Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

63. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 23, 1972, 1532Z.

Tohak 95/WH 29642. Reference paragraphs one and two of Hakto 53,² communications problems apparently persist. As I pointed out in Tohak 90,³ the President read your 41.⁴ I told him at the time that you did not favor going to Hanoi and I think he understood this completely. On the other hand, the presentation of the option was a source of some concern. This was a result of your own message, the effect of which I tried to soften, and not the result of my posturing the President in that direction.

Reference paragraphs three and four of Hakto 53, no one repeat no one here has been engaged in effort designed to shake President’s confidence. Facts are precisely the opposite. The President at no time has been rattled or disconcerted by your messages or by the objective situation. He is calm, confident and totally secure in all that you are doing. His views on the final leg have been evident to me and I think you from the outset. He was disturbed by the proposal in Hakto 41 that I make a commitment to Dobrynin yesterday afternoon. That resulted from reading your cable, not from any criticisms or inciting on my part—precisely the opposite. I told him yesterday morning when he read 41 that I was sure that you had no intention of going that far and called him immediately when I received subsequent messages and informed him that that proposal had been modified along the lines of the course we are now pursuing. You must understand that there is no carping or nitpicking going on here, merely an effort by me to outline considerations and reaction to messages which you send which you may or may not have had an opportunity to consider. To do less would be a distinct disservice to you and, more importantly, to the country.

Reference paragraph five of Hakto 53, I agree course outlined in Tohak 85⁵ has many risks and may not be manageable. It is merely an alternate approach which should be explored along with many others.

Reference paragraph six of Hakto 53, I met with President prior to his departure for New York and outlined your current thinking which, as I have reiterated earlier, corresponds to his own and indeed to mine. I know of no instance when your views may not have been presented to him in a balanced way. The only minor complication since you departed was that generated by Hakto 41. That subsided immediately as a result of your subsequent messages. You can be sure I never rush to the President when due to communications breakdowns or substantive disagreements such action might support my views. We have indeed come a long way but we have not gotten that way through rubber stamp support from me. I have never operated this way in the past and do not intend to do so as long as you delegate the responsibilities to me which you have. Do not misinterpret efforts to support you as efforts to hector you.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip Tohak, October 16–23, 1972 (1 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Lord. Kissinger was en route to Washington.
2. Document 61.
3. Document 57.
4. Document 43.
5. Document 53.