135. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1
SUBJECT
- Vietnam
PARTICIPATION
- Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
- State
- U. Alexis Johnson
- William Sullivan
- DOD
- Kenneth Rush
- G. Warren Nutter
- Rear Adm. William Flanagan
- JCS
- Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
- CIA
- Richard Helms
- George Carver
- William Newton (stayed only for Mr. Helms’ briefing)
- NSC Staff
- Major Gen. Alexander M. Haig
- Richard T. Kennedy
- John Negroponte
- Mark Wandler
Summary of Conclusions
It was agreed that:
- —State and Defense will draft a letter from the President to President Park of Korea, urging more ROK activity in MR 2.2
- —Admiral Moorer will check on the report that North Vietnamese troops machine-gunned refugees south of the Dak To area.
- —We will reassess our PR position tomorrow, in the light of the President’s speech tonight.
- —The State, Defense and CIA papers on a cease-fire will be discussed at Friday’s meeting.
Gen. Haig: Henry is doing some speech writing, so he asked me to start the meeting for him. He should be down here fairly soon. (to Mr. Helms) Dick, can we have your briefing?
[Page 337]Mr. Helms: [Reads his briefing]3
Mr. Johnson: What’s happening to the ARVN forces around Kontum?
Adm. Moorer: Three Ranger battalions are being airlifted out of Ben Het, and the ARVN forces are concentrating at FSB Metro.
Mr. Johnson: Is the 22nd Division getting back together?
Adm. Moorer: Yes. About 1,500 men from the division will be reformed, and the remaining elements of the division are continuing their movement to Vo Dinh. The 47th Regiment is being reorganized south of Pleiku, and it will probably move up. This is rugged country, from the air support point of view. In this connection, I want to mention that the ROKs have gained the high ground at the An Khe pass. They report killing 238 of the enemy. We have a message in from General Michaelis [U.S. Commander in Korea],4 saying that the Koreans want to make sure we have an evacuation plan prepared, in case their positions are overrun by the North Vietnamese.
Mr. Johnson: That’s not new. They asked us some time ago to prepare this evacuation plan.
Adm. Moorer: This message came in before the recent action at the An Khe pass, too. The Koreans have made a big contribution to the effort to open up Highway 19.
Mr. Johnson: Is the Highway open now?
Adm. Moorer: No. But it will be open fairly soon. At the same time, the Koreans are nervous about their positions. And that’s why they want the evacuation plan to be ready.
Mr. Sullivan: If I recall correctly, the evacuation plan was a basic part of the bargain we made with them to retain the two divisions in Vietnam. We agreed to draw up the plan.
Mr. Negroponte: Yes, but it was to be used when there was an emergency in Korea, not in Vietnam.
Mr. Sullivan: You mean it is a plan to return them to Korea, if they are needed there?
Mr. Negroponte: Yes.
Gen. Haig: As long as this question has come up, let me discuss something that Henry was certainly going to talk about. When the President sees the Korean Foreign Minister this morning, he will ask the Foreign Minister to inform Park of our hope that the Korean forces become more [Page 338] actively engaged in II Corps. Since the President is going to do this, isn’t it a good idea for the President to send a message today to Park? The message could inform Park of the augmentation measures we have taken and of our determination to do what is necessary in Vietnam. The message would also ask Park to coordinate with the JGS and Abrams, with a view towards taking decisive action in this critical situation.
Adm. Moorer: We should mention the latest action at the An Khe pass, too.
Gen. Haig: We know that Abe [Abrams] doesn’t like to use the ROKs. We are past the point, though, where we can ignore them. The Koreans must get out of their enclaves and take over some of the activity in their portion of II Corps.
Mr. Rush: They’ve been guilty of some atrocities, you know. That’s one reason Abe doesn’t want to use them.
Gen. Haig: I understand that. We don’t want to push Abe into a situation he won’t be able to handle. Still, we should get some action out of the ROKs.
Adm. Moorer: I can’t understand why Abrams doesn’t want to use them to help open up Highway 19. They can work on opening the road, especially in the area north of the road. In other words, they just have to expand their area of operations a little more.
We originally had the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the area north of Kontum. When the brigade was pulled out, part of the 22nd ARVN Division went in there. Then the old 3rd NVA Division—which we estimate to be the worst of the NVA units—moved down there. The enemy has been roughing up the countryside and blocking Highway 1. Now it would be good if the Koreans could just work their area, without really going very far.
Mr. Johnson: (to Gen. Haig) You think we should just make a general exhortation to Park in the letter from the President?
Gen. Haig: Yes.
Mr. Sullivan: We should recognize that a letter from the President to Park will undoubtedly result in a Korean request for something which will cost money. Do we want to get into that kind of a situation?
Mr. Rush: What would the Koreans ask for?
Mr. Johnson: We’re negotiating with them now in several areas.
Mr. Sullivan: They’ve already said they need $18 million just to move out of the enclaves.
Mr. Rush: We don’t want them to move to another area. We just want them to make their area safe.
[Page 339]Gen. Haig: Let’s get a draft today of a joint State/DOD message. We don’t want a bill of particulars, just a general plea to get the job done.
Mr. Rush: We can start out by congratulating them on the job at the An Khe pass.
Mr. Johnson: Obviously.
Adm. Moorer: We should tell them it would be very helpful if they could work on the reopening of Highway 19 and in the area north of Qui Nhon.
Mr. Johnson: (to Adm. Moorer) We’ll get to work on the message. I assume you will get something out to Abrams.
Adm. Moorer: Yes, but I need to see the message to Park first.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.↩
- Telegram 73671 to Seoul, April 28, transmitted Nixon’s message to Park. Nixon requested that “in this critical and perhaps decisive phase, if your two divisions were to expand their current area of operations it would provide a significant additional contribution.” He continued: “If you agree that this suggestion has merit, I would ask that your field commander in South Vietnam consult with General Vien and General Abrams at the earliest possible moment to explore ways in which your forces may be deployed in the most effective manner with a view to ensuring that Hanoi’s offensive is decisively thrown back.” (Ibid., Box 757, Presidential Correspondence File 1969–1974, Korea, President Chung Hee Park, 1972)↩
- Brackets are in the original.↩
- Brackets are in the original.↩