Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, May 19, 1972, 0300Z.

2869. Subj: Korea and Vietnam.

1. Since my return to Seoul a few weeks ago I have detected a submerged but real feeling of concern among Koreans that they are being neglected by the United States. Most specifically, they exhibit a degree of unhappiness over events in Vietnam in which they see themselves being swept along by currents concerning which they have no knowledge, and over which they have no control.

2. Some of this they accept as inherent in their minority position as a remaining partner in Vietnam. Nevertheless, they believe that as our last ally with troops fighting in Vietnam we should share with them, to some degree at least, our plans and strategy. We have had some second echelon levels in the government express disappointment that we have not recognized, either in our public statements or in our private efforts, the contribution of the Korean forces and the risks and dangers they also run if there were to be a North Vietnamese breakthrough.

3. These feelings have been behind Korean refusal to agree to an expansion of their area of operation in Vietnam and also explain Korean reluctance to commit themselves unequivocally to maintaining their forces in Vietnam through the end of 1972. We have been able fortunately to take advantage of the timely presence of Ambassador Brown to counter the indications that some elements in the Korean Government were proposing early withdrawal of Korea’s divisions in Vietnam. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister showed clear understanding of the desirability of maintaining those forces through 1972 but, nevertheless, set forth their expectations of greater support from the United States in return. The commitment is however not iron-clad, and we should not assume that under all circumstances they will retain their forces there.

4. Generally speaking, we are seeing a rising trend of Korean concern that the U.S. takes them for granted and that we also are less than prepared to share in advance those discussions of strategy and actions which we are pursuing in regard to matters directly affecting Korea’s forces and Korea’s future, both military and political.

5. I believe that we are jeopardizing unnecessarily our objectives both here and in Vietnam if we do not share with Korea, to the extent we can, our plans and intentions regarding those matters that affect them directly. The Korean leadership has an umblemished record in protecting our confidences. I see no reason why we cannot discuss frankly and fully with President Park the course of secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese, our plans for military action and military presence in Vietnam in the near future and to keep him reasonably well informed of our dealings with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. If we do so, I am convinced we will find him understanding and cooperative. If we do not, we are courting unpleasant surprises.

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR S–US. Secret; Nodis.