Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, March 2, 1972, 0743Z.

1224. Subj: Post China Trip—Meeting of Assistant Secretary with ROK FonMin. Summary: In three hour meeting March 1 FonMin and Assistant Secretary Green reviewed at length visit to China, communiquè,² and effect of these not only on Korea but on general situation in East Asia including Japan, Taiwan, Viet-Nam, and USSR.

1. In opening general remarks Asst Secy described the visit to China with presentation essentially same as that made to FonMin Fukuda reported from Tokyo.

2. A. Korea. Predictably, FonMin was mainly concerned with the visit and the communiqué in relation to Korea. He wanted to know at what level subject had been discussed, whether China or U.S. introduced subject, with what intensity Chinese pursued their points on Korea, whether reasons were given by Chinese for supporting North Korea’s Eight Points on Reunification, and whether Chinese had mentioned four-point peace pact proposal of Kim Il Sung Yomiuri interview.³

B. Asst Secy Green and Holdridge replied in general terms explaining that each side expressed its points of view as the talks proceeded, China having first introduced its point of view on Korea. They noted that discussion on Korea was relatively brief, was, as other subjects taken up, in broad generalities and essentially along lines set forth in the communiqué. Brief discussions had not given any new insights on Korean question. Green said he thought PRC felt compelled to touch upon Korea and North Viet-Nam in conventional terms but not beyond conventional terms because of ties with North Korea and North Vietnam, and as a means of preventing USSR exploitation of Chinese failure to show support for its friends. Four-point peace pact proposal set forth in Yomiuri interview was not mentioned in China.

3. Korea and U.S. Forces. A. FonMin said ROKG attaches significance to Chinese failure specifically to demand withdrawal of U.S. from Korea in communiqué while calling for abolition of UNCURK. He asked whether Chinese expressed objection to presence our forces here, at one point indicating belief that Chinese perhaps had no objection to that presence.

B. Green said this was interesting point but felt it should not be over-emphasized without further analysis. Holdridge noted that in another section of communiqué Chinese declared as a general principle that “all foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own country.”

C. Green said that one of most important long-range effects of visit to China will be that Chinese now have opportunity to develop better understanding of U.S. purposes and policies in Asia. As Chinese cope with their difficulties with USSR, they can through dialogue with U.S. come to understand that U.S. policy in Asia is not antagonistic to PRC. This affords opportunity for example for Chinese to understand better U.S. policy with respect to ROK, and that helps ROK.

4. Chinese View of Korea. A. FonMin inquired how much emphasis Chinese put on reunification and whether they seemed to consider ROK hostile. Did Asst Secy believe that Chinese would support an NK adventure against South, or would they check North Korea?

B. Green and Holdridge replied that as previously indicated discussion was brief, general, and about as set forth in communiqué. Asst Secy said that without having gained any special or new impressions on these matters during week in China, he had personally felt for some time that North Korea was more adventurous than Chinese and that latter, having a strong memory of heavy losses and bitter experience in Korean war, wanted no repetition of conflict in Korea.

5. Taiwan. A. FonMin said that in communiqué U.S. described Taiwan as part of China. Green and Holdridge corrected this pointing to very careful language with which U.S. acknowledges and does not challenge that both Taipei and Peking consider Taiwan part of China. This did not mean that we accepted Taiwan as part of China, but rather that we wished to avoid involving ourselves in the legal technicalities. FonMin said that Koreans nevertheless understand that U.S. has changed its policy vis-à-vis Taiwan.

B. Asst Secy and Holdridge emphasized that U.S. has not changed its policy. Green went on to express view that Chinese displayed some tolerance in the position taken in the communiqué on Taiwan avoiding, for example, any attack on the U.S./GRC mutual defense treaty.

[Omitted here is discussion of Japan, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.]

Habib

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Taipei for Assistant Secretary Green’s party and to Tokyo.
2. President Nixon visited China February 21–28. Text of the joint communiqué issued at Shanghai on February 28 is in Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1972, pp. 435–438. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Documents 194–204.
3. For the North Korea’s Eight Points, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, p. 25040. For the Yomiuri interview, see Document 123.