Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

157. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Republic of Korea Troops in Viet-Nam

REFERENCE

• NSDM 161 of April 5, 1972

NSDM 161² requested the Under Secretaries Committee to review the question of a continued Republic of Korea (ROK) military presence in South Viet-Nam beyond CY 1972 and to submit this review not later than September 29, 1972. A detailed review is attached as an Appendix.³

There are two ROK infantry divisions in Viet-Nam. The Government of Viet-Nam has asked the Republic of Korea Government to maintain two full divisions until June 1973, and not to begin the withdrawal of the second of the two until the beginning of CY 1974. The ROKG has replied that it intends to begin withdrawing its forces “from the beginning of 1973” and it is our understanding that the withdrawal is to be completed by June 30, 1973. The ROKG has told us privately that there is some room for negotiation on the time-table if this would accommodate the United States, but it wanted the GVN to understand that ROK forces could not stay until the end of CY 1973. Although the ROKG insists on negotiations with the US on any retention of its forces in Viet-Nam, it is to our interest to keep intact the bilateral ROK commitment to Viet-Nam and to maintain the position that the US is in a supporting role to any ROKG/GVN negotiations.

We believe the ROKG is firm in wanting to withdraw at least one division in CY 1973 and at the outside might be willing to retain some smaller force until early CY 1974. Within these limits are four principal alternatives for a ROK troop presence:

1. Retain two ROK divisions until June 1973. Begin redeployment of one division in July 1973 and the second division in CY 1974.

2. Redeploy one ROK division at the beginning of CY 1973, retain the second through CY 1973, and review the need for its retention in CY 1974 late in 1973.

3. Redeploy one ROK division at the beginning of CY 1973, retain the second through the 1973 dry season (September). (Although the point would not be a part of the discussions, there is implicit in this alternative the option to review during the 1973 dry season the continued presence of one ROK division through CY 1973 and possibly into CY 1974.)

4. Redeploy both ROK divisions by June 1973.

The Korean troops in Viet-Nam are performing a useful role and the GVN cannot assume responsibility for their areas of operation before the end of CY 1973. At the same time, the ROKG finds little reason to retain two full divisions in Viet-Nam in view of the departure of most US ground forces and of what it sees as growing domestic and international liabilities. The critical period from a security point of view appears to be their presence through the dry season (September) of CY 1973. Events cannot be forecast beyond that period, but even the GVN is not planning at this point for any ROK troop presence beyond the first part of CY 1974. Presently, there is no firm requirement for both ROK divisions to remain through entire CY 1973 and the problem is to phase the withdrawals to ensure the presence of one division through as much of CY 1973 as possible.

Consideration has been given to the continued support of ROK forces. While the RVNAF currently provides the bulk of logistic support, they are and will be unable to provide helicopter support and only minimal close air support. Moreover, within the periods envisaged, the ROK forces will be unable to develop self-sufficiency in these areas. The only alternative is continued US helicopter and close air support. The retention of US personnel spaces for the support of ROK forces in Viet-Nam has been weighed against the impact on the security of remaining US forces, Vietnamization, the advisory effort, the command and control of the air war, and support of the RVNAF. If an appropriate level of US support is to be provided to ROK forces, it will be necessary to retain additional US personnel specifically for this purpose when the US force level goes below 25,000. (The details of US personnel support requirements for ROK forces are contained in Tab B to the Appendix.)

This review of ROK forces in Viet-Nam is based on the assumption that we will not achieve a negotiated peace prior to the end of the dry season 1973. If negotiations succeed, the alternatives discussed in this paper will no longer be applicable. If peace or a cease-fire along the lines of your May 8, 1972 proposal is established, the ROK forces in Viet-Nam should be withdrawn along with the US forces in four months. The other side will demand it, and it is doubtful that the ROKG could be induced to keep troops in Viet-Nam once we have withdrawn all US forces.

Alternative 3, retention of one division through the critical 1973 dry season period would substantially meet GVN security requirements and probably would provide some ROK military presence through most of the remainder of CY 1973. It would be consistent with ROK aims of completing the redeployment of its forces by the end of CY 1973.

We recommend this alternative together with the following:

1. That Ambassador Bunker be authorized to consult with the GVN, seek its concurrence with our preferred alternative 3 and request that the GVN initially present this joint US–GVN proposal to the ROKG.

2. That Ambassador Habib be authorized to assure the ROKG that the United States will continue to provide comparable levels of air, helicopter, and logistic support to ROK forces during that period; that the US force levels in Viet-Nam will take into consideration these support requirements (i.e., 1,762 US personnel to support a two division ROK force and 1,041 US personnel to support a one division ROK force); that the provisions of the Brown Memorandum of March 1966 as amended⁴ will continue to apply; and that the United States is prepared to consider the transfer of title to a considerable portion of the US equipment presently furnished to ROK forces in Viet-Nam. If the question is raised by the ROK, Ambassador Habib may add that the US would, of course, expect ROK forces in Viet-Nam to be withdrawn along with US forces if a settlement or cease-fire is negotiated along the levels of President Nixon’s May 8, 1972 proposal.

3. That the United States be prepared (but only if necessary to secure retention of ROK forces in Viet-Nam) to offer equipment for one company of tanks to provide additional security to the remaining division.

Discussions with President Park would be facilitated if Ambassador Habib were authorized to state that you were looking forward to an early meeting with him to review Asian security problems.

U. Alexis Johnson⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 161. Top Secret; Nodis. Transmitted to Kissinger by Acting Staff Director of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee Seymour Weiss. On August 30, in a memorandum to members of the NSC, Acting Staff Director of the Committee John K. Wilhelm informed them that the Committee was undertaking the review of continued ROK presence in South Vietnam according to the President’s instructions in NSDM 161. (Ibid.)
2. Attached; printed as Document 132.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. See footnote 3, Document 67.
5. Johnson signed for Irwin over Irwin’s typed signature.