128. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Republic of Korea Forces in South Viet-Nam
This memorandum is in response to your request as transmitted in Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum of February 16, 1972,2 for a review of negotiations on the retention of ROK forces in Viet-Nam and the courses of action open to us to maximize the ROK presence. A detailed study is attached as an appendix.3
The ROKG has asked for military and political assurances regarding its forces in Viet-Nam if it is to keep two divisions there through CY 1972.
We think we can provide acceptable military assurances, although not in the exact terms requested, based on current support levels until U.S. forces reach the 30,000 man level. After that the U.S. capability will begin to decrease. At the 15,000 man level it will not be possible to support ROK forces unless additional U.S. personnel are retained in Viet-Nam specifically for that purpose (our best estimate is 1,735 men).
Following is an analysis of the ROKG security requests:
- 1.
- Retain two U.S. brigades in Viet-Nam while ROK forces are there. This will be difficult to meet under the 69,000 man U.S. force level programmed for May 1. It might be possible to retain one U.S. brigade at the 35,000 man level but not at any lower level.
- 2.
- Air Support. Not a problem.
- 3.
- Helicopters. The issue is AHCs. We currently provide two companies and could provide a third after May 1. The ROKG has asked for four but the current level of activity of its forces does not justify this.
- 4.
- Logistic support from U.S. sources. Current plans are for a combined U.S., RVNAF, contractor support program which we think the ROKG will accept.
- 5.
- Relocation of ROK bases and support facilities. It can be done. Since we do not know what the ROKG has in mind, it is not possible to set a price tag but it would be costly.
- 6.
- Emergency airlift of ROK forces to Korea if the security situation warrants. Planning is no problem but the assets cannot be committed at this time.
We believe the ROKG will compromise on its requests for assurances. Its principal concern is U.S. assurance of support at home and we have had hints President Park wants something along these lines. There are two alternatives:
- 1.
-
Negotiate for the two divisions with one of
the following proposals:
- a.
- A brief meeting between you and Park, and an assurance we will do everything possible to retain the U.S. Second Division in Korea through FY 1974 (OSD does not believe we should make a commitment on U.S. force levels at this time).
- b.
- Inform Park we will do everything possible to make up the FY 1972 modernization shortfall and that cash and credit sales which go to meet agreed objectives of the program would not result in a proportional diminution of the total $1.5 billion modernization package. While this inducement would be less attractive to Park than the first, the five-year (FY 71–75) military modernization program is a priority ROKG security objective. The Congressional cutback in MAP appropriations this year caused a 40% reduction in planned funding for this important program. Should Congress fail to provide the MAP levels required for ROK military modernization, Korea’s progress toward defense self-sufficiency would be retarded. It might then be necessary to extend this program beyond FY 75.
- 2.
- Negotiate for less than a two division force. This might be satisfactory if the ROKG price is too high or if an assessment of the military situation warrants.
A third alternative outside the scope of this paper is not to oppose the commencement of ROKG troop withdrawals on June 1 as currently planned.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 161. Top Secret.↩
- Document 126.↩
- An undated appendix entitled “Republic of Korea Forces in South Viet-Nam” is attached but not printed.↩