136. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Foreign Minister Kim Yong Sik of South Korea on April 26, 1972 at 11:45 a.m. in the Oval Office
PARTICIPANTS
- President Nixon
- Foreign Minister Kim Yong Sik
- Major General A.M. Haig, Jr.
- Korean Ambassador Dong Jo Kim
Foreign Minister Kim began the meeting by expressing his deep appreciation to the President for his willingness to meet with him at this very busy time. The Foreign Minister extended President Park’s warm best wishes and specifically wished him well in his upcoming visit to the Soviet Union. The Foreign Minister also expressed [Page 340] appreciation for the support given to the Government of Korea in the communiqué which resulted from the President’s trip to Peking.2
President Nixon responded that he always welcomed the opportunity to meet with strong and long standing friends. President Park could be assured that the United States would stand firmly behind its commitments to Korea. President Nixon had insisted on this not only in conjunction with drafting the Shanghai communiqué; but also, and perhaps even more importantly, in the oral exchanges between himself and the Chinese leaders. The President also emphasized that President Park could be assured that similar support would be expressed in Moscow although he did not foresee that the Korean question would arise except in the most general way.
Foreign Minister Kim commented that he had had a most successful meeting with Secretary Rogers the day before,3 and that the Republic of Korea was intensely interested in the successful completion of the modernization of their armed forces. He noted that the first year of the modernization program had been most successful but that some difficulties were now developing due to Congressional attitudes and that our two Governments were discussing this on a regular basis.
President Nixon asserted that it was his personal intention to see that United States commitments toward the modernization of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea would be met. However, at this time, there were many difficulties with respect to Congressional attitudes on the whole subject of military aid and foreign assistance. Nevertheless, Korea had many friends within the United States legislature and momentary difficulties should not be overplayed. In any event, as the President of the United States, he intended to do everything possible to insure that American commitments for the modernization of the Korean armed forces were met.
Foreign Minister Kim then stated that as a result of the stepped up fighting in South Vietnam, his government had expressed concern about the security of their 50,000-man contingent. He noted that earlier his government had considered a more expedited withdrawal of their forces, but that as a result of an urgent request from their South Vietnamese friends they had limited this withdrawal to one marine [Page 341] brigade of roughly 10,000 men. Now that the fighting was stepped up there was concern about the security of the remaining forces. There was special concern because the Korean Government believed that it was essential that Korean forces have the same level of support which they were accustomed to receiving when United States force levels in Vietnam were higher. Now, as U.S. forces were withdrawn, the provision of helicopters and similar support was in jeopardy. Consequently, they were conducting intense discussions with General Abrams to insure adequate support was provided.
President Nixon replied that the United States recognized that the enemy’s flagrant violation of the DMZ and their massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam represented the ultimate challenge to all of the non-Communist nations in Asia. If the North Vietnamese, with their sophisticated weaponry provided by the Soviet Union and China, were to succeed, then certainly the threat would be greatly increased for the Republic of Korea itself. More importantly, Moscow would be encouraged to continue this kind of proxy aggression. Therefore, it was incumbent upon all to take the battle to the enemy in South Vietnam and to achieve an important victory as a result of the recent enemy action. The United States for its part had more than doubled its air activity in the theater and intended to apply air power relentlessly to destroy as many of the enemy as possible. He noted that the Korean forces had now moved out on some of South Vietnam’s highways and were intensifying their operation. This was a period when all free nations involved in the conflict must move aggressively to defeat the North Vietnamese invasion. He personally was dedicated to doing all that was necessary.
Foreign Minister Kim observed that Korea, of course, was always subject to criticism, especially since U.S. forces were withdrawing and Korean forces remained. President Nixon stated that he would insure maximum U.S. support was garnered for Korea’s participation in the defense of South Vietnam. In the United Nations, Ambassador Bush would do everything possible to register U.S. support for Korea’s help to South Vietnam. In the Congress, Korea has many friends and we would influence them also to maintain support for Korea.
Foreign Minister Kim then commented that the Republic of Korea had been in touch through the Red Cross on the humanitarian problem existing between North and South Korea. They had consciously adopted a program which would deal first through the Red Cross on the humanitarian issues and then if the talks were successful shift to more sensitive political issues. President Nixon noted that this was a matter for the Republic of Korea. The United States, of course, welcomed any progress that might be made between North and South Korea, but it was not an issue that the United States would attempt to [Page 342] manipulate as a third party. We welcomed improving relations if this was possible but we expected the Government of South Korea to be the ultimate judge of the degree to which the dialogue should be carried on.
Foreign Minister Kim then expressed the wish of President Park that President Nixon would have an opportunity to visit Korea soon. President Nixon answered that he intended to make such a visit because he had many Korean friends and he had long been close to many of Korea’s American friends here in the United States. Nevertheless, because this was an election year, it would be impossible for him to undertake any more foreign travel after the visits associated with the Soviet Summit were concluded. Nevertheless, he would hold a subsequent visit to Korea high on his agenda. Foreign Minister Kim said that he would convey this message to President Park and wished to emphasize again as President Park had done in his letter to the President, that the Republic of Korea was fully behind and supported the President’s visit to the Soviet Union and wished President Nixon every success in this endeavor.
The Foreign Minister commented that his discussion with Secretary Rogers had been fruitful and that he had enjoyed a game of golf the previous Sunday at Burning Tree Country Club. President Nixon asked about President Park’s golf game and Ambassador Dong Jo Kim noted that President Park is an excellent golfer. President Nixon presented to the Foreign Minister a dozen golf balls with the Presidential seal and asked the Foreign Minister to again express his full support to President Park, as well as his regrets that an election year would preclude a visit to Korea in the short term.
The Meeting adjourned at 12:03 p.m.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, January–December 1972. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- The text of the “Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of China,” commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 203.↩
- A memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Kim on April 26 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S.↩