seoul, describing their experience of ROK society as revolting and disgusting. In addition, Pyongyang was clearly stung by its decisive defeat in the UN, made particularly galling by ROK use of the North-South talks to win support for its postponement position. Pyongyang has responded by leveling the sharpest propaganda attacks since the July fourth agreement at the South Korean leadership, accusing President Park by name of perfidy and bad faith. The attacks have stopped short of threatening to end the talks, however. Apparently Kim Il Sung sees this verbal offensive as a means of focusing blame for his UN defeat and embarrassment of his delegation in Seoul on Southern treachery. Moreover, the attacks probably please the hawks in his inner circle while reminding the Northern population that despite the talks there is still an unscrupulous enemy to the south. Additionally Kim certainly views the attacks as a means of pressuring the South to concede to Northern demands for politicization of the talks.
Secret Talks
Discussions in the private channel have aimed at establishing the coordinating committee called for in the July fourth agreement to oversee development of North-South relations at all levels. These talks have been stalled for several weeks over the question of the Committee’s membership. The North demands cabinet level membership to include Foreign and Defense Ministers. The South wants lower level members. [Page 410] The latest secret meeting on September 29 saw no movement from these respective positions but witnessed an exchange of charges of violation of the July fourth agreement’s prohibition of public name calling.
Prospects
Yi Hu Rak told Ambassador Habib contacts are at a “delicate stage” with the Northern attacks possibly a prelude to Pyongyang’s breaking off the talks. We believe an actual break is unlikely. Though neither side seems ready to move rapidly at this point, neither will want the blame for ending contacts. Both seem to see the present moment as a time for assessment of gains and losses in this new form of competition. Both probably also feel a need to devote some attention to internal dissension generated within the respective leadership groups over strategies for handling future developments.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR N–KOR S. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Picard and concurred in by Kriebel.↩
- See Document 151.↩