Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

140. Memorandum From John A. Froebe, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Results of South Korean CIA Director’s Visit to North Korea May 2–5

South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak briefed Ambassador Habib May 10 on his visit to Pyongyang May 2–5. Yi said he first had two meetings and a dinner with Vice Premier Kim Yong-chu, who is also Premier Kim Il-song’s younger brother. Following these, late on May 4 and again the next day he met with Kim Il-song for a total of more than four hours. Overall, Yi thought his trip had been successful as a mutual exploration of basic political differences, but said that no important conclusions were reached and no problems were settled. Ambassador Habib assured Yi of U.S. sympathy and support for these efforts.

Kim Il-song impressed Yi as highly intelligent and far superior to any of the other North Korean officials he met. Yi found Kim to be quick in understanding and logical in his thought processes. Kim’s knowledge of South Korea internally, as well as of the outside world, according to Yi’s description, was badly deficient. Physically, Kim appeared vigorous and in good health.

The major points that emerged from these sessions, according to Yi Hu-rak, were:

• —South Korean Threat. Kim Il-song was concerned that President Park, aided and abetted by the U.S., might attack North Korea. (Yi thought this was the key point that came out of his discussions in Pyongyang.) Kim emphasized several times that North Korea would not “repeat the Korean War,” and that the ROK leadership could thus feel reassured. Kim reiterated this assurance in a message to President Park, stating that “I have no intention whatever of making war.”
• —Korean Reunification. The North Korean representatives were not interested in a two Koreas solution. They rejected the German solution as inappropriate for North and South Korea, which they held should not seek co-existence but rather eventual reunification. Yi said he believes, however, that reunification is a long way off, and that the two Koreas need to deal with immediate practical problems.
• —Reduction of Tensions on the Peninsula. Yi gained the impression that the North Koreans genuinely wanted a reduction of tensions on the Peninsula, and Yi believes that progress on this is possible. He sees the North Korean leadership now concerned with the “social construction of North Korea.” Kim Il-song proposed a purely Korean joint committee to coordinate on relations between North and South and solve problems that arise, although Yi took Kim’s idea as extemporaneous and not a formal, thought-out proposal.
• —Current North-South Red Cross Talks. Kim Il-song said in effect that his government had been delaying in the Red Cross talks, but that, in light of his discussions with Yi, North Korea was now ready to push forward. Yi noted that plenary sessions of the talks would probably take place in June.
• —U.S. and Japanese Roles in Korea. Kim Il-song asked why Seoul was trying to prevent the further withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, to which Yi said he replied that North Korea had caused U.S. forces to come in in the first place and that North Korea could contribute to U.S. troop withdrawal by showing that it would not resort to war. On Japan, Yi said he responded to Kim Il-song’s concern over the possible Japanese reoccupation of Korea by saying that South Korea is clever enough to preserve equality in its relationship with Japan. Yi said the North Koreans hold to the belief that Seoul is essentially a puppet of Japan and the U.S. Yi stated that there was no mention of the PRC or the Soviet Union during his discussions in Pyongyang.
• —North Korean Assassination Attempt Against Park in 1968. When the question came up in another context, Kim Il-song ascribed the North Korean assassination attempt against President Park in 1968 to “leftist adventurists,” expressed his extreme regret that it had happened, and said it did not represent his intention and that those responsible had been purged. [Kim’s admission of the fact of the assassination attempt—Pyongyang has consistently denied it—and his disassociating himself from it now are quite significant, and add to the credibility of his interest in détente with the Park Government. (It is doubtful historically that he did not approve the 1968 attempt.) There not unexpectedly still is contention within the North Korean Government over the use of armed force.]²
• —Pueblo Incident. Kim Il-song raised the Pueblo Incident, saying that when the Enterprise entered the Sea of Japan, the North Korean leadership thought war was imminent and asked why the U.S. had not opened hostilities. Yi replied that the U.S. move was to deter North Korea, adding that the U.S. never initiated hostilities. (Kim also said that North Korea’s capture of the Pueblo was happenstance and was not planned, and that North Korea was not aware the ship was on an intelligence mission.)
• —Seoul–Pyongyang Hot Line. Kim Il-song agreed that a Seoul–Pyongyang hot line that had been set up for Yi’s visit should continue operational to help prevent or resolve incidents.
• —Continuing Contacts. Kim Il-song agreed that the secret high level exchanges should continue, and suggested that Seoul invite Second Vice Premier for Foreign Affairs Pak Song-ch’ol. No time was set.

Comment: Allowing for Yi Hu-rak’s personal stake in the success of these exchanges, the credibility he attaches to Kim Il-song’s professed interest in a reduction of tensions is significant. A North Korean need for détente can quite plausibly be argued in terms of reduced reliability of PRC international support, of the desirability of shifting resources from defense to economic development (with about 15% of its GNP devoted to defense, North Korea’s security burden is one of the world’s heaviest), and of satisfying accumulating demands for consumer goods. In addition, neither side probably wants to be blamed for breaking the contacts off, faced as they are with the Korean question in the U.N. General Assembly next fall.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1972, Part 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Initialed by Kissinger and Haig.
2. Brackets are in the original.