Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

131. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 31, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Korean Forces in South Vietnam

NSDM 113 of June 23, 1971,² promulgated your decision that the U.S. would support the presence of two ROK divisions in South Vietnam through CY 1972 and would review the question of their retention beyond 1972 after the current dry season. In an aide mémoire of February 4, 1972,³ the ROKs stated that they would begin to withdraw their two divisions from SVN in May 1972 unless they receive adequate U.S. assurances of support in six specified areas. In a March 15 conversation with General Michaelis, the ROK Minister of National Defense pressed for the U.S. assurances sought in their February 4 note but dropped the two requirements which were proving most difficult for us (retention of two U.S. infantry brigades in SVN and provision of increased helicopter support).

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee has sent you a memorandum (at Tab B)⁴ incorporating an interagency study of how we might react to the ROK request. The study’s comments upon the four remaining ROK desiderata are:

• —Adequate air support will not be a problem.
• —Logistic support. Our capability to provide logistic support from U.S. facilities will diminish once our force level drops below 30,000 until at 15,000 no U.S. support could be provided without a special U.S. personnel increment of about 1,700 men for this purpose. Currently about 5,000 U.S. personnel provide logistics and aviation support for the ROKs. However, CINCPAC and MACV have developed an alternative plan involving a combination of RVNAF, contractor, and offshore support for the ROKs which would reduce the requirement for U.S. personnel to 1,733. Informally both the RVNAF and ROKFV have agreed to this arrangement.
• —Provision of materials to support construction for redisposition of ROKFV. No details have been specified. Previous experience indicates this could be quite costly. Although there are no plans at present for redisposition of ROK forces within South Vietnam and such redisposition appears unlikely.
• —Plans for emergency airlift of the ROKFV to Korea. Planning would be no problem, but we would not wish to commit our airlift to this role regardless of conditions and other priorities.

The Under Secretaries Committee memorandum suggests two alternatives for retaining the two ROK divisions:

1. A brief meeting between you and Park in which you could assure him we will do everything possible to retain the U.S. Second Division in Korea through FY 1974. However, Secretary Laird does not believe we should make that committment at this time (Tab C),⁵ and I agree. Also, another summit meeting before your Moscow trip is impractical, and in any event such a meeting would result in requests for similar visits by other Asian leaders.

2. Inform Park we will do everything we can to make up the FY 1972 modernization shortfall and that cash and credit sales toward the objectives of the program will not be counted against the $1.5 billion total. (Secretary Laird believes that the primary ROK concern is the modernization program.)

The February 4 ROK aide mémoire did not raise these subjects, and I do not believe that we should, at least in this context.

A significant factor not mentioned in the study is that the ROKs derive substantial foreign exchange benefits from their forces in SVN; approximately $190 million in FY 1970 and $120 million in 1971. At the present the ROKG is facing severe financial problems and is quite aware of the monetary advantages of retaining its forces in SVN. I agree with the study that the ROKs are concerned with their worldwide image and with the security of their forces in SVN, but I also believe they actually prefer to have their troops stay, if their security concerns can be met.

Defense has informally expressed a strong belief that the GVN and ROKG should negotiate the matter between themselves, and to some extent this is appropriate. On the other hand, we are also directly involved and must participate.

I believe that we should negotiate with the ROKs for the retention of the two Korean divisions in South Vietnam through the end of the 1972–73 dry season on the basis of their remaining specific requests for support of their forces in South Vietnam, namely:

• —a reassurance of adequate air support within overall priorities as in the past;
• —the alternative logistics support system developed by CINCPAC/COMUSMACV;
• —provision of construction materials within the capability of our diminishing force and with the understanding that no major projects will be undertaken in view of the fact that ROK forces will eventually be withdrawn from SVN in any event; and
• —plans for an evacuation airlift for the ROKFV with the proviso that should an emergency arise we and the ROKG will consult regarding priorities for airlift assets.

In addition, we should, in the course of these negotiations, assure the Koreans that there is no danger of our withdrawing all our troops from South Vietnam before they do.

The NSDM at Tab A⁶ incorporates the above recommendations.

Recommendation

That you approve the NSDM at Tab A.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 161. Top Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it.
2. Document 96.
3. See Document 124.
4. Attached; printed as Document 128.
5. Attached; printed as Document 129.
6. Attached; printed as Document 132.
7. Nixon initialed his approval.